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THE DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES IN THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT 
MARKET (AIM) 
 ABSTRACT 
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM), a junior market for small and medium sized 
companies with relaxed admission rules, reduced regulation and great variety of corporate 
governance practices, provides a unique opportunity to examine audit market issues for small 
and medium sized companies and to ascertain whether corporate governance factors 
especially audit committee characteristics influence audit pricing.  This study seeks to address 
this gap by investigating the determinants of audit fees for a large sample of companies listed 
on AIM during the 2009/2010 financial year.  The findings from the multivariate analysis show 
that audit fees for AIM companies are positively influenced by audit client size,  audit client 
complexity and audit risk, London auditor, the audit report lag time, the auditing process 
happening in the busy season, and the joint provision of non-audit services.  Moreover, the 
study documents that auditor size is a key determinant of audit fees on AIM, with Big 4 
auditors charging a fee premium and smaller auditors charging significantly lower fees.  The 
findings also show that Grant Thornton, the market auditor specialist, charges significantly 
lower fees compared with its competitors.  The findings of this study also indicate that audit 
committee size shows no significant impact on audit fees; the presence of an executive 
director on the audit committee has a significant and negative impact on audit fees, which is 
consistent with the notion that a lack of independence serves to reduce the extent of audit 
intensity, resulting in a lower audit fee; and the audit committees with greater financial 
expertise especially members having accounting and auditing related expertise or even 
qualification as chartered accountants has a positive influence on audit fees, which is 
consistent with greater expertise enhancing the communication and understanding of 
external audits and ensuring that audits are comprehensive, resulting in more audit effort.  
Therefore, the findings provide insights into the audit market for smaller companies and offer 
practitioners and policy makers with a better understanding of the impact of corporate 
governance practices especially audit committee effectiveness on audit pricing strategy.  
Key words: AIM; Audit fee; Big 4; Auditor specialist; Governance; Audit committee  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.0   Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis.  The first section briefly discusses the 
development of audit pricing research in publicly-owned private companies.  Section two 
outlines the motivation for the study, with a discussion of the unique characteristics of the 
AIM companies and the special platform AIM could contribute to the audit pricing research.  
This section also discusses the main aim of the study, the specific research objective to be 
addressed and the research questions to be answered.  The third section explains the 
contribution made by this research to our understanding of the determinants of audit pricing 
and the audit market; while section four briefly introduces the research methodology used in 
the study, including an explanation of the sample selection process and the key factors used 
in the empirical analyses.  The chapter concludes with an overview of the structure of this 
research thesis.  
1.1 Audit Pricing Research 
Audit pricing research began with the paper by Simunic (1980), in which he attempted to test 
the competitiveness of the audit industry using audit fees, and established the original model 
of the determinants of audit fees.  The cornerstone of the audit fee model is the expectation 
that audit fees are charged based on the amount of time and effort needed and the unit 
pricing for the external audit service.  The quantity of auditing needed by audit clients is based 
on the company’s consideration of private benefits and costs derived from the audit services.  
The nature of the benefit for audit clients is avoidance of liability from the financial statement 
users; meanwhile, such liability also represents the potential cost to the auditors.  Simunic’s 
(1980) model recognises the essential interdependence between the economic interests of 
audit client and auditor.  This points to the main purposes of studying the determinants of 
audit pricing: first, to evaluate competitiveness in the audit industry; and second, to examine 
issues of contracting and independence related to the audit process (Hay et al., 2006).  The 
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basic assumption of Simunic’s (1980) audit pricing model is that both auditors and audit clients 
seek to maximize the expected profit for their own entities; therefore, both parties could 
benefit from the research and findings in this area.  For audit clients, the knowledge of 
determinants of audit pricing could help them improve internal control and management and 
increase negotiation power on audit fees (Al-Harshani, 2008); while for auditors, this 
knowledge will help them make decisions on pricing for audit services (Gist, 1992).  As noted 
by Low et al. (1990), the importance of a proper audit pricing model is “its objectivity and 
relevance to the audit function” (p.292), which reflects the audit effort and the risks involved 
in the audit process.  Hence audit pricing research provides both auditors and audit clients 
with an objective benchmark for negotiation.   
In their meta-analysis on audit pricing research, Hay et al. (2006) found that a common 
methodology, developed based on Simunic’s (1980) model, has been employed by over 100 
published journal articles to examine the determinants of audit fees.  Over the past thirty 
years, the original model has been expanded and verified by numerous studies, with the 
addition of new variables.  It has been widely employed not only in Anglo-Saxon countries but 
also in other parts of the world, including India (Simon et al., 1986; Ahmed and Goyal 2005), 
Singapore (Low et al. 1990), Hong Kong (Simon et al., 1992), Malaysia (Simon et al., 1992), 
South Africa (Simon, 1995), Bangladesh (Waresul Karim and Moizer, 1996), Japan (Taylor, 
1997), The Netherlands (Langendijk, 1997), Norway (Firth, 1997), Pakistan (Simon and Taylor, 
1997), South Korea (Taylor et al., 1999), Finland (Niemi, 2002), Nigeria (Taylor and Simon, 
2003), Indonesia (Basioudis and Fifi, 2004), Italy (Cameran, 2005), Kuwait (Al-Harshani, 2008), 
Belgium (Caneghem, 2010) and China (Liu and Subramaniam, 2013).       
The existing literature focuses predominantly on audit pricing in the context of large listed 
companies, with a number of factors emerging as having a reasonably consistent impact on 
fees (Hay et al., 2006).  First, a number of audit client characteristics have consistently been 
found to influence audit fees.  These include size, complexity, risk, profitability, and leverage.  
Second, prior research has also reported a number of auditor characteristics to be significant 
in the audit pricing decision, for example whether the auditor is one of the Big 4 audit firms, 
the length of the auditor’s tenure, the auditor’s market share, and, in the case of UK-based 
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research, whether the auditor is based in London.  Third, a number of audit engagement 
attributes, such as audit timing, the length of time between the financial year-end and the 
signing of the audit report, as well as the presence of an audit qualification, typically emerge 
as important influences on the audit fee.  Fourth, prior research has also focused on the 
impact of the joint provision of non-audit services on audit fees, with reasonably consistent 
evidence that the value of non-audit services purchased from the audit firm exerts a positive 
impact on the audit fee.  Finally, more recently, an emerging strand of research has begun to 
investigate issues of internal governance and how this influences auditors’ pricing decisions.  
Much of this research looks at board characteristics, with a particular recent focus on how 
audit committee characteristics impact on audit fees.  Board independence (number of 
independent directors on the board), CEO/Chairman duality, diligence and expertise are the 
most common factors that have been studied in this context, with each characteristic 
apparently exerting a positive influence (e.g. O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002).  The most 
frequently studied characteristics of audit committees include size, independence, diligence 
(number of meetings), and expertise, with most studies showing a positive association with 
audit fees (e.g. Abbott et al., 2003a; Abbott et al., 2003b; Goodwin-Stewait and Kent, 2006; 
Zaman et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2013).  In the UK, prior research has also sought to investigate 
the determinants of audit fees in different contexts.  This includes studies comparing the 
determinants of audit fees in private versus listed companies (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007), as 
well as a growing strand of research seeking to understand the determinants of audit fees in 
various sections of the public and non-profit sectors, such as Charities, Trusts, and Universities 
(e.g. Beattie et al., 2001; Clatworthy et al., 2002; Basioudis and Ellwood, 2005; Mellett et al., 
2007; Xue and O’Sullivan, 2013). 
1.2 Motivation for Study and Research Objectives 
Since Simunic’s (1980) seminal paper a significant literature has grown up seeking to explain 
the determinants of audit fees.  The existing studies mainly focus on discovering the influential 
factors of audit pricing in large listed companies, and found out a series of factors with 
reasonably consistent impact on audit fees (Hay et al., 2006).  In recent studies, the audit 
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pricing research has expanded from the US and UK to other countries, but it is still focused 
mainly on the larger and/or publicly-traded audit clients.  To date, the audit pricing research is 
facing substantial issues such as Big 4 domination, lack of audit choice for listed companies, 
and similar internal governance practices among large companies.  The situation of most 
markets being studied with high auditor concentration and high homogeneity in terms 
internal governance makes it difficult to study the actual influence of auditor characteristics 
(such as auditor size and auditor choice) and governance characteristics on audit pricing.  
Hence this research aims to examine what happens to audit pricing when a company is in a 
less concentrated market with more choice of auditors, and when companies in the market 
could have diversified board structure and audit committee characteristics.  Moreover, there 
is not sufficient research or knowledge about the factors that influence audit fees in the listed 
small and medium sized companies (SMEs).  In 2014, there were 5.2 million SMEs in the UK, 
which accounted for over 99 per cent of all businesses in number; and according to the 
estimation of the European Commission’s SME Performance Review, these companies 
brought 49.8 per cent Gross Value Added1 to the UK economy (Ward and Rhodes, 2014).    The 
small and mid-sized companies provide job opportunities for nearly 4.6 million people which 
representing approximately 17 per cent of private sector employment in the UK (QCA, 2015), 
which indicate that small and mid-sized companies have great value to the UK economy.   
In 1995, in order to provide a market for small and medium sized companies that need capital 
to grow and expand, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) was established.  This provides 
a platform for these companies to raise new capital, to allow their shares to be traded widely, 
and to allow owner/managers to liquidate some of their shareholding.  Therefore, as a 
secondary market dominated by small and medium sized companies, AIM provides a great 
opportunity to examine the audit pricing in the small audit client market.  Moreover, as a 
secondary market, AIM has unique features which have allowed it to survive several economic 
collapses over the past twenty years, and even to expand.  The more relaxed admission rules 
                                                          
1 Gross Value Added (GVA) measures “the contribution to the economy of each individual producer, industry or 
sector in the United Kingdom”, and is used in the estimation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Office for 
National Statistics, 2015). 
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and reduced levels of regulation have proved attractive, not only for UK companies but also 
for overseas companies wishing to obtain a stock market listing in the UK.  A recent AIM 
Statistics Report indicates that there are over 1,000 companies listed on AIM (London Stock 
Exchange, 2015), so it represents a very significant part of the UK quoted company sector.   
As indicated in the Oxera report (2006), Big 4 has dominated the audit services of FTSE 350 
firms and the auditor switching rate is very low in the audit market.  The competitive tendering 
in the UK audit market does not occur frequently, and the high concentration has led to higher 
audit fees.  On the contrary, AIM companies show great diversity in terms of auditor choice, 
which offers a great opportunity for further understanding of the audit market through audit 
pricing, and investigates how to increase audit market competitiveness and audit choice 
effectiveness and how to help mid-tier and small auditors to expand their market share.  
As a separate entity from the main market of the London Stock Exchange, AIM has its own 
regulatory regime, including the unique Nominated Adviser system, and a less prescriptive 
corporate governance structure, which means that AIM companies have greater flexibility to 
choose corporate governance practices based on their own nature and experience.  Previous 
research on AIM focuses on governance characteristics, financial report disclosure, market 
regulations and the IPO process (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 1998, 2008, 2009, 2012; Mendoza, 2008; 
Espenlaub et al., 2012).  However, despite the growing importance of AIM companies, and an 
increasing number of studies exploring how internal governance influences auditors’ pricing 
decisions, relatively little academic attention has focused on this issue in this market.   The 
great flexibility of AIM companies’ corporate governance practices and the special regulatory 
regime of the market also makes it possible to investigate the relationship between board 
structure, audit committee effectiveness and external auditing, which is quite difficult in the 
main market.  Moreover when considering audit fees as an indirect measure of audit quality, 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance characteristics, especially the 
audit committee characteristics, and audit fees in AIM companies would provide evidence on 
the effectiveness of governance practices with regard to audit quality.   
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Therefore, the objective of this research is to extend our understanding of the determinants 
of audit pricing by undertaking a study of companies listed on the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM).  To achieve the desired objective, this study will investigate the following 
research questions: 
1) Do audit client characteristics (size, complexity, risk) influence the audit fees of AIM 
companies? 
2) Do auditor characteristics (auditor size, specialism, location, tenure) influence the audit 
fees of AIM companies? 
3) Do engagement characteristics (report lag, busy season, audit opinion, joint provision of 
non-audit services) influence the audit fees of AIM companies? 
4) Do internal governance issues (board characteristics, ownership structure, Nominated 
Adviser) influence the audit fees of AIM companies? 
5) Do audit committee characteristics (size, independence, expertise) influence the audit 
fees of AIM companies?   
 
1.3 Contribution of Study 
This study addresses the research gaps of audit pricing studies by investigating companies in 
a less concentrated audit market, with more auditor choices, under less stringent admission 
rules and different external regulatory regime, and more diversity of internal governance 
structure such as board and audit committee, and makes a number of key contributions to 
the literature on audit pricing.   It helps to gain further understanding on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) and the characteristics of the small and medium sized listed 
companies on the market.  It also provides evidence for regulatory authorities as well as and 
some policy implications for suggestions on possible solutions for auditor selection and 
concentration issues and governance practice in the Alternative Investment Market.  
First, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a relatively new market, and little research 
has been focused on AIM companies, especially in the context of auditing.  Examining the 
determinants of audit fees for AIM companies not only provides an opportunity to understand 
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more about AIM and its participants, but also allows us to investigate some of the traditional 
determinants of audit pricing in fully-listed companies in a less regulated and potentially more 
entrepreneurial environment.  The scope of this study (i.e. the largest 500 companies listed 
on AIM in the 2009/2010 financial year) provides a valuable addition to the audit pricing 
literature by providing some conclusive evidence on the impact of influential factors on audit 
fees in small and medium sized companies where prior research findings have been very 
limited (Peel and Roberts, 2003).   
As AIM is a junior market, its listed companies have many unique characteristics compared 
with companies listed on the main market.  For example, AIM companies are often relatively 
young firms without a significant financial track record.  A significant number of companies 
list on AIM for the purpose of getting access to finance to enable them to pursue relatively 
high-risk ventures.  As shown in the AIM statistics, a large number of AIM companies are 
involved in the extraction of natural resources, and many are still waiting for revenue streams 
to materialize.  Consequently, some AIM companies may present a more significant and 
identifiable audit risk than more mature and long-established fully-listed companies.  
Therefore, this study makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the association 
between the various AIM-specific characteristics (e.g. higher audit risk) and audit fees.  To 
encourage companies to join the market and raise capital, AIM has kept its admission rules 
simple.  To eliminate investors’ concern, Nominated Advisers (NOMADs) were introduced by 
the London Stock Exchange as ‘gatekeepers’ to verify AIM companies’ financial health and 
test whether the companies are suited to an AIM listing (London Stock Exchange, 2010).  Every 
company listed on AIM is required to appoint an AIM-approved financial corporation as its 
Nominated Adviser.  In some cases, the Nominated Adviser also acts as the company’s broker.  
Since the Nominated Adviser system is unique to AIM and also central to its regulatory regime, 
its influence on corporate governance of AIM companies, and the impact of this on the 
relationship with external audit fees and audit quality still require detailed investigation.  This 
study seeks to establish the relationship between the Nominated Adviser characteristics and 
audit pricing, and provides some empirical evidence on the impact of Nominated Advisers on 
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AIM companies’ governance practices, which hopefully will help the regulators have better 
understanding of the benefits and drawbacks of this regulatory system.    
For many AIM companies, one of the main purposes of listing on the market is to raise new 
capital and attract investment, especially from large institutional investors.  Arcot et al. (2007) 
report that, compared with other markets such as NASDAQ in the US, AIM is an institution-
dominated market.  Based on agency theory, the separation of ownership and control could 
generate conflicts between shareholders’ and managers’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  For AIM companies with large blockholders, institutional investors are expected to play 
a significant role in monitoring.  Meanwhile, AIM companies and their advisers have to provide 
explanations to their investors not only about the nature of their business, but also about all 
the features of the company, including their corporate governance arrangements.  In this 
study, the researcher includes the measurement of blockholder ownership of AIM companies 
to investigate its influence on audit fees, which will further contribute to our understanding 
of agency theory and governance issues in AIM companies.   
In his pioneering audit pricing research, Simunic (1980) aimed to test the competitiveness of 
the audit industry using fee data. At that time the audit market was considered to be 
monopolized by the ‘Big 8’ firms.  Today, one of the on-going concerns of audit regulators is 
the high concentration of listed company audits in the hands of the Big 4 accounting firms 
(European Commission, 2011).  In a contemporary study of FTSE 350 firms, Ghafran and 
O’Sullivan (2012) show that during 2007-2010, 96 per cent of their sample firms were audited 
by a Big 4 auditor.  Due to the great concentration of the audit market for large listed 
companies, it is impossible to test for fee premium issues and auditor selection problems 
(McMeeking et al., 2006).  Since AIM companies are mainly small and medium sized, they 
show significantly richer variation in terms of auditor choice, with a large number of 
companies in the sample of this study using second tier auditors or local and regional auditing 
firms.  Hence, this study is important because it possesses sufficient variation to evaluate the 
competitiveness of the audit market, especially for smaller audit clients, and to revisit some 
audit market issues such as the Big 4 fee premium and auditor selection decisions, which has 
not been possible in the main market for some time.  The findings of this study will enhance 
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audit clients’ understanding of auditor’ pricing strategy and the audit market which could 
benefits them with auditor selection decision and better negotiation position in terms of audit 
price.  The findings would also provide evidences on the audit sub-market for small and 
medium-sized companies, and suggest the policy makers with advices and evidences on how 
to reduce auditor concentration and increase competition from the non-Big 4 accounting 
firms.  
Unlike fully-listed companies, AIM companies are not expected to abide by the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2010, 2012).  In 2009, the Corporate Governance 
Guidelines for Smaller Quoted Companies (Quoted Companies Alliance, 2009), also known as 
the QCA Guidelines, have been firstly introduced to provide guidance to the AIM companies 
and their advisers.  In the same year, the Quoted Companies Alliance2 also published the Audit 
Committee Guide for Smaller Quoted Companies (2009) to provide recommendations on the 
responsibilities and practices of audit committees to the AIM companies.  Although AIM 
companies are expected to comply with the best practice of corporate governance, they are 
still free to choose not to.  This is particularly important as, in the main market in the UK, 
although companies can choose not to comply with the Corporate Governance Code, they are 
still under pressure to explain why they choose not to, which to some extent pushes these 
fully-listed companies to tick the box simply to save costs.  In AIM, companies have no 
obligation to follow the recommendations provided in the QCA Guidelines, which gives them 
more freedom and flexibility to choose their governance practices.  It is interesting and 
important to investigate whether AIM companies choosing to follow the QCA Guidelines 
(2009) and Audit Committee Guide (2009) or not has impact on the external audit and 
financial reporting quality.  Therefore, this study investigates the impact of governance 
characteristics on audit fees in a largely unregulated environment.  As a result, the findings of 
this study are important in that they provide a rare insight into the various corporate 
governance practices chosen by the AIM companies themselves, and how these practices 
influence the external auditors’ pricing decision.  In particular, this study makes a significant 
                                                          
2 Quoted Companies Alliance is a non-profit independent membership organization aiming for the interest of 
small and mid-sized quoted companies.   
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contribution to our understanding of the relationship between the various audit committee 
characteristics and audit pricing in a less regulated environment, which provides evidence to 
policy makers for the encouragement of the regulatory recommendations.   This study also 
attempts to establish an appropriate measurement for the level of independence of audit 
committees under a less regulated environment.  The findings in relation to the independence 
of these directors are an important contribution, and unique in that the notion of weak 
independence in the audit committee is measured using the existence of executive directors, 
something that is specifically discouraged in fully-listed companies.  In this study the 
researcher measures the impact of finance expertise of audit committee members on audit 
fees using three different definitions of expertise: overall financial expertise of the audit 
committee (i.e. accounting expertise, finance expertise and supervisory expertise), audit 
committee members with recent accounting or auditing experience, and audit committee 
members qualified as chartered accountants.  The importance of such in-depth analysis 
presents a fuller picture as to the nature of governance and financial expertise that help 
constitute an effective audit committee.  This study provides evidence to assist the boards of 
directors in smaller listed companies in understanding the important characteristics of the 
board and audit committees that play a key role in the audit pricing and hence enhance the 
audit quality.  The findings of this study will provide policy implications and support for 
regulatory implementation in AIM and other markets and to refine the best governance 
practices that are suitable for small and medium sized quoted companies.       
1.4 Research Methodology 
In order to answer the research questions listed above, this study adopts a quantitative 
research method based on the secondary data published by AIM companies.  The study 
sample comprises companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market in the 2009/2010 
financial year with market capitalization over £10 million.  I chose this period because it is the 
first year after the QCA Guidelines published which provides AIM companies a guideline on 
corporate governance practices.  Moreover, it is after the recent financial crisis happened in 
2007 to 2008 which would reduce the impact of the crisis on the companies and audit market.  
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I exclude all investment trusts and all overseas companies due to the differences in their 
financial reporting requirements.  The sample also excludes those companies that were 
admitted to AIM in 2010, because they could not provide complete financial reports for the 
2009/2010 financial year.  The final sample used in this study includes 477 companies which 
covers majority of the UK companies listed on the market, hence the results are very 
generalizable.  In 2013, the QCA published a new version of the Guidelines while the contents 
are almost the same, and the regulations in AIM remain almost the same, which make it 
reasonable to believe that the characteristics of companies and the market have little change 
afterwards.  The data used in the study is collected mainly from the companies’ annual reports, 
which are either obtained directly from the companies’ websites, or accessed through the 
FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) database.  The dataset of this study is very 
comprehensive and detailed with great coverage on the potential influential factors on the 
audit pricing including companies’ financial information, auditor information, audit 
engagement information, and internal and external governance of the AIM companies.  All 
the data used in this study is manually collected: the financial statements data is collected 
from the companies’ annual reports; the auditor data, engagement data and audit fee data 
are collected from the Report of the Independent Auditors; the board variables data, 
ownership structure data, Nominated Adviser data, and audit committee variables data are 
collected from the companies’ Corporate Governance Reports.   Due to the relaxed disclosure 
requirements for the AIM companies, some data is difficult to obtain from the annual reports 
as it is not fully disclosed; therefore, alternative sources such as the FAME database, the Stock 
Exchange Yearbook and the Corporate Register are also included in the data collection process 
to help ensure completeness and consistency of the data.   
This research tests the suitability of the traditional audit pricing model established mainly 
from literature on fully-listed companies, for AIM companies, which are dominated by small 
and medium sized firms.  It also introduces new factors and variables that are unique to AIM 
companies in seeking to expand the audit pricing model as it applies to AIM companies.  In 
addition to testing and expanding the model, this study uses new measures to quantify the 
joint provision of non-audit services and tests its influence on audit pricing.  This research also 
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introduces new measures of audit committee size, independence and financial expertise.  
Furthermore, this study explores the influence of various corporate governance practices on 
audit fees by examining the impact of board characteristics, ownership structure, Nominated 
Advisers, and audit committee characteristics in AIM companies.  It also includes additional 
tests on various sub-samples to further investigate the audit pricing model for different 
groups of AIM companies.  Empirical analyses are undertaken using the statistical analysis 
software and these include both univariate and multivariate analysis.  All the analysis 
employed in this study is rigorous and the validity and reliability of the data used is also tested.    
1.5   Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM).  The first section of the chapter introduces the history and the 
development of AIM, including the motivation for establishing the market, the challenges it 
has faced since its launch in 1995, and the transformation it has undergone during that period 
in order to maintain its success.  The second section explains the special regulatory regime of 
AIM.  It introduces the admission rules that companies aiming to list on AIM need to follow, 
and explains why AIM is more attractive compared with other markets; it outlines the unique 
Nominated Adviser system and how it works for the regulators, the companies, and the 
investors as the centre of AIM’s regulatory regime; and describes corporate governance in 
AIM, including the requirements and findings from previous literature, to indicate its 
distinction from other markets.  The third section discusses the characteristics of the 
companies listed on AIM, including the distribution of AIM companies, the industrial sectors 
and countries the AIM companies operate in, and the future of the AIM companies.  The fourth 
section of Chapter 2 discusses the investors in AIM companies – who are they, what 
characteristics they have, and why AIM is attractive for them.  Finally, the chapter provides a 
brief overview of the uniqueness of AIM and points out the interest and great importance of 
studying audit pricing in that market in order to expand our understanding of audit pricing 
more broadly. 
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Chapter 3 presents a review of the vast empirical literature that exists in the area of the 
determinants of audit pricing and presents the hypotheses to be tested in the context of AIM 
companies.  The first section of the chapter introduces the design and development of the 
audit pricing model.  It explains the model established by Simunic (1980) and subsequently 
verified and expanded in subsequent studies.  The following sections review the academic 
literature on the key factors identified as having an impact on companies’ audit pricing, and 
proposes the hypotheses to be tested in this study.  The second section focuses on the impact 
of audit client characteristics on audit fees and presents the hypotheses related to these 
characteristics; section three investigates the influence of auditor characteristics on audit 
pricing and addresses the related hypotheses; section four introduces the relationship 
between audit engagement characteristics and the audit pricing model along with the related 
hypotheses, while section five explains the influence of corporate governance related factors 
and audit committee characteristics on the audit pricing decision, and presents the 
hypotheses in the context of AIM companies.  The final section summarizes the main empirical 
studies and findings on the determinants of audit pricing and emphasizes the importance of 
studying audit pricing in the context of AIM companies, which provide a level of diversity that 
cannot be found in the main market as well as the opportunity to understand audit pricing 
decisions for small and medium sized companies. 
Chapter 4 presents the research method employed in this study.  The chapter begins by 
outlining the research questions to be investigated.  Then, it justifies the sample selection, 
describes the sources of data and explains the data collection methods and the process 
employed.  Due to the empirical nature of the study, a significant part of this section is 
devoted to identifying and justifying the dependent and independent variables to be used in 
analysis.  The third section of the chapter explains in detail how the dependent variable (audit 
fee) is measured as well as the measurement of the independent variables.  Section 4 explains 
the regression models employed in the study to explain the influence of each determinant 
factor on audit pricing in AIM companies, and the statistical techniques used in the univariate 
and multivariate analysis.  
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Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis and discussion of the impact of various factors on audit 
fees.  The chapter begins by presenting a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the variables 
utilized in the first empirical analysis.  Then, a correlation matrix presents the results of two-
way Pearson correlations between the variables employed in the first empirical analysis.  This 
is followed by presentation of the results of the multivariate regression analysis, based on a 
cross-sessional dataset, investigating the hypotheses set out in Chapter Three.  The 
multivariate analysis also includes four sub-samples to investigate the different audit pricing 
models for companies with different characteristics, and for each sub-sample, a detailed 
univariate analysis that highlights the significant differences in the mean and median values 
of the variables is also outlined.  In addition, the multivariate analysis includes a set of 
additional tests on the influence of various potential influential factors on audit fees.  The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the results and discussion of the findings of the first 
empirical analysis of this study. 
Chapter 6 presents a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the impact of various audit 
committee characteristics on AIM companies’ audit pricing with a reduced sample.  Due to 
the relaxed regulation on information disclosure and corporate governance, not all AIM 
companies completely disclosed the audit committee related.  Hence, in order to maintain the 
completeness and consistency of data, only AIM companies with full disclosure of detailed 
information on audit committee size, independence and expertise are included in the reduced 
sample. The chapter begins with a detailed descriptive statistical analysis of the audit 
committee variables and other audit pricing variables employed in the second empirical 
analysis. Similar to the first empirical analysis, the next section of this chapter presents a 
correlation matrix showing the results of a two-way Pearson correlation between the 
variables included in the study.  This is followed by presentation of a detailed multivariate 
regression analysis to investigate the impact of audit committee characteristics on audit fees 
in AIM companies.  A set of additional investigations is also included to further discuss the 
impact of audit committee expertise on audit pricing.  The last section of the chapter 
summarizes the results and discusses the findings of the second empirical analysis.   
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Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the analysis and discussion conducted in the previous chapters, 
and provides conclusions and recommendations on the AIM companies’ governance practice 
and regulatory implication for policy makers.  The chapter also presents the research 
limitations of this study, and suggests the future research potential in this area.      
16 
 
Chapter 2: Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
 
2.0   Introduction 
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) was launched in June 1995 by the London Stock 
Exchange as a ‘junior’ stock market for small and medium-sized companies seeking equity 
capital for expansion.  AIM offers opportunities for firms unable to match the listing 
requirements of other world markets, providing a unique community of innovative and 
entrepreneurial companies seeking opportunities to raise capital in order to fund their 
development, allowing their shares to be traded and owners/managers to liquidate some of 
their shareholdings.  After nearly twenty years’ development, AIM has become a significant 
player in the global financial market, highly regarded by advisers, investors and companies. 
When it opened for business on 19th June 1995, AIM listed only 10 companies in 6 sectors, with 
a total value of £82.2 million.  By December 2014, over 3,500 companies had joined AIM 
(London Stock Exchange, 2015), some of which had developed and moved to the main market, 
or had been taken over by larger companies. 
According to Marcus Stuttard, Head of AIM, its success is a product of several factors, 
including: 
“a balanced approach to regulation which facilitates a smooth transition to becoming a 
public company and allows companies to focus on growing their business once on the 
market; 
a network of advisers that is experienced in supporting companies from the time they first 
consider a flotation, through to helping them raise capital to fulfil their growth potential; 
an international investor base that has the knowledge and understanding to effectively 
provide capital to companies as they progress and has confidence in the regulatory 
environment.” (London Stock Exchange, 2010: p.3)   
17 
 
One of the key features contributing to AIM’s success is its relaxed regulatory environment, 
which is specifically designed for the needs and requirements of small and growing companies.  
For example, in terms of admission rules, there is no minimum market capitalization 
requirement, no minimum trading record and no percentage of shares required to be held in 
public hands.  Unlike companies listed on the main London International Stock Exchange, AIM 
companies do not have to comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2010).  Instead, the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA), an association 
representing smaller companies and their advisers, encourages AIM companies to observe 
the recommendations contained in their publication, Corporate Governance Guidelines for 
Smaller Quoted Companies (also known as the QCA Guidelines), the latest version of which 
was published in 20133.  In practice, the QCA Guidelines are broadly consistent with the nature 
and spirit of the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2010), while 
appreciating the practical difficulties of achieving widespread compliance among relatively 
smaller companies.  There is also a sense and even active encouragement, from the QCA 
Guidelines that AIM companies should have the freedom to develop their own bespoke 
governance arrangements to suit their specific governance challenges.  Interestingly, one of 
the reasons given by the QCA for AIM firms to improve the quality of corporate governance 
and transparency between directors and shareholders is to avoid the imposition of stronger 
external regulation: “An important purpose of the QCA code is to encourage directors and 
shareholders to think about how they can actively build trust, rather than treat this as a 
checklist of corporate governance structures and policies” (Quoted Companies Alliance, 2010: 
p. 4). 
Certain ‘light touch’ regulation is in place.  AIM is regulated by the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE), which is in turn regulated by the UK Financial Services Authority4.  A unique system of 
Nominated Advisers (Nomads) acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ to ensure that the AIM listed companies 
                                                          
3 The latest version was published in 2013, and changed the name to Corporate Governance Code for Small and 
Mid-size Quoted Companies.  
4 After April 2013, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was abolished and its responsibilities were split between 
the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England.   
18 
 
follow all the requirements from the time of listing and thereafter.  AIM’s regulatory regime 
is reviewed regularly to monitor Nomads.   
The more relaxed admission rules and regulatory environment have proved attractive, not 
only for UK companies, but also for a growing number of overseas companies in a variety of 
sectors.  In recent years, many investors have considered AIM as a comparable exchange to 
NASDAQ or the TSX, essentially because of its low listing cost and reduced regulation.  
According to a report by Rousseau (2008), Canadian issuers and investors, as well as a number 
of Canadian public companies, show great interest in listing on AIM.  Meanwhile, as observed 
by Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009), the more demanding regulatory climate in operation in the US 
post-Enron has resulted in a significant increase in listings on AIM.  Both of these studies note 
that one of the main reasons driving North American companies to list on AIM is the will to 
avoid the high cost and stringent regulations associated with the North American regulatory 
environment.  While at the end of 2007 listings on AIM had reached a peak at almost 1,700, at 
the end of December 2014 there were approximately 1,104 firms listed, worth over £71 billion 
and operating in 40 sectors.  Of these, approximately 219 were overseas companies (London 
Stock Exchange, 2015).  Thanks to the relaxed regulation and listing rules, the London location, 
and the cluster of skills, experience and resources built up over the years, AIM has acquired 
great advantage in scale, which could be difficult for other stock markets to match. 
This chapter provides a detailed overview of AIM. Section 2.1 describes the history and 
development of AIM, while Section 2.2 gives details of the special regulatory regime, including 
admission rules, the Nominated Adviser system and corporate governance. Sections 2.3 and 
2.4 discuss the AIM listed companies and investors respectively. Section 2.5 provides a 
summary of the chapter.  
2.1   History and Development of AIM 
Although AIM is considered by some scholars as a replacement for the Unlisted Securities 
Market (USM) (Bauer and Boritz, 2006), the original idea to set up a secondary market can be 
traced back to the debate about the shortage of equity capital available to smaller British 
companies.  This debate began with a report by the Macmillan Committee in 1931, continued 
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after the Second World War, and resulted in the establishment of a new institution, the 
Industrial Commercial and Financial Corporation (ICFC), to fill the gap of equity capital.  
However, even with the help of the ICFC, smaller companies still found it difficult to access 
the public market and broader investments.  In 1973 this situation was exacerbated when the 
small regional stock exchanges, which were well placed to handle small company flotation, 
were integrated to the London Stock Exchange.  In 1977 Arthur D. Little noted that compared 
with the US, where the more flexible NASDAQ exchange attracted great numbers of small 
and fast-growing companies, the UK and Europe ought to give more serious consideration to 
small companies (Little, 1977).  In 1980, after careful consideration of the criteria for the listing 
companies, the London Stock Exchange introduced the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), 
which was designed as a secondary market to satisfy the demand for market quotation of 
smaller British companies (The National Archive, 2014).  Attracted by the less stringent 
admission rules and lower flotation costs, a great number of smaller companies chose to list 
on the USM, and many of them were later transferred to the main market.  The establishment 
and initial success of the USM indicated that investors were willing to take the risk to buy 
shares from promising companies.  However, in the 1990s the USM declined, due to the 
worldwide stock market recession and the new regulations issued by the European 
Commission.  The implementation of the Mutual Recognition of Listing Particulars Directive 
reduced the differences in listing requirements between the LSE and USM; specifically it 
reduced the minimum trading period for businesses to list on the LSE from five years to three 
years, and on the USM from three years to two years.  With fewer and fewer companies 
choosing to list on the USM, the London Stock Exchange then decided to close this secondary 
market. Subsequently, lobbyists raised concerns about the lack of ability of smaller companies 
to raise capital, and persuaded the LSE to launch another secondary market with different 
listing requirements.  This was the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) (Burrowes and Jones, 
2004).   
Despite frequent comparisons with NASDAQ, the London Stock Exchange did not build AIM 
as a British version of NASDAQ, since it was not designed to target high-technology 
companies or companies in any particular sector.  Neither was AIM designed along the same 
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lines as the USM; according to Michael Lawrence, chief executive of the London Stock 
Exchange, AIM was never intended as a springboard for small and fast growing companies to 
list on the main market, and therefore he believed it should have its own identity, be managed 
separately, and be regulated according to a distinctive approach appropriate to its target 
companies, which should be drawn from various business sectors (London Stock Exchange, 
2008).   
During the process of setting up AIM, one of the biggest debates in the London Stock 
Exchange concerned the form of regulation.  Finally, it was decided that AIM would apply a 
set of less prescriptive rules, with self-regulation as an important component.  For example, 
there is no minimum market capitalization requirement, no minimum trading record and no 
percentage of shares required to be held in public hands.  The self-regulation element is 
conducted by Nominated Advisers, or Nomads, ‘full-time corporate finance advisers’ charged 
with verifying a company’s financial health and suitability for AIM, assisting it during the 
flotation process at admission and providing advice to keep companies up-to-date on 
corporate governance and regulatory issues in the post-listing period (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 
2012).  The Nomads system is a unique feature of AIM and central to its regulatory model.  For 
AIM companies and investors, Nomads act as gatekeepers, advisers and regulators (Mendoza, 
2008).  Full details of the AIM regulatory regime will be given in the next section.   
In addition to the principle-based regulatory regime, AIM provided other benefits to its listing 
companies.  For example, AIM companies were considered as unquoted for tax purposes, so 
that tax reliefs were available for individuals who bought shares in them (Board et al., 1998).  
Moreover, the launch of AIM was closely followed by the founding of two investment trusts 
to help attract investors to AIM companies.  Consequently, AIM grew quickly.  From a starting 
point of only 10 companies on the opening day, 19th June 1995, by the end of 1996 there were 
over 200 companies traded on AIM.   
The first challenge to confront AIM was the dot.com boom. This began with the flotation in 
the NASDAQ of Netscape, the US internet browser company, followed by a number of initial 
public offerings from internet-related companies, many of which had no track record of 
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making profits, nor any proper business plan.  Although the boom started in the US, it spread 
to Europe and severely impacted the national stock exchanges.  At around the same time as 
AIM was being launched in the UK, other national stock exchanges were being founded 
throughout Europe, for example the Paris Nouveau Marche in February 1996, EASDAQ 
(European Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations) in September 1996, 
Euro.N.M.Belgium in November 1996, the Netherlands’ Nieuwe Markt in February 1997, and 
the German Neuer Markt in March 1997 (Board et al., 1998).  Compared with these other 
European markets, internet-based and other high-technology related stocks accounted for a 
much smaller proportion of the AIM population.  This consideration influenced the growth of 
AIM in the late 1990s during the boom in high-technology stocks.  However, as shown in Table 
2.1, most of the new European markets failed because they could not attract sufficient 
numbers of listing companies or institutional investors.  By the time the dot.com bubble burst, 
these new exchanges had not grown sufficiently mature to survive.  In contrast, although AIM 
had shared the experience of being a new market during the dot.com boom, it had the 
advantage of support from a group of participants who had gained experience of floating, 
investing and trading in smaller companies from the USM.  Moreover, AIM had a more 
balanced company composition, listing companies from various sectors, especially in the 
more stable industries.  The unique regulatory system of AIM also provided enough flexibility 
to protect the market from businesses that might undermine its credibility.  Furthermore, 
although the stock market collapse resulted in a severe drop in the AIM index, the dot.com 
boom had matured the market and emphasized the involvement of institutional investors.  As 
a result, the overall picture was positive for AIM during the dot.com boom and crash but it 
was left with a serious need for growth.  For further development, AIM needed more listings, 
more liquidity and more investors.  After considering the possibilities, the London Stock 
Exchange decided to expand AIM into an international market. 
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Table 2.1   Rise and Fall of the New European Markets 
Market Country Opening Date Closing Date 
Alternative Investment 
Market 
UK June 19,1995 N/a 
Paris Nouveau Marche France March, 1996 Eurolist as of February 
21, 2005 
EASDAQ (European 
Association of 
Securities Dealers 
Automated 
Quotations) 
Pan-European September, 1996 November, 2003 
Euro.N.M.Belgium Belgium November, 1996 October, 2000 
Netherlands Nieuwe 
Markt 
Netherlands February, 1997 Eurolist as of April, 
2005 
Neuer Markt Germany March, 1997 December, 2003 
Source: Adopted from Board et al. (1998) and Mendoza (2008) 
 
In 2002, AIM started the transformation from a local exchange into an international market.  
The first overseas markets to be targeted were Commonwealth countries that shared a similar 
legal system with the UK, as well as a similar approach to the equity markets.  At this stage 
AIM was introduced to Australian and Canadian firms, offering great international 
opportunities and access to investors.  Since London is an important source of funds for 
natural resource development, the London Stock Exchange particularly targeted mining and 
oil and gas companies, not only from Commonwealth countries, but also from Russia and the 
Middle East.  During the period between 2003 and 2005, mining and gas and oil became the 
most dynamic sectors in AIM, rather than the high-technology companies as in the late 1990s.  
AIM also allowed a system of dual listing, whereby companies already listed on certain 
designated exchanges could secondary list on AIM through a fast-tracking process.  The 
designated exchanges included Australian, Canadian and South African exchanges, NASDAQ 
and the New York Stock Exchange, and Deutsche Borse and Euronext in Europe.  AIM also 
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tried to attract investment banks and brokers in the Commonwealth countries to join the AIM 
community.   
The transformation into an international market gained great success.  By the end of 2003 
AIM had become an important player both in the London capital market and on the 
international exchange stage.  In addition to the Commonwealth countries and the mining 
and oil and gas sectors, the London Stock Exchange also targeted other countries and 
industries to ensure a balance of the companies listed and thus avoid the sort of market 
collapse seen with the dot.com crash.  The next market to be targeted was the USA.  Although 
the US market has a larger capital community than Britain, and already had a well-established 
high-technology market, the companies listed in the NASDAQ were relatively larger and more 
mature than is usual for companies listed on secondary markets.  Furthermore, following the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, companies intending to list in the New 
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ needed to spend more time and money to satisfy the 
additional disclosure requirements and financial controls.  As a result, the London capital 
market – both the main market and AIM - became more attractive.  AIM also targeted new 
opportunities from emerging markets such as China, India and Vietnam.   
The second challenge for AIM was the financial crisis between 2008 and 2010.  From 2007 to 
2010, the number of companies listed on AIM dropped from almost 1,700 to approximately 
1,195 (see Figure 2.1).  The total market capitalization declined sharply, from nearly £100,000m 
in 2007 to lower than £40,000m in 2009 (see Figure 2.2).  The international expansion to non-
British countries and resourced-based companies helped AIM to maintain its position and 
development during the crisis.  As shown in Figure 2.1, over the crisis period the proportion of 
international companies listed in AIM accounted for more than 20 per cent of the total.  From 
2009, the total market capitalization of AIM started to increase, and by the end of 2014, the 
total market value had recovered to approximately £71,414m (see Table 2.2).  Table 2.2 shows 
that AIM has been an important part of the UK stock market as it has comparable number of 
UK and international companies listed on the market as those listed on the Main Market after 
the financial crisis.  Although the market value of the AIM and the companies listed on AIM 
are still relatively small comparing to the Main Market, while the number of companies does 
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indicate AIM offers great opportunity to small and medium sized companies to raise the 
equity and expand.  The current issue for the London Stock Exchange is how to maintain and 
reinforce the position of AIM in the UK and international exchanges, especially under the 
conditions of increasing competition in the industry.  One key issue in the development of AIM 
is how to keep its regulation correspondent with the changes in the character of the market 
and the wider environment.  Other key elements are the development of companies listed on 
the market and the involvement of the investors.  In the following sections, the regulation of 
AIM, the listed companies, and the investors will be discussed.  
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Figure 2.1   Number of Companies Listed on AIM 
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Table 2.2   Summary of AIM Companies and comparison with the Main Market  
 AIM Main Market 
 Number of companies Market value (£m) Number of companies Market value (£bn) 
 UK International Total  UK International Total  
19/06/1995 10 0 10 82.2     
1995 118 3 121 2382.4     
1996 235 17 252 5298.5     
1997 286 22 308 5655.1     
1998 291 21 312 4437.9     
1999 325 22 347 13468.5 1945 499 2444 5397.6 
2000 493 31 524 14935.2 1904 501 2405 5322.5 
2001 587 42 629 11607.2 1809 453 2262 4103.0 
2002 654 50 704 10252.3 1701 419 2120 3049.5 
2003 694 60 754 18358.5 1557 381 1938 3330.6 
2004 905 116 1021 31753.4 1465 351 1816 3432.3 
2005 1179 220 1399 56618.5 1358 334 1692 4035.6 
2006 1330 304 1634 90666.4 1276 330 1606 4305.6 
2007 1347 347 1694 97561.0 1239 341 1580 4225.9 
2008 1233 317 1550 37731.9 1174 327 1501 2897.2 
2009 1052 241 1293 56632.0 1121 331 1452 3527 
2010 967 228 1195 79419.3 1093 330 1423 3954.9 
2011 918 225 1143 62212.7 1069 327 1396 3602.7 
2012 870 226 1096 61747.7 1009 318 1327 3768.9 
2013 861 226 1087 75928.6 996 303 1299 4174.5 
2014 885 219 1104 71414.3 973 313 1286 3965.1 
Note: 1 The data of Main Market from 1995 to 1998 is not available from the London Stock Exchange official website.  
Source: AIM Factsheet – December 2014, London Stock Exchange (2015); Main Market Fact Sheet -- December 2014/2013/2012/2011/2010/2009/2008/ 
2007/2006/2005/2004/2003/2002/2001/2000/1999, London Stock Exchange (2016).
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2.2   The Regulation of AIM 
One key attraction of AIM is its unique regulatory regime, which allows more flexibility in 
terms of admission and disclosure.  As an exchange-regulated market run by the London Stock 
Exchange AIM’s regulatory regime does not necessarily follow the European Union directive 
on listing rules.  Unlike the rule-based regulatory approach market, AIM is an example of 
principle-based regulation, which offers companies the flexibility to interpret the regulatory 
requirements and customize their compliance.  When establishing the regulatory regime the 
LSE considered the fact that AIM companies are different from those listed on the main 
market and require a different set of admission rules.  The other unique characteristic of AIM’s 
regulatory regime is the system of Nominated Advisers (Nomads), professional financial 
entities approved by the Exchange to perform the roles of gatekeeper, regulator and adviser.  
As the main regulatory system of AIM, Nomads are also regulated and monitored by the 
Exchange.  The obligations of Nomads and companies are set out in two rule books: ‘Rules for 
Nomads’ and ‘Rules for Companies’.  Details of the admission rules of AIM and the Nomads 
system are introduced and discussed in the sub-sections below.   
2.2.1   Admission to AIM 
The admission criterion of a market directly impacts its character and the companies listed.  
Since AIM is designed for small cap companies the admission criteria are simple and less 
restrictive than for the main market.  There is no minimum market capitalization requirement 
for companies seeking entry and no minimum trading record, although in common with the 
main market, AIM requires companies to supply three years’ audited accounts.  Further, there 
is no percentage of shares required to be held in public hands, although in practice at least 
ten per cent of the shares, as expected by investors, should be available to the public and the 
offered percentage should be disclosed.  Table 2.3 compares the admission requirements of 
AIM, the LSE main market, OTCQX U.S. and the NASDAQ Capital Market 5.  Both AIM and 
                                                          
5 I have excluded the NYSE/AMEX because it has relatively little overlap with AIM in terms of firm size.  The three 
exchanges chosen here each have characteristics appropriate for comparison purposes. The LSE main market is 
useful because it is another UK market, which eliminates the country-level differences.  NASDAQ is chosen 
because many studies consider the competition between NASDAQ and AIM. The OTCQX is important because it 
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OTCQX have no minimum requirement on the percentage of shares to be held by the public 
or the requirements on trading records.  Unlike the other three markets, AIM has no 
requirement on minimum market capitalization.  Companies seeking to list on AIM must 
submit pre-admission and admission documents and a prospectus.  However, unlike the main 
market or NASDAQ, AIM has no requirement that the admission documents be checked by 
the respective market regulatory authority; instead, they are delegated to the Nomads (AIM).  
Hence, for AIM it is the Nomad who acts as gatekeeper and secures the required degree of 
oversight.   
The lighter regulation for admission has not only made AIM more accessible to small and 
medium-sized companies (Clatworthy and Peel, 1998), but has also attracted an increasing 
number of international companies (as shown in Table 2.2).  As observed by Mallin and Ow-
Yong (2009), the more demanding regulatory climate post-Enron in the US has resulted in a 
significant increase in listings on AIM.  Rousseau (2007) also notes that since January 2004, a 
significant number of Canadian firms have sought listing on AIM.  However, while the 
admission rules might appear to be excessively lax, AIM implements a unique regulatory 
system to ensure that the firms are suitable for listing, and hence guarantee the integrity and 
reputation of the market.  The Nominated Adviser system will be explained in the next sub-
section.   
                                                          
has smaller and younger firms, which helps mitigate concerns about firm size and age.   
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Table 2.3   Comparison of Admission Rules1 
Rules AIM LSE Main Market NASDAQ Capital Market OTCQX U.S 
Public float No minimum required Minimum 25% of shares in 
public hands 
300 shareholder; 1 million 
shares publicly held with 
minimum market value 
between $4-5 million 
No minimum required 
Trading record None required 3 years trading records 0-2 year trading record None required 
Minimum market 
capitalization 
No minimum required Minimum £10 million Minimum $50 million Minimum of $5 million 
Role of advisors Nomad required for all 
companies during and 
after IPO 
No requirement No requirement Designated Advisor for 
disclosure DAD required 
during and after IPO 
Admission documents Admission documents not 
examined by UKLA2 
Admission documents 
inspected by UKLA 
Admission documents 
inspected by US SEC 
Admission documents not 
examined by US SEC 
Source: Adopted from AIM, NASDAQ, www.otcmarkets.com, Espenlaub et al. (2012) 
Note: 
1 NYSE/AMEX is excluded because it has relative little overlap with the AIM in terms of company size. 
2 United Kingdom Listing Authority. 
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2.2.2 The Role of Nominated Advisers (Nomads) 
The Nominated Adviser (Nomad) system is a unique feature of AIM, and central to its 
regulatory regime.  Unlike rule-based regulatory markets, AIM is a principle-based regulatory 
market with Nomads as ‘regulatory agents’ or ‘decentralized regulators’ (Espenlaub et al., 
2012).  Nomads act as ‘full-time corporate finance advisers’ to verify a company’s financial 
health and suitability for AIM, to assist it during the flotation process at admission, and to 
provide advice to keep the company up-to-date on corporate governance and regulatory 
issues in the post-listing period (Mallin and Ow-Young, 2012).  Hence, for AIM companies and 
investors, Nomads act as gatekeepers, advisers and regulators (Mendoza, 2008).  In order to 
secure the function of Nomads, the AIM Rules for Companies require that all applicants to 
AIM appoint an approved Nomad before the IPO and retain a Nomad throughout the whole 
period of listing (London Stock Exchange, 2010).  If an AIM company does not have a Nomad 
then its share trading activities will be suspended until it hires a new one; if the company fails 
to appoint a new Nomad within one month of the suspension, then its listing on AIM will be 
cancelled (London Stock Exchange, 2010).  For example, in April 2015, Rangers International 
Football Club Plc was delisted from AIM since it was unable to appoint a new Nomad before 
the one month deadline after its suspension in March following the resignation of its Nomad, 
WH Ireland (BBC Sport Football, 2015).    
The Nomads’ joint role of ‘gatekeeper’ for the exchange to ensure the suitability of companies 
admitted to AIM, and adviser to companies on compliance, is unique to AIM.  A Nomad can 
also act as the company’s broker, involving its own commercial interest in the company’s 
listing on AIM.  Given that Nomads play a crucial part in the AIM regulatory regime, the 
Exchange has published a rulebook setting out guidance to ensure that Nomads understand 
their role and responsibilities, and to regulate their behaviour.  
According to the AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers (London Stock Exchange, 2014), to become 
a Nomad, a firm needs to meet strict requirements and go through a screening process that 
will ascertain its knowledge, experience and qualification for the role.  A Nomad must be a 
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firm that employs at least four Qualified Executives 6, has practiced corporate finance for at 
least two years, and has acted on at least three relevant transactions (i.e. transactions 
requiring a prospectus or offer document on a takeover) during that two-year period.  The list 
of all firms authorized as Nomads is available on the LSE website, and reveals that they include 
accounting firms, investment banks, corporate finance firms and stockbrokers.  The Exchange 
may also interview some or all of the proposed Qualified Executives to ensure that they have 
sufficient understanding and experience in corporate finance, market transactions and legal 
or regulatory rules of the UK corporate finance market and AIM in particular.  When a Nomad 
believes that an AIM company is in breach of the AIM Rules for Companies or other rules, it 
must inform the Exchange as soon as practicable.   
Despite the flexibility provided by the role of Nomad, criticism of AIM’s regulatory system has 
been fierce, especially after several scandals involving corporate fraud and failure, when the 
Nomads failed in their responsibility as monitors and advisers.  In response, the Exchange 
issued a detailed rulebook explaining the responsibilities and duties of Nomads, and enhanced 
the procedures for review and discipline of Nomads.  For instance, the Exchange now 
regularly reviews Nomads’ activities to consider whether there have been any breaches of 
responsibilities or impairments of AIM’s integrity and reputation.  If any such breach is 
identified, the Exchange may take disciplinary action against the Nomad concerned, for 
example by issuing a warning notice, fine or censure, removing the firm from the register of 
Nomads, and publishing details of the action taken and the reason for it (London Stock 
Exchange, 2014).  Since maintaining reputation in the market is important for Nomads, such 
disciplinary actions have a severe negative impact.  As a result of Nomads deciding to 
withdraw from the market after being fined or publicly censured, the number of Nomads 
declined substantially, from 85 at the beginning of 2007 to 63 in 2010 (Espenlaub et al., 2012).  
For highly respected firms such as WH Ireland or Grant Thornton, underperformance as a 
Nomad would have a detrimental effect on their other business.  Therefore, Nomads’ 
                                                          
6 Based on AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers (London Stock Exchange, 2014), Qualified Executives are defined as 
full-time employees who have full understanding of the UK corporate finance market and AIM, and have acted 
in a corporate finance advisory role for at least the past three years and been involved in at least three relevant 
transactions during that period.   
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reputational concern is a mechanism to ensure the effective monitoring of their clients’ 
information disclosure, which in turn provides an incentive for the AIM companies to act with 
full transparency.    
According to the AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers (London Stock Exchange, 2014), it is the 
responsibility of Nomads to provide advice and guidance to AIM companies and ensure that 
they follow the AIM Rules for Companies (London Stock Exchange, 2010) both during the 
process of their IPO and throughout the whole period of their listing on AIM.  For each AIM 
company, a Nomad should allocate at least two qualified staff (including at least one Qualified 
Executive) to ensure the advice and knowledge is available at all times.  As a result, a Nomad 
should have full knowledge and understanding of its client’s business, including its 
governance structure, financial situation, and legal status, and hence be able to make the 
judgment of whether the company is appropriate for AIM when it makes its application to the 
market, and ensure that its client meets the disclosure requirements adequately during the 
period of listing on AIM.   
2.2.3 Corporate Governance 
The relaxed regulatory regime of AIM refers not only to its admission rules, but especially to 
the regulation of corporate governance for AIM companies, which is significantly less 
prescriptive than for fully-listed companies.  Under the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010-
2014) (previously known as the Combined Code), companies listed on the main market are 
under the obligation to ‘comply or explain’; that is, they must either comply with the Code or 
explain and justify their reasons for departure from it.  However, due to the size and 
complexity of AIM companies, they are not obliged to adhere to the provision of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, and are required only to have ‘appropriate’ corporate governance 
structure. This does not mean that corporate governance is considered unimportant for AIM 
companies.  According to Alastair Walmsley, Head of Primary markets, London Stock 
Exchange Group, “they are encouraged to develop strong governance procedures and are 
advised to aspire to achieve the key elements set out in the Code as they grow” (London Stock 
Exchange, 2012, p.5).  For AIM companies, establishing an appropriate governance system, 
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adopting an effective governance approach and improving governance practice have an 
important impact on enhancing investors’ confidence in the market as a whole, establishing 
successful investor relationships for individual AIM companies, improving company 
performance, and eventually creating more value to the shareholders (London Stock 
Exchange, 2012).  Research also indicates that both the institutional investors and Nomads 
consider that good corporate governance provides confidence to investors (Mendoza, 2007; 
Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012).  Mendoza (2008) claims that companies without proper 
governance mechanisms would struggle to attract institutional investors, due to the lack of 
assurance on handling corporate affairs. 
Figure 2.3 presents an overview of the key participants in the corporate governance of AIM 
companies. This corporate governance comprises two facets: the internal governance 
structure, where directors are responsible to set up appropriate and sufficient procedures, 
resources and controls; and the external governance advisory and monitoring system, where 
Nomads are responsible to assess the on-going qualification of their AIM clients and to 
provide advice (Arcot et al., 2007).  The corporate governance approach of AIM is consistent 
with the principle-based regulatory regime and provides great flexibility to the quoted 
companies when testing the appropriateness and robustness of their governance structures 
and practices.   
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Figure 2.3   Key Participants of Corporate Governance in AIM Companies 
 
Source: Adopted from Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) 
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quoted companies.  It is expected that Nomads and directors will consider the QCA Guidelines 
as the recommended corporate governance regime for companies to establish the 
appropriate governance structure.  However, unlike the Corporate Governance Code, the QCA 
Guidelines are not mandatory: if AIM companies choose not to comply with them, no 
explanation is required.   
In terms of the board structure, the QCA Guidelines recommend the AIM companies to have 
“at least two independent non-executive directors”, and “the chairman may count as one of 
the independent directors, provided has was independent at the time of appointment” 
(Quoted Companies Alliance, 2013, p. 17).  The QCA Guidelines also mention that though it is 
difficult for AIM companies (small and mid-sized companies) to meet all the criteria of 
independent set out by the UK Corporate Governance Code, they still need to foster the 
judgement and character of independence.  The QCA Guidelines emphasize the importance 
of chairman’s separation from the day-to-day business in order to make independent 
decisions, and recommended the separation of the roles of chairman and CEO (Quoted 
Companies, Alliance, 2013).  However, according to Mallin and Ow-Yong (2008), fewer than 
half of AIM companies comply or partly comply with the QCA recommendations on board.  
For example, although a majority of the companies interviewed had two to three non-
executive directors on the board, only a third of them defined board independence based on 
either the QCA Guidelines or the Corporate Governance Code; half of the sampled companies 
did not disclose whether their non-executive directors were independent, which implied that 
AIM companies were not aware of the importance of ensuring such independence.  With 
regard to CEO/Chairman duality, over 70 per cent of sampled companies indicated that they 
had a separate CEO and chairman (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2008). 
In terms of board sub-committees, the AIM companies are not obliged to establish or maintain 
any of the sub-committees normally required in fully-listed companies, such as audit 
committee, remuneration committee, or nomination committee.  Guidance on these matters 
is provided by the QCA Audit Committee Guide for Smaller Quoted Companies (2009), Audit 
Committee Guide for Small and Mid-Size Quoted Companies (2014), and Remuneration 
Committee Guide for Smaller Quoted Companies (2012).  The QCA Guidelines and other QCA 
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guidance recommend that AIM companies establish an audit committee and a remuneration 
committee with at least two independent non-executive directors, to ensure internal control 
and risk management.  Jeffery (2007) indicates that all the companies listed on AIM had 
established audit committees, but only a few had set up nomination and remuneration 
committees.  Similarly, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2008) indicate that a majority of their sampled 
companies did have audit and remuneration committees, but fewer than half of them 
comprised independent non-executive directors, and only a small number of companies had 
a nomination committee.   
As shown above, although AIM companies are encouraged to comply with the QCA Guidelines 
and other QCA guidance, not all the companies decide to do so.  The flexibility of the corporate 
governance requirement allows each AIM company to choose the best governance practices 
for itself based on its nature and experience.  While fully-listed companies in the main market 
can also choose not to comply with the Code, they then need to explain the reasons, so that 
in practice companies choose compliance in order to save time and money, and the Code 
becomes more like a checklist (Patterson, 2012).  However, for AIM companies, directors can 
hand pick their governance practice and test its appropriateness for themselves.  This greater 
flexibility of corporate governance also provides scholars with more opportunities to 
investigate the robustness of different governance practices, as well as their impact.    
2.3   The Companies on AIM 
Generally speaking, the AIM companies are small and medium-sized companies in the 
entrepreneurial phase, seeking to grow and expand.  These companies share characteristics 
such as high innovativeness, strong entrepreneurial creativity, and high level of uncertainty 
(Cassia et al., 2009).  They aim to raise equity capital from experienced investors who could 
support their businesses in the long term.  Firms entering the market range from early stage 
companies with around £10 million initial market value or even less, to mature businesses with 
more than £500 million market capitalization.  As AIM has developed, the average market 
value of listed companies has risen from £19.7m at the end of 1995 to £66.5m in 2010 (London 
Stock Exchange, 2011); nevertheless, there are still a number of smaller and early stage 
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companies entering the market every year.  As shown in Table 2.4, at the end of 2010 there 
were 26 companies valued at more than £500m, and their total equity market value accounted 
for nearly 30 per cent or the total market capitalization.  Of these companies, 9 had a market 
value exceeding £1000m, while 17 had a market value between £500m and £1000m.  Many of 
these were mature and well-established international companies or in the oil & mining sector, 
with some dual listing in other markets or delisted from the main market.  The companies 
valued at £50m or more represented only 26.7 per cent of the total number of AIM companies, 
but accounted for 82.7 per cent of the total market capitalization.  Meanwhile, more than half 
of the AIM companies (54.4%) were valued at less than £25m, but together accounted for only 
7.3 per cent of the total market capitalization.  This reflects the fact that AIM mainly targets 
smaller and less developed companies with less equity capital, seeking initial funding and 
support.   
There have been some concerns regarding the number of small and under-performing 
companies in AIM.  As shown in Table 2.4, by the end of 2010 there were over 400 companies 
on AIM with less than £10m market capitalization.  The majority of these were British firms, 
and they represented over 30 per cent of the total number of AIM companies.  Although there 
is no minimum size requirement for companies listed on AIM, it is not economic for these 
companies to issue IPOs; moreover, it does not improve the quality of the market (Arcot et 
al., 2007).   
As mentioned previously, the AIM companies are from different sectors and various countries, 
and these factors are the main reasons the market has survived the challenges it has faced.  
Hence, when analysing the AIM companies, business sector and country of operation are 
commonly applied classifications.  As shown in Table 2.5, AIM does not target companies from 
any single business sector.  On the basis of the number of companies, by the end of 2010, the 
financial sector is the largest, accounting for 23.5 per cent of AIM companies, followed by the 
industrial sector (18.8%), basic material sector (13.5%), consumer services (11.8%), technology 
(10.1%) and five other sectors, each with less than ten per cent of the total number of AIM 
companies.  This balanced company composition has helped AIM survive many challenges and 
crises.   
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Table 2.4   Distribution of AIM Companies by Equity Market Value 
Market value range (£m) 
AIM (UK & International) 
No. of companies % Equity market value (£m) % 
Over 1,000 9 0.8 11041.4 13.9 
500-1,000 17 1.4 11794.7 14.9 
250-500 48 4.0 16202.1 20.4 
100-250 108 9.0 17154.6 21.6 
50-100 137 11.5 9468.5 11.9 
25-50 214 17.9 7773.4 9.8 
10-25 246 20.6 4007.3 5.0 
5-10 161 13.5 1170.8 1.5 
2-5 147 12.3 512.3 0.6 
0-2 95 8.0 112.1 0.1 
Unvalued securities 3 0.3 -- -- 
Suspended 9 0.8 182.1 0.2 
Totals 1194 100.00 79419.3 100.0 
More than £50m 319 26.7 65661.3 82.7 
Less than £50m 863 72.3 13576.0 17.1 
Less than £25m 649 54.4 5802.6 7.3 
Source: AIM Market Statistics – December 2010, London Stock Exchange (2011) 
 
Although the resources sector (oil & gas) accounts for less than one tenth (9.6%) of the total 
number of AIM companies, it dominates in terms of market capitalization, accounting for 
nearly one fourth (23.6%) of the total AIM market value.  Moreover, these resources 
companies are on average larger than companies in other sectors; for example the technology 
sector accounts for 10.1 per cent of the total number of companies but only 7.4 per cent of 
the entire AIM market value, and the consumer services sector represents 11.8 per cent of 
companies but only 6.9 per cent of the total market capitalization.  As mentioned in a previous 
section, oil & gas companies were among the major targets when AIM was aiming to expand 
with international companies; hence the resource sector has a large number of international 
companies, and since some of these were already listed on other markets when they joined 
AIM, they are relatively mature and well-developed.  Meanwhile, the financial sector is the 
largest sector in terms of the number of companies listed, which also reflects AIM’s change 
of direction whereby, from 2006, it started to attract investment trusts and other financial 
companies.  In 2006, around half of the new money raised on AIM was from property funds 
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and equity investment entities (Arcot et al., 2007).  Many of these financial companies, 
especially real estate companies, tend to be relatively large when issuing IPO, and are able to 
attract investors to identify and exploit investment opportunities.   
Table 2.5   Breakdown of AIM Companies by Sector 
Business Sector No. of Companies % Market Capitalization % 
Oil & Gas 115 9.6 18739 23.6 
Basic Materials 161 13.5 17986.2 22.6 
Industrials 224 18.8 7352.7 9.3 
Consumer Goods 62 5.2 3107.8 3.9 
Health Care 65 5.4 3808.2 4.8 
Consumer Services 141 11.8 5500.0 6.9 
Telecommunications 13 1.1 1131.5 1.4 
Utilities 12 1.0 659.0 0.8 
Financials 281 23.5 15277.8 19.3 
Technology 120 10.1 5857.4 7.4 
Total 1194 100.0 79419.35 100.0 
Source: AIM Market Statistics – December 2010, London Stock Exchange (2011) 
 
Although the initial intention when establishing AIM was to offer small British companies an 
opportunity to raise equity capital from investors, the development of the market and 
changes in the business environment led AIM to expand its target area to overseas companies.  
By September 2011, AIM companies had operations in 95 countries across the world (London 
Stock Exchange, 2011).  Table 2.6 shows the breakdown of AIM companies based on the 
country of operations, which indicates the location of the companies’ principle assets.  As the 
heart of the AIM contingent, the UK is still the most important component, accounting for 
61.1 per cent of the total number of companies and 39.3 per cent of the total market 
capitalization.  The key players among the British companies are those with market value in 
the range of £50m to £500m and a clear business plan, looking for investors and opportunities 
for transition of the ownership structure and expansion through merger and acquisition.  AIM 
offers these companies a platform to grow and attract a wider range of investors until they 
are qualified to list on the main market.  Afterwards, these companies can choose to move to 
the main market for more investment opportunities or stay in AIM.   
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Table 2.6   Breakdown of AIM Companies by Country of Operation 
  Number of 
companies as 
per country of 
operation 
% Total market 
capitalization as 
at month end £m 
% 
UK  729 61.1 31113 39.3 
Rest of 
Europe 
 162 13.6 12425 15.7 
 Central & Eastern 
Europe 
24 2.0 1129 1.4 
 Channel Islands 7 0.6 701 0.9 
 Isle of Man 11 0.9 1314 1.7 
 Western Europe 71 5.9 5066 6.4 
 Russia & CIS 38 3.2 3316 4.2 
 Other Offshore 11 0.9 899 1.1 
Americas  92 7.7 10185 12.9 
 USA 48 4.0 3358 4.2 
 Latin America 26 2.2 2614 3.3 
 Canada 18 1.5 4213 5.3 
Asia  133 11.1 14641 18.5 
 China 44 3.7 4664 5.9 
 India & 
Bangladesh 
28 2.3 3388 4.3 
 Japan 3 0.3 104 0.1 
 Middle East 12 1.0 2268 2.9 
 South East Asia 36 3.0 4107 5.2 
 Israel 10 0.8 110 0.1 
Australia  24 2.0 2223 2.8 
Africa  54 4.5 8596 10.9 
Total  1194 100.0 79184 100.0 
Source: AIM Market Statistics – December 2010, London Stock Exchange (2011) 
 
The largest non-British area, on the basis of number of companies, is the rest of Europe, which 
accounts for 13.6 per cent of AIM companies, followed by Asia, America, Africa and Australia.  
Western Europe plays a key role in the Europe area, with 71 companies listed on AIM, followed 
by Russia & the CIS region, with 38 companies.  When considering market capitalization, Asia 
has surpassed America to become the second largest area after the UK.  By the end of 2010, 
the total market capitalization of the Asia component had reached £14,641m, accounting for 
18.5 per cent of the AIM market value.  Within the Asia area, China has the largest number of 
companies (44 companies) as well as the largest market value (5.9%).  America includes the 
US, with 48 companies and 4.2 per cent of market value, Latin America (26 companies), and 
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Canada (18 companies).  Although only 54 companies are operating in African countries, the 
majority of these are in the oil & gas sector, and they therefore still represent 10.9 per cent of 
the total market capitalization.   
The above statistics reflect the change in character of AIM since 2002 when it started to 
attract international companies.  When it first began to target the resources sector, Australia 
and Canada were important sources for oil & gas companies.  Most of these companies were 
dual listed in AIM and their home Exchanges.  In recent years, more and more resources 
companies from Africa and Russia have chosen to list on AIM in order to raise capital under a 
flexible regulatory environment and gain access to expertise in the resources-based stocks in 
London -- a financial cluster with a long-established reputation.  The clustering effect attracts 
not only mining companies, but also firms in the high-technology and environmental 
industries.  For example, AIM has drawn many companies that specialize in renewable energy, 
and is increasingly becoming the home for global clean-tech companies, with 78 companies 
valued at £3.88 billion in June, 2011 (London Stock Exchange, 2011).  For those foreign 
companies not in the resources sector, AIM is attractive not only as a platform for raising 
equity capital, but also for the opportunities it offers to increase international awareness and 
reputation.   
The fact that AIM was introduced to Continental European companies as a European growth 
market with support from the European Venture Capital Association helps to explain why 
Continental Europe is the largest non-British area (Arcot et al., 2007).  For some of the 
American companies that list on AIM, one important reason would be the tightened 
regulatory environment and the increased cost of listing in their home countries.  For the same 
reasons, AIM has attracted non-US companies which might otherwise have chosen to list in 
the US Exchanges.  For example, Israeli high-technology companies used to have a close 
relationship with the US, while by 2012, there were 10 Israeli companies listed on AIM due to 
its low cost and reduced regulatory requirements. 
Although AIM has been considered as a springboard to the main market, research has found 
that while some AIM companies choose to move to the main market when they are 
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sufficiently mature, more firms tend to move from the main market to AIM (Gerakos et al., 
2013).  Companies choosing to move to the main market are looking for access to more 
institutional investors and a greater degree of visibility, albeit that they might need to adjust 
to stricter rules and requirements as well as the UK Corporate Governance Code.  The 
companies that choose to move from the main market to AIM are predominantly small 
companies that either feel too small to be noticed in the main market, or are attracted by the 
opportunity for acquisition.  It is a company’s decision whether to move out of AIM when they 
reach a more mature stage, and there is no pressure upon them to leave, since remaining with 
AIM could also provide significant opportunities.   
2.4   The Investors  
Since AIM is designed for small companies to raise capital, the investors play an important role 
in the market.  When AIM was launched in 1995, in order to attract private investors to buy 
shares from small and less mature companies, a tax incentive program was offered whereby 
AIM companies were considered as unlisted for tax purposes, and investments in some AIM 
companies could receive relief from Inheritance Tax (Arcot et al., 2007).  Certain AIM 
companies are also included in two subsequent schemes, introduced by the Conservative 
government to stimulate investment: the Enterprise Investment Scheme targets business 
angels and other wealthy individuals to attract them to take the risk of investing in 
entrepreneurial firms in the early stages of development (HM Revenue & Customs, 2014), 
while the Venture Capital Trusts Scheme (VCTs) aims to attract venture capital investment in 
high-risk businesses (HM Revenue & Customs, 2014).  The AIM companies fulfil the 
requirements of these tax relief schemes have been among the principal beneficiaries of such 
incentives.   
Tax incentive programs are helpful for AIM companies to attract investment specialized in 
small capitalization stocks.  However, with the development and growth of the market and 
the expansion of the range of companies, AIM has attracted an increasing number of 
institutional investors.  Their involvement accelerated during the dot.com boom period, since 
many high-tech companies were listed on AIM and the institutions were afraid of losing 
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opportunities.  When the dot.com bubble burst, institutional investors did not evacuate from 
the market, and from 2002, as the stock market started to recover and AIM continued to 
expand, more institutional investors showed interest in the market.  By 2010, the investment 
by institutional investors had reached approximately £6258.5m (London Stock Exchange, 
2011), and the institutions involved included some of the largest investment groups in the 
world.  Table 2.7 lists the ten most influential and active institutional investors in 2010, ranked 
by both the value of investment and the number of investments.  Much of the institutional 
investment went to companies with high market capitalization, in sectors such as mining, oil 
and gas, and real estate.  Meanwhile, a considerable number of mainstream institutions 
showed great interest in the smaller and entrepreneurial companies.  With the increase in the 
number of overseas companies listed on AIM, the London Stock Exchange began to 
encourage more non-British institutional investors to consider investing in AIM companies, 
especially investors from the countries of origin of non-British AIM companies.   
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Table 2.7   Top Influential Institutional and Retail Investors for AIM Companies 
Most Active Institutions by Value of investment  Most Active Institutional by Number of investments 
Rank Investor Value of 
Investment (£m) 
No. of 
Investment 
 Rank Investor No. of 
Investment 
Value of Investment (£m) 
1 BlackRock 1242.2 130  1 BNY Mellon (Nominees) 190 451.93 
2 Invesco 825.68 74  2 BlackRock Group 130 1242.2 
3 Citivic 
(Nominees) 
767.9 5 
 3 Gartmore Investment Ltd 
106 322.55 
4 Fidelity 752.23 103  4 Fidelity International 103 752.23 
5 Prudential 
Group 
499.34 38 
 5 AXA 
103 285.07 
6 Lloyds Banking 
Group 
454.08 68 
 6 Artemis Investment 
Management 
92 353.59 
7 BNY Mellon 
(Nominees) 
451.93 190 
 7 F&C Group 
81 255.22 
8 Brickington 
Trading 
444.73 1 
 8 Henderson Group 
81 241.00 
9 RAB Capital 417.91 43  9 Barclays 80 244.68 
10 Capital Group 
companies 
402.49 35 
 10 HSBC (Nominees) 
75 290.7 
Total  6258.49     1041  
Source: London Stock Exchange (2010) 
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Compared with other secondary markets, AIM places much greater emphasis and relies more 
heavily on institutional investment.  In the market’s advertising, institutional investment is 
stressed as one of its most attractive features.  A large proportion of the AIM listed companies 
have chosen this market in order to seek investment from mainstream institutions.  Once 
institutional shareholdings are accounted for, only about half of the remaining shares of AIM 
companies are owned by retail investors actively trading in the market.  The rest are held by 
company directors, employees, and founding families.  This type of ownership structure is 
another unique characteristic of AIM companies, and has attracted debate among scholars as 
to its advantages and disadvantages.  From the perspective of the companies, institutional 
investment is more stable and able to support long-term share issues.  The unique 
characteristics of AIM with regard to light touch regulation and corporate governance also 
determine that experienced and knowledgeable investors are more suitable for this market 
(Mallin and Ow-Young, 2009).  However, retail investors are still required, and are welcomed 
to AIM in order to enhance the liquidity of the market.   
There is no evidence that investors have been affected by the criticism of AIM.  The main 
concern raised by investors is that the AIM management should pay more attention to helping 
the existing companies make progress with their business plans in order to increase 
recognition among and attractiveness to investors, rather than focusing on securing IPOs.  
Overall, although as a secondary market with a great number of small and growing companies 
AIM has a higher risk level than the main market, many investors are still willing to take the 
risk, and suggest that stricter regulations and rules are not the proper means to secure the 
market.   
2.5   Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the characteristics of AIM as a secondary market for small and 
medium-sized companies from different perspectives including its history and development, 
its regulation, the companies listed on the market and the investors.  The review of AIM 
history indicates that as a junior stock market regulated by the London Stock Exchange, AIM 
was designed for small and medium sized companies to raise equity capital and seek 
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opportunities to expand which was originally intended for British companies but later open 
to international companies all over the world.  The AIM characteristics show that the market 
provides great flexibility in terms of regulation and reporting requirements, and diversity in 
terms both of the companies listed and of investors, all of which make AIM different from 
other stock markets around the world.  For the purpose of this research, these characteristics 
make the study of audit pricing for AIM companies especially interesting, since it provides a 
great opportunity to investigate the small and medium sized listed companies under their 
growing stages, with less financial tracking and relatively higher risk.  Moreover, the unique 
regulatory regime in AIM especially its relaxed corporate governance requirements also 
allows the researcher to further investigate the influence of various corporate governance 
practices especially board structure and audit committee characteristics on auditing and 
financial reporting quality which could be difficult to find in the main market with well-
established regulations on corporate governance.  As one of the most successful secondary 
markets in the world, AIM established a special regulatory regime – the Nominated Advisor, 
and is unique to the market and so far provided effective guidance and supervision roles to 
the companies listed on AIM.  As an important part of the global financial markets with great 
number of listed companies, AIM shows significant differences from other markets including 
the special firm characteristics (i.e. high risk, short financial tracking period, small and medium 
sized, on their early stage), the Nomad system, the relaxed admission rules and corporate 
governance requirements; all these make AIM a unique market in an audit pricing setting.  As 
a market with great variation on companies’ audit demand and requirements and less 
homogeneity in terms of internal governance comparing with other markets studied by 
researchers, AIM offers me possibility to re-examine the audit pricing issues.  Moreover, the 
impact of the Nomad system, the influence of the investors, the special feather of the 
companies listed on the market, and their internal governance structure on audit pricing 
would provide the practitioners further understanding on auditing related decision making 
and the policy makers evidences on the market and suggestions on the regulatory regime.  
The next chapter attempts to place the audit pricing issue emanating from AIM in the context 
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of the existing knowledge of determinants of audit fees, especially in the case of larger listed 
firms, and to set out specific hypotheses for AIM companies.  
  
48 
 
Chapter 3: Review of Audit Pricing Literature and Hypotheses 
Development 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Simunic’s (1980) seminal theoretical and empirical study of the determinants of corporate 
audit fees based on US companies initiated a vast amount of audit pricing research.  The 
cornerstone of audit fee research is the expectation that audit fees are charged based on the 
amount of time and effort needed coupled with the unit pricing for the external audit service.  
The quantity of auditing needed by the company is based on the company’s consideration of 
private benefits and costs derived from the audit service.  The nature of the benefit for audit 
clients is the satisfaction of statutory/regulatory requirements as well as the avoidance of 
liability from the financial statement users.  Of course any subsequent litigation arising from 
the audit also represents the potential monetary/reputational cost to the auditors. Hence, 
audit pricing is closely related to the auditor’s knowledge and judgement of the potential risk 
issues.  The initial purpose of Simunic’s (1980) research was to use audit fees to test the 
competitiveness of the audit industry.  Having established and tested the original audit pricing 
model he also recognized the essential interdependence between the economic interests of 
audit client and auditor.  Hence the main motivations for studying the determinants of audit 
pricing are to evaluate the competitiveness in the audit industry and to examine issues of 
contracting and independence related to the audit process (Hay et al., 2006).   Simunic (1980) 
assumes that both auditors and audit clients seek to maximize the expected profit for their 
own entities.  Therefore, both parties could benefit from the research and findings on the 
determinants of audit pricing.   As Low et al. (1990) note, the importance of a proper audit 
pricing model is “its objectivity and relevance to the audit function” (p. 292).  Since the audit 
fee is assumed to be a direct measurement of audit effort and a reflection of the risks involved 
in the audit engagement, study of the determinants of audit pricing could provide both 
auditors and audit client firms with an objective benchmark for negotiation (Low et al., 1990).   
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The basic model established by Simunic (1980) to explain the determinants of audit pricing in 
US firms has been expanded and verified by numerous subsequent studies.  The early models 
of audit fee determinants focused on audit client characteristics such as size, complexity and 
risk (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Chan et al., 1993; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Ward et al., 
1994; Gregory and Collier, 1996; Simunic and Stein, 1996), as well as auditor characteristics 
including size of auditor firm, location, auditor specialist and length of audit tenure(Palmrose, 
1986a; Simon and Francis, 1988; O’Keefe et al., 1994; Che-Ahmad and Houghton, 1996; Gregory 
and Collier, 1996; Kealey et al., 2007; McMeeking et al., 2007; Bedard and Johnstone, 2010).  
Some audit engagement issues were then included in the discussion, for example audit report 
lag, busy season reporting, and the joint provision of audit and non-audit services (Palmrose 
1986b, Chan et al. 1993, Ward et al. 1994, Firth 1997, Frankel et al. 2002).  After Enron and other 
corporate governance scandals, attention began to focus on the impact of governance issues 
on audit pricing and on a more detailed analysis of the relationship between audit fees and 
mechanisms of internal governance, not least audit committee characteristics and 
effectiveness (O’Sullivan, 1999; Peel and Clatworthy, 2001; Carcello et al., 2002; O'Sullivan and 
Diacon, 2002; Abbott et al., 2003a; Abbott et al., 2003b; Goodwin-Stewait and Kent, 2006; 
Krishnan and Lee, 2009; Bliss, 2011; Zaman et al., 2011; Hines et al., 2015).   
This chapter introduces the design and development of the audit pricing model, reviews the 
factors identified in previous literature as having an impact on audit pricing, and presents the 
hypotheses to be tested in the context of AIM companies.   The structure of the chapter is as 
follows: Section 3.1 explains the theoretical framework of the audit pricing model and its 
development; Section 3.2 reviews the impact of audit client characteristics on audit fees and 
presents the hypotheses related to these characteristics; Section 3.3 investigates the 
influence of auditor characteristics on audit pricing and addresses the related hypotheses; 
Section 3.4 explores the relationship between audit engagement characteristics and audit 
pricing decisions and presents the related hypotheses; Section 3.5 explains the impact of 
corporate governance related factors on the audit pricing decision making and posits the 
related hypotheses; Section 3.6 reviews separately the influence of individual audit 
committee characteristics on the audit fees, thus reflecting the functional importance of the 
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audit committee, and gives the hypotheses in the context of AIM companies; and finally, 
Section 3.7 summarizes the main empirical studies and findings on the determinants of audit 
pricing decision.   
3.1 The Audit Pricing Model and Theoretical Framework 
Audit pricing research began with Simunic’s paper published in 1980, in which he attempted 
to test the competitiveness of the audit industry using audit fees, and established the original 
model of the determinants of audit fees.  The cornerstone of the audit fee model is the 
expectation that audit fees are charged according to the amount of time and effort needed 
and the unit pricing for external audit service, and the establishment of the model is based on 
the assumption that both audit client and auditor are “risk neutral and seek to maximize their 
own expected profits each period” (Simunic, 1980: p.163).  Since the external audit could be 
considered as a subsystem of a company’s financial reporting system (Demski and 
Swieringa ,1974), the quantity of auditing needed by the audit client is based on the company’s 
consideration of private benefits and costs derived from the audit services.  The benefit for 
the audit client is avoidance of liability from the financial statement users.  However, this 
means that the auditor faces the risk of an uncertain return for the engagement because the 
ex post revelation of material misstatement will lead to costly litigation and/or loss of 
reputation (Simunic and Stein, 1996).  Therefore, when pricing the audit service, auditors 
make fee adjustments based on the level of liability exposure.  The fee adjustment could be 
made through a higher level of auditor effort or through a simple fee premium.  Hence, high 
audit risk and potential liability losses could increase audit time and effort so that auditors are 
more likely to detect any material misstatements, which will result in higher audit fees for the 
additional work (Brinn et al., 1994; Bell et al., 2001).  Meanwhile, different sized auditors face 
different levels of cost from audit failure, which in turn leads to differentiated audit pricing in 
the audit market (Dye, 1993; Simunic and Stein, 1996).   
A number of studies of the audit market have focused on examining the Big 
Eight/Six/Five/Four effect and the possible low-balling effect of change of auditors (Palmrose, 
1986a; Francis and Simon, 1987; Simon and Francis, 1988).  Since most of the empirical studies 
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of audit pricing in the 1980s and 1990s applied a common rationale without explicit 
explanation of the model, Pong and Whittington (1994) then identified the theoretical 
rationale of the empirical models of audit fees as supply and demand.  They argued that the 
supply curve could be determined by the costs of auditors based on the amount of work done, 
while the demand depends on the size of the audit client (Pong and Whittington, 1994).  The 
impact of other influential factors on audit fees could be explained either as interactive 
measure of size or as a component of the set-up cost of the audit service.  However, empirical 
studies present mixed results regarding some important explanatory variables such as the 
impact of internal auditing, which may be due to inherent problems with this production-
based audit pricing model (Hay et al., 2006).  
With the development of information economics and agency theory, and since auditors play 
a role as intermediaries between corporate management and investors, one strand of 
academic research began to focus on auditor independence and corporate governance.  
Agency theory explains the relationship between the owners and the management of 
companies as a conflict of interest, since corporate managers are motivated to increase their 
personal interest rather than to maximize the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency problems could be reduced by 
incurring agency costs, one component of which is monitoring costs incurred by the 
shareholders in implementing governance mechanisms to monitor the managers’ actions.  
The monitoring costs are generated from appointing internal and external oversight functions 
such as external auditors, board of directors, internal audit, and board sub-committees.  
Hence, audit fees are an essential component of the monitoring costs, since in addition to 
examining the company’s accounts, external auditors also provide assurance to the 
shareholders that the managers are acting in the owners’ interest.  Therefore, in order to fulfil 
their monitoring function and reduce the potential risk caused by poor internal monitoring, 
auditors would spend more time and effort on those companies with greater agency 
problems.  Within a corporate entity, the board of directors, the board sub-committees, and 
the internal audit all have the function of overseeing the activities of management, and the 
ownership structure of a company indicates the interests of the different shareholders.  
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Hence, the monitoring roles of these governance mechanisms in the corporate entities could 
be best explained by agency theory (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Hung, 1998).   
According to agency theory, companies with better corporate governance and internal 
control could reduce the agency cost by “enhancing the quality of information flows between 
the principal and the agent” (Pincus et al., 1989, p. 265).  More specifically here, this indicates 
the influence on audit fees of governance mechanisms such as board of directors, ownership 
structure, internal audit function, and audit committee.   
In this preliminary study of the audit pricing in AIM companies, production-based supply and 
demand theory, agency theory together provide the theoretical underpinning for the 
research and determine the approach applied.  These theories also influence the formulation 
of the study’s hypotheses.  In the following sections, the relationships between audit fees and 
influential factors with different attributes are reviewed and discussed, and the hypotheses 
to be examined in the study are presented.  
3.2 Audit Client Characteristics 
3.2.1 Client Size 
Size of the audit client company is considered the most significant determinant of audit fees 
in almost all audit pricing studies.  In their comprehensive review of the audit pricing literature, 
Hay et al. (2006) note that “the most dominant determinant of audit fees across virtually all 
published studies is size” (p.8).  The explanation of the significantly positive relationship 
between audit client size and audit fees is that more time and effort is required in auditing the 
financial statements of larger companies, in terms of testing and verifying more data and 
information (Simunic, 1980; Chan et al., 1993; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Simon, 1995; Firth, 
1997).   The main theoretical debate on audit client size focuses on the most appropriate 
measurement – whether turnover or assets (Pong and Whittington, 1994).  According to the 
review conducted by Hay et al. (2006), by 2003 out of the 111 research studies of the 
determinants of audit fees done up to 2003, 87 used total assets as the size measurement 
while only 25 used revenue.  Among the audit pricing literature based in the UK, total assets 
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is the most widely-employed size measurement.  It is argued that total assets suits audit firms 
with a balance sheet-based audit approach, while revenue is a better fit for a transactions-
based audit approach (Chan et al., 1993).  Researches using total assets (e.g. Chan et al., 1993; 
Carson et al., 2004; Carson and Fargher, 2007; Chan et al., 2013; Johnstone et al., 2014) and 
natural logarithm of annual net sales (e.g. Chan et al., 1993; Gregory and Collier, 1996; Owusu-
Ansah et al., 2010) as the size measurement all find that the larger the company, the higher 
the fees it pays for the audit services.  However, each measurement has its drawbacks.  Total 
assets could be influenced by the choice of accounting policy in terms of fixed asset 
revaluations, treatment of goodwill and other assets.  Moreover, using total assets as a size 
measurement may cause interaction with certain complex variables such as inventory and 
receivables, since total asset is directly incorporated in the calculation of these variables (Chan 
et al., 1993).   The main issue with using revenue is that its definition varies across different 
industries, which may affect subsequent comparisons (Chan et al., 1993).  In general, most 
empirical evidence suggests that, regardless of the size measure used, audit client size has a 
consistently significant positive impact on audit fees (Pong and Whittington, 1994; Ezzamel et 
al., 1996; O’Sullivan, 2000; McMeeking et al., 2006; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2009; 
Hay, 2013; Chan et al., 2013).  In view of the very strong and consistent evidence in prior 
research regarding the positive impact of audit client size on audit fees, I will include the size 
measure as a control variable in this study. 
3.2.2 Client Complexity 
Audit client complexity is another factor examined in audit pricing studies (e.g. Low et al., 
1990; Gist, 1992; Chan et al., 1993; Brinn et al., 1994; O’Keefe et al., 1994; Pong and Whittington, 
1994; Gregory and Collier, 1996; Firth, 1997; O'Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Basioudis, 2007; 
McMeeking et al., 2006; O’Sullivan, 2009).  It is reasonable to expect that the more complex 
a company is, the more difficult it will be to audit and as a result, auditors need to invest more 
time and effort which will then increase the audit fees.  A company’s complexity is commonly 
presented by the nature of the business, geographic location, internal control system, and the 
presence of special or unusual transactions.  The commonly applied measurements of audit 
client complexity include the extent of subsidiaries, the number of foreign subsidiaries, the 
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number of business segments, organization location, the proportion of foreign assets, the 
proportion of unusual transactions and the nature of some financial statement items.   
The most commonly discussed complexity factor in previous research is the presence and 
extent of subsidiaries.  The number, location, and business sector of subsidiaries are the most 
typical explanatory variables used to examine the influence of complexity on audit fees (Gist, 
1992; Chan et al., 1993; O’Sullivan, 1999, 2000, 2009; Hay et al., 2006).  There are five main 
reasons why the number and business sector of subsidiaries are likely to influence the audit 
fee paid to external auditors.  First, more subsidiaries require greater audit effort because of 
differences in statutory and disclosure requirements.  Second, when subsidiaries are not 
audited by the group auditor, there will be inquiry costs for information sharing, thus 
increasing the total audit cost.  Meanwhile, the group auditors need to pay more attention to 
intra-group transfer pricing policies (Chan et al., 1993).  Third, when subsidiary companies are 
not wholly owned by the group, extra effort is required to ensure the protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests.  Fourth, where subsidiary companies operate in different business 
fields, audit difficulty is increased and hence learning and expertise costs are higher.   Finally, 
foreign subsidiary companies are considered as another important variable for increasing 
monitoring costs, because when clients are located in different countries, the participation of 
audit offices located in those countries is required (O’Sullivan, 1999, 2000).  O’Sullivan (1999) 
studied the importance of location of subsidiaries and indicated that foreign subsidiaries have 
greater influence on audit fees compared with local subsidiaries.  Other research has found 
that the proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries has a positive impact on audit 
fees (Hay et al., 2006).   In summary, the total number of subsidiaries and the extent of foreign 
subsidiaries exert a significantly positive impact on audit fees (Maher et al., 1992; Brinn et al., 
1994; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Gist, 1994; O’Sullivan, 1999, 2000, 2009; O’Sullivan and 
Diacon, 2002; Basioudis and Fifi, 2004). 
Prior research also demonstrates that the industrial sector in which the client company 
operates affects the audit fees paid to external auditors, since certain industrial 
characteristics determine why some industries are more difficult to audit than others (Simunic, 
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1980; Turpen, 1990; Pearson and Trompeter, 1994).  The main debates concentrate on the 
following aspects.  First, companies with a high proportion of large assets are relatively easy 
to audit compared to companies with extensive inventory, receivables or knowledge-based 
assets, such as manufacturing companies.  Second, different industries are subject to 
different types and levels of regulation, which also causes audit divergence.  For example, 
Low et al. (1990) demonstrate that the audit pricing model has more explanatory power in 
samples with segmented industries, such as the hotel industry; while financial institutions and 
utilities are frequently excluded from audit pricing studies since they are generally easier to 
audit (Hay et al., 2006).  O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) examine audit pricing in the insurance 
industry and find that the audit of specialist insurers is less complex than that of composite 
insurers.  Furthermore, reduced audit fees have been reported in the case of more regulated 
industries (Ezzamel et al., 1996; O’Sullivan, 2000).  This is commonly explained by the fact that 
most companies operating in regulated industries have a limited product range with a 
predominantly national-based business, which requires less audit effort compared with 
international companies with multi-product ranges; while according to another argument, 
companies operating in regulated industries are subject to substitute evaluation, hence the 
statutory audit is not the only form of investigation they face, and thus the cost of audit is 
shared (Chan et al., 1993; Ezzamel et al., 1996; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007).   
Prior studies have also recognized the potential complexity associated with the content and 
nature of financial statement items, such as the nature of transactions, the accounting policy 
and criteria for recognition and measurement of assets, and the degree of judgment related 
to potential consequences of future events (Firth, 1985; Thinggaard and Kiertzner, 2008).  For 
example, previous studies indicate that the audit of inventories and receivables could 
influence the complexity of the audit, and report a positive link between the proportion of a 
client’s assets represented by inventories and/or receivables and audit fees (Ahmad et al., 
2006; Hay et al., 2006).  It is argued that specific types of assets, especially inventories and 
receivables, are more complex and difficult to audit.  The difficulty of auditing inventories 
comes from verifying the ownership and conditions of the various components included in 
the definition.  The auditing of receivables consists of complex procedures to ensure the 
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accuracy of records for each movement during the year and to assess accurately the level of 
likely bad debts.  Therefore, inventory and receivables as part of audit client complexity have 
a significant positive impact on audit fees (Firth, 1985; Menon and William, 2001; Basioudis and 
Fifi, 2004; Cameran, 2005; Ahmad et al., 2006; Thinggaard and Kiertzner, 2008).  O’Sullivan 
(2000) used expenditure on R&D as one of the proxies of complexity and found that a 
company’s R&D expenditure is positively associated with audit fees.  This result supports the 
argument that knowledge-based industries with higher levels of intangible assets are likely to 
require more audit services.    
This study seeks to examine the influence of company complexity on audit fees in the specific 
context of AIM companies, using the measurements discussed above.  According to Hay et al 
(2006), though the definitions of complexity vary across different studies and some lead to 
inconsistent results, the overall empirical evidences strongly suggest a positive relationship 
between complexity and audit fees.  In light of the above discussion, it is reasonable to expect 
that company complexity would be a significant determinant of audit fees for AIM companies, 
with greater complexity associated with higher fees. 
H1: There is a positive relationship between audit client complexity and audit fees in AIM 
companies.  
3.2.3 Audit Risk 
The auditor’s perception of client risk has traditionally played an important role in audit pricing 
studies, with significant evidence of more risky audits being associated with higher audit fees 
(Simunic and Stein, 1996; Cobbin, 2002; Niemi, 2002; Hoitash et al., 2008; Charles et al., 2010).  
This finding is based on the anticipation that risky clients are more likely to face problems of 
fraudulently prepared financial statements involving, for example, falsification of financial 
records, misapplication of accounting principles, and intentional omission of transactions and 
financial information (Wong, 2000).  Hence more risky audits are likely to expose auditors to 
liability claims and/or reputational loss, and the auditors seek to counter this possibility either 
through increased audit effort or by incorporating some form of insurance element in the 
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audit fee (Brinn et al., 1994; Simunic and Stein, 1996).  Firth (1990) explains that the loss faced 
by auditors experiencing failure could be both monetary and reputational, possibly including 
a lawsuit; hence companies with high audit risk would expect a higher audit charge.  In order 
to control the high possibility of misstatement and to achieve the target standard of 
assurance, extra audit hours are required, so that even where the unit price remains standard, 
there will be an increase in the total audit fee (Bell et al., 2001).  Moreover, when the business 
risk is too high to be reduced to a standard level, a premium audit fee would be expected 
(Houston et al., 2005).  Therefore, auditors commonly incorporate some element of insurance 
premium fee in order to transfer risk to the client (Chan et al., 1993).   
Consequently, audit pricing studies typically include some measures of financial performance 
and/or financial leverage, since better performance reduces the likelihood of the auditor 
subsequently incurring losses, while higher leverage increases the likelihood of business 
failure and hence possible suitor pay-outs (Simunic, 1980).  Company profitability usually 
reflects financial health, and a client suffering operating losses is more likely to fail.  It is 
reasonable to believe that weak company performance is strongly linked with higher audit 
risk, and hence higher audit fees (Caneghem, 2010).  In recent years, the existence of a loss 
for a company has become an important driver of audit fees, as a measure of profitability 
other than return on assets (Hay et al., 2006).  Studies indicate that audit fees are negatively 
impacted by return on assets, while they are positively affected by the presence of a loss.  
However, as noted by Hay et al. (2006), there is no consistent evidence that client profitability 
(or lack of it) impacts audit fees, especially in a non-US setting (e.g. Niemi, 2002).   
Meanwhile, the level of leverage is usually considered an indicator of a company’s long-term 
solvency, with the common expectation being that higher leverage is associated with higher 
auditing risk, hence higher audit fees. However, the results from existing literature are 
inconsistent.  While a significant number of studies do report a positive relationship between 
leverage and audit fees (Gist, 1992; Menon and William, 2001; Jong-Hag et al., 2008), the 
results of Ang et al. (2000) and Chaney et al. (2004) and suggest a negative relationship, and 
the authors explain this with reference to the stricter monitoring by lenders to avoid losses.  
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Moreover, Hay et al. (2006) indicate that the level of leverage is more important as a 
determinant of audit fees in the US and the UK than in other countries.   
Moreover, different regulatory requirement and legislation might potentially increase the 
audit risk.  For example, O’Sullivan (2000) separated US subsidiaries from other foreign 
subsidiaries and found a significant positive association between US subsidiaries and audit 
fees and suggests companies with US subsidiaries tend to have higher risk due to the 
justification of financial reporting and auditing based on US GAAP reconciliation and US 
legislation requirements. 
With specific reference to AIM companies, there are further risk issues that may be expected 
to influence auditors’ pricing strategies.  For example, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
AIM companies tend to be relatively young firms, often without a significant financial track 
record.  Therefore, the length of time an AIM company has been listed on the market may 
influence the auditor’s perception of the risks involved due to change in companies’ capital 
structures and financial stability and profitability, and the audit fees might be adjusted 
accordingly.  Furthermore, many companies list on AIM in order to secure external financing 
for relatively risky projects (e.g. exploration for natural resources), many of which do not have 
immediate income streams.  Such companies may present a particular audit risk and this 
should be incorporated in any empirical analysis.   
In view of the above, therefore, it is reasonable to expect that audit risk will have a positive 
impact on audit fees for AIM companies.  In line with previous research examining the impact 
of audit risk on audit fees, this study will apply various measurements in the analysis, including 
those utilized in studies on the main markets as well as some specific to AIM.   
H2: There is a positive relationship between audit risk and audit fees in AIM companies.  
3.3 Auditor Characteristics 
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3.3.1 Auditor Size 
Based on their size, audit firms are usually divided into Big Four (previously Big Eight/Six/Five) 
auditors (PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, and Ernst & Young) and non-
Big auditors.  It is widely hypothesized that Big audit firms tend to charge a premium for their 
audits, and studies in many countries have found evidence of larger audit firms, typically the 
current Big Four firms and their predecessors, charging significantly higher fees than smaller 
firms (Taffler and Ramalinggam, 1982; Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Chan et al., 1993; 
Palmrose, 1986a; Palmrose, 1986b; Turpen, 1990; Gul, 1999; Simon and Taylor, 2002; Wang et 
al., 2009).  Possible reasons for this positive association include Big auditors’ reputation for 
better quality audits (Deangelo, 1981), higher customer selectivity (Cameran, 2005), and 
stronger brand name and market power (Basioudis and Fifi, 2004).   
However, it should be noted that the findings are not entirely consistent.  Some studies in the 
USA, Canada and the UK have found no significant impact of auditor size on audit fees 
(Simunic, 1980; Brinn et al., 1994).  According to Chaney et al. (2004), on average, audit clients 
do not consider that the quality of services that big auditors provide is sufficiently superior to 
allow them to charge a fee premium.   Among the UK research, evidence on the existence of 
a large auditor premium is mixed, with studies by Pong and Whittington (1994) and Ezzamel 
et al. (1996) reporting a Big auditor premium, whereas O’Sullivan (2000) and Ezzamel et al. 
(2002) fail to find such a relationship.  In a longitudinal analysis spanning 1985-2002, 
McMeeking et al. (2006) suggest that the large auditor premium did exist in the UK in the 
1980s and early 1990s, but has been eroded in more recent years, possibly because in the 
1980s and 1990s, the degree of auditor concentration in the UK was significantly less than it 
was in early 2000s.  Some researchers also argue that the relationship between auditor size 
and audit fees should be negative, because of the economies of scale enjoyed by the Big 
auditors (Cameran, 2005).   
Some studies also find that the relationship between auditor size and audit fees differs slightly 
between small and large client companies (e.g. Carson et al. 2004).  There is evidence that for 
very large companies, auditor size does not have a significant association with audit fees 
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(Simunic, 1980; Simon et al., 1986; Francis and Stoke, 1986; Palmrose, 1986a); while for small 
companies, a positive relationship has been reported between auditor size and audit pricing 
(Francis & Simon, 1987; Lee, 1996; Peel and Roberts, 2003; Peel, 2013).  However, other studies 
find that for listed companies and large audit clients, Big Four auditors still charge an audit fee 
premium (Johnson et al., 1995; Gul, 1999; Ireland and Lennox, 2002).   
Some scholars have further separated non-Big Four auditors into second tier national firms 
and regional or local firms (Peel and Roberts, 2003), and have found a significant premium in 
the fees of Big auditors compared to those of both second tier national and regional or local 
firms (Francis and Simon, 1987; Peel and Roberts, 2003).   
Other studies have related the existence of a fee premium to individual audit firms rather than 
to all Big auditors (Firth, 1997; Langendijk, 1997; Simon and Taylor, 2002).  For example, Firth 
(1997) found that in Norway only Arthur Andersen charges an audit fee premium; Langendijk 
(1997) reported that in the Netherlands the Big auditor premium is mainly related to KPMG; 
while Simon and Taylor (2002) studied Big auditor fee premium in Ireland and revealed that 
higher fees related only to Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand.  With regard to small 
and medium sized companies, Peel and Roberts (2003) examined the UK micro-firm sub-
market and found that small companies are willing to pay a premium to be audited by a mid-
tier or even a Big Six auditor in order to benefit from associated reputational and signalling 
effects.   
Unlike the main market or other secondary market, AIM companies show great variance in 
terms of auditor selection which makes the audit market less concentrated.  This provides me 
the opportunity to re-examine the impact of some auditor characteristics including fee 
premium and using different sized auditors on audit pricing.  Following previous studies, it is 
reasonable to expect that, in a market such as AIM where the Big Four auditors are not as 
dominant, larger auditors will charge a fee premium for their audits.  In addition, as a market 
with a lower level of auditor concentration, AIM allows us to examine whether companies are 
also willing to pay higher fees to nationally known auditors (other than the Big Four) 
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compared to their small counterparts, for the differentiated products they are able to provide, 
but this fee premium effect should be less than that exhibited by the Big Four auditors.   
H3a: There is a positive relationship between audits undertaken by one of the Big Four audit firms 
and audit fees in AIM companies. 
H3b: Mid-tier auditors charge a fee premium compared to small auditors, but the premium is 
smaller than that charged by Big Four auditors.  
3.3.2 Auditor Specialization 
A specialist auditor is an auditor who has gained extensive training and experience 
concentrated in a specific industry or market (Sun and Liu 2011).  Large international 
accounting firms could be examples of specialist auditors, since they have developed 
specialized skills which enable them to provide their clients with solutions to specific issues 
(Neal and Riley, 2004).  Supported by studies on auditor specialization and audit quality, it is 
reasonable to believe that auditor specialists are able to ensure high audit quality and financial 
reporting quality with fewer issues of fraud (Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Dunn and Mayhew, 
2004), lower level of discretionary accruals (Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan, 2003) and less 
chance of financial restatement (Stanley and Todd DeZoort 2007).  Hence, audit clients are 
willing to pay higher fees for the service provided by specialist auditors (Palmrose, 1986a; 
Craswell et al., 1995; Francis et al., 2005; Carson, 2009). Neal and Riley (2004) define a 
specialised auditor as an auditor that has “differentiated itself from its competitors in terms 
of market share within a particular industry” (p.170), which indicates that market share is a 
commonly used variable to distinguish between specialist and non-specialist auditors (e.g. 
Francis et al. 2005).  However, Minutte-Meza (2013) points out that using market share as the 
proxy for auditor specialization is not appropriate because: 1) conceptually, small firms may 
have extensive industry or market experience and knowledge; and 2) since auditors with large 
market share are more likely to attract larger clients, this proxy could cause an econometric 
problem because a number of audit client size-related characteristics are simultaneously 
correlated with the specialist variable and with the audit-quality proxies and audit fee.  
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Another measure of auditor specialization is whether the firm has the largest share of the 
industry’s total assets (Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). Using this proxy, studies have found a 
positive relationship between audit fees and industry leadership (DeFond et al., 2000; 
Ferguson et al., 2003). For example, Ferguson and Stokes (2002) indicate that the industry 
auditor specialization premium appears to link to one audit firm only – KPMG.  Previous 
studies have also reported fee premium at global (Carson, 2009), national (Craswell et al., 
1995) and city level (Ferguson et al., 2003).  The evidence suggests that local level auditor 
specialization depends on experienced and skilled individuals or audit team; national level 
specialization benefits from a database of knowledge of the whole firm; while global industry 
specialization benefits from the use of the firm’s network structure in the global audit market 
(Carson, 2009; Hay, 2013).  However, although many studies report evidence to support the 
positive relationship between auditor specialization and audit fees, others have found 
different results.  Palmrose (1986a), Pearson and Trompeter (1994), and Minutte-Meza (2013) 
report no consistent evidence of a specialist fee premium, while O’Keefe et al. (1994), Deis 
and Giroux (1996) and Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) find a significant negative association 
between specialized auditors and audit fees.   
Unlike in most markets, where the auditor specialist is one of the big international accounting 
firms (e.g. KPMG in Australia), in AIM the auditor specialist with the largest market share is 
Grant Thornton, a mid-tier national audit firm which in 2010 had more than 15 per cent of AIM 
companies as clients (see Table 4.3).  In light of the above discussion, it is reasonable to expect 
that the auditor specialist in AIM, Grant Thornton, will have significant positive impact on audit 
fees for its audit services.  Meanwhile, similar to other markets, it is reasonable to believe that 
auditors with higher market share in AIM are better-skilled and experienced and more familiar 
with the market and companies, which would lead to higher audit fees.   
H4a: There is a positive significant relationship between audits undertaken by Grant Thornton 
and audit fees in AIM companies.  
H4b: There is positive significant relationship between auditor specialist in AIM and audit fees.  
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3.3.3 Auditor Location 
The location of the audit firm is another variable that could influence the audit fee.  Here the 
discussion is based on two issues: geographical proximity and metropolitan centre premium.  
With regard to proximity, the debate revolves around the following two assumptions: First, 
closer proximity should mean greater familiarity with client information, hence lower level of 
information asymmetry between auditor and client, so reducing audit risk and leading to 
lower audit fees (Malloy, 2005).  However, according to the other assumption, the 
information advantage and the ease of communication facilitated by proximity may lead to 
more effective monitoring and higher quality from local auditors, which will then lead to 
higher audit fees.  In their research, Jong-Hag et al. (2008) examine the relationship between 
auditors’ and clients’ geographical proximity and audit quality, as well as audit pricing, and 
conclude that cost saving deriving from local audits dominates the relationship and leads to 
lower audit fees.   
With regard to the metropolitan centre premium, studies indicate that auditor firms located 
in metropolitan centres such as London (UK), Amsterdam (Netherlands) and Oslo (Norway) 
charge an audit premium.  For example, in previous UK based studies, Ezzamel et al. (1996), 
O’Sullivan (2000), Chaney et al. (2004), and Xue and O’Sullivan (2013) indicate a significant 
positive relationship between audit fees and auditors located in London.  This could be 
explained by the higher costs of running a London-based practice, as well as the greater (and 
more costly) expertise held by London-based offices.  Although Hay et al.’s (2006) meta-
analysis finds an overall significant and positive relationship between audit undertaken in 
metropolitan center and audit pricing, there are still some research fail to find significant 
association.  In this study, I propose that for AIM companies, London-based auditors charge a 
premium for their audits. 
H5: There is positive significant relationship between audit undertaken by London auditors in 
AIM and audit fees.  
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3.3.4 Auditor Change 
Audit clients will always try to reduce the audit cost while maintaining the level of quality and 
find the best balance between audit benefits and costs, and changing their auditors could be 
an opportunity to reduce audit fees since some audit firms provide discounts to new 
customers in order to get more business (Deangelo, 1981).  This audit firm strategy is usually 
referred to as “low balling”.  It is expected that the rotation of auditors would allow clients 
to benefit from lower fees due to the low balling strategy, especially when they choose to 
switch away from Big Four audit firms (Bedard et al., 2008).  In their investigation of UK 
companies, Gregory and Collier (1996) found a significant fee reduction when companies 
changed their auditors, while the reduction was greater if they changed from non-Big Six to 
Big Six audit firms.  Owusu-Ansah et al. (2010) study Greek companies and find a significant 
negative relationship between change of auditor and audit fees.  They suggest that the reason 
could be that with the opening up of the auditor market in Greece, new entrants, especially 
the international firms, offer lower prices in order to attract clients and expand their market 
share; alternatively, it might be that the more competitive audit market forces firms to cut 
prices in order to maintain clients.  Peel (2013) reviewed the pricing of initial engagement in 
the UK and found that large companies listed on the Main Market get discount from switching 
between Big Four auditors, which indicates that for companies who considering appointing 
Big Four auditors, audit price is an important factor since all four auditors provide relatively 
homogeneous product with similar quality.  Based on the association between audit tenure 
and audit quality, as well as the low balling strategy, audit fees would be lower in the first 
several years, due to unfamiliarity with the clients and the discount offer, and then increase 
to normal levels in the following years due to the increase in audit effort and audit quality.  
This runs counter to the learning curve of economics, whereby the audit fee should decrease 
after a few years when the auditors become familiar with their clients’ company situation and 
accounting systems.   
In the recent study, Peel (2013) also compared the benefits from switching auditors for 
companies listed on the Main Market and AIM, and found out that AIM companies switch 
from the Big Four auditors to the mid-tier auditors would receive significant discounts, while 
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no evidence shows that they could get some benefit from switching between Big Four 
auditors.  In this study, change of auditors will be applied as the measurement of audit change 
to investigate the existence of a low balling strategy in the AIM companies in general.  This 
study considers all kinds of auditor switching which expands the Peel’s study in 2013 to test 
whether their results still hold.  In line with the findings of Gregory and Collier (1996) and Peel 
(2013), it is reasonable to believe that AIM companies that change their auditors between 
2008/2009 and 2009/2010 financial year would pay lower fees for auditing services. 
H6: There is a negative relationship between change of auditors and audit fees in AIM companies.  
3.4 Engagement Characteristics 
3.4.1 Report Lag 
Report lag refers to the length of time between a company’s financial year end and the signing 
date of its audit report, usually measured in the number of days or weeks.  It is sometimes 
considered as an indication of audit efficiency.  On one hand, a shorter period may indicate 
greater efficiency of the auditor; however, it could also represent tight deadlines with low 
audit quality.  On the other hand, a longer time might reflect more testing or investigation 
work required by auditors.  Most of the existing research shows a positive relationship 
between report lag and audit fee (Ezzamel et al., 1996; O’Sullivan, 2000; Hay et al., 2006), 
while O’Sullivan (1999) failed to find any impact.  Further investigation explains that longer 
report lag is usually caused by incremental audit effort, the presence of contentious tax issues, 
and the use of less experienced audit staff (Knechel and Payne, 2001).  In line with previous 
research, it is reasonable to believe that, for AIM companies, longer length of time between 
a company’s financial year end and the signing date of its audit report is associated with higher 
audit fees.  
H7: There is a positive relationship between the length of report lag and audit fees in AIM 
companies.  
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3.4.2 Busy Season 
It is known that auditors have a “busy season”, which corresponds to the time when most 
companies have their financial year end.  In the northern hemisphere countries, such as the 
United States and the UK, the most common financial year end is 31st December, so the 
auditors’ busy season refers to the three months afterwards till 31st March; while in Australia 
and New Zealand, the common financial year end is 30th June.  It is expected that during the 
busy season auditors’ workload is higher, and due to the constraint of resources, the auditors 
might need to spend extra hours for auditing, which might result in higher audit costs.  
However, the evidence on this issue is inconsistent.  Among 32 studies examined by Hay et al. 
(2006), only five found a significant positive association, while two found a negative 
relationship and the rest showed no significant result.  However, Hay (2013) asserts that busy 
season has a significant positive relationship with audit fee, and suggests that further studies 
should include this measure.  Hence, following previous research, this study will examine the 
impact of busy season audit service on the audit fees in the context of AIM companies, and it 
is expected that AIM companies with financial year end during the busy audit season pay 
higher audit fees.  
H8: There is a positive relationship between busy season audits and audit fees in AIM companies.  
3.4.3 Audit Opinion 
When an auditor issues a report with a qualified or modified opinion, this indicates problems 
in completing the audit.  Simunic (1980) notes that audit problems also mean increased audit 
risk and audit effort and hence higher audit fees.  The commonly used measurement of the 
existence of audit problems is a dummy variable indicating a qualified or modified audit 
opinion.  It is reasonable to expect a positive association between problematic audit reports 
and audit fees; however, the empirical results are inconsistent.  According to Hay et al. (2006), 
less than a third of studies surveyed found a significant positive association.  Furthermore, 
different results are found across different countries and periods.  Among all the studies, a 
positive association is observed mainly in Australia and the United States (Hay et al., 2006).  In 
addition, the majority of the studies indicating significantly positive results were conducted 
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before 1990, while after 1990 the results become insignificant (Hay et al., 2006).  This might 
be explained by the changes in reporting policies on going-concern issues in the late 1980s.  
Hence, in this study, it is reasonable to keep an open mind on the relationship between 
qualified or modified audit opinion and the audit fees paid by AIM companies, and state the 
hypothesis in null form.  
H9: There is no significant relationship between qualified or modified audit opinion and audit 
fees in AIM companies.  
3.4.4 Non-Audit Services 
Since Simunic (1980), the relationship between audit fees and non-audit services has attracted 
a great deal of attention from both scholars and commentators (e.g. Simunic, 1984; Hillison 
and Kennelley, 1988; Firth, 1997).  Recently, due largely to more stringent disclosure 
requirements, researchers have paid more attention to the impact of joint provision of audit 
and non-audit services on audit fees (e.g. Whisenant et al., 2003; Stein, 2006; Zaman et al., 
2011).  The non-audit services provided by accounting firms include taxation consultancy, 
management consultancy, IT system consultancy, international business advice, and financial 
and investment consultancies (Firth, 1997).  Non-audit services have become a major source 
of accounting firms’ total revenue (Vinatoru and Calota, 2009).  Many studies have 
investigated whether the provision of non-audit services from the same accounting firm may 
influence the auditor’s independence and objectivity (Firth, 1997; Antle et al. 2006).  It is 
argued that the provision of non-audit services has a potential negative impact on audit fees, 
due to the “knowledge spillover” (Abdel-Khalik, 1990; Whisenant et al., 2003).  According to 
this argument, obtaining non-audit services from the auditor firm could be cost efficient, due 
to the reduction of client search and transaction costs; auditors would need to spend less 
effort in testing or investigating and increasing their understanding of the client, hence 
contributing to an enhanced audit performance with lower cost (Joe and Vandervelde, 2007).  
Furthermore, some researchers have proposed a “loss leader” argument whereby accounting 
firms may strategically reduce audit fees in order to increase competitive advantage and 
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attract more non-audit business from their clients (Hillison and Kenneley, 1988; Ahmad et al. 
2006).    
However, contrary to these theories, the overwhelming evidence from the existing literature 
indicates that the provision of non-audit services has a positive influence on audit fees 
(Palmrose, 1986b; Ezzamel et al., 1996; Firth, 1997; Firth 2002).  A number of explanations have 
been suggested for these counter-intuitive results.  Simunic (1984) and Firth (1997) argue that 
the joint provision of audit and non-audit services might create a false impression for clients 
about the price-elasticity of audits by reducing the price per unit of audit service; this would 
then lead to more auditing being demanded and higher total audit cost.  Ezzamel et al. (2002) 
and Firth (2002) suggest that large non-audit fees may arise from clients’ special consultancy 
requirements such as merger and acquisition, share issues, implementation of new IT and 
accounting systems, appointment of new director, and/or corporate restructuring, and these 
specific events will require additional audit effort, which will then increase the audit cost.   
Another possible explanation is that companies requesting more non-audit services are more 
likely to be problematic with a higher litigation risk, hence they will be charged higher audit 
fees to cover the potential audit risk.   Other literature argues that the breakdown in total 
audit remunerations may be split in favour of the audit partners as traditionally they were 
seen as being more important (Solomon, 1990; McMeeking et al., 2006).  Wu (2006) argues 
that since SOX precludes auditors form providing certain non-audit services for audit clients, 
it leads to a positive impact on audit fees because this restriction reduces the competition 
crossover in the market; meanwhile, SOX also requires the auditor to evaluate the clients’ 
internal controls which allows the auditors to obtain extra benefits under the new regulatory 
environment.  Hay et al. (2006) point out that the monopoly power and service efficiency of 
non-audit services allow auditors to charge higher fees.   
The relationship between non-audit services and audit fees has been studied in a variety of 
countries and settings, including private and public companies in the US, UK, Australia, France, 
Korea, New Zealand and Singapore (e.g. Palmrose, 1986b; Davis et al., 1993;  Ezzamel et al., 
1996; Jeong et al., 2005; Hay et al., 2006).  Most studies use some form of ordinary least 
squares regression, which makes the results comparable.  However, Whisenant et al. (2003) 
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incorporate simultaneous equation models into audit pricing studies and find that audit fees 
and non-audit fees are jointly determined.  In order to avoid endogeneity problems, many 
studies use a two-stage least squares approach, but their findings show inconsistent results 
on the relationship between audit and non-audit fees.  For example, Whisenant et al. (2003) 
indicate that there is no significant association between audit and non-audit fees after 
considering the simultaneous equation bias, which suggests that the knowledge spillover 
does not exist.  Conversely, Antle et al. (2006) use US data to test the joint determination of 
audit fees, non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals, and find that audit fees and non-audit fees 
are significantly correlated, which suggests that there is knowledge spillover from the 
auditing to non-audit service.  Chan et al. (2012) introduce new econometric tests and 
techniques to overcome the problem of weak instruments and find that when the instruments 
are not weak, there is a positive association between audit and non-audit fees, and this 
association also exists for audit and tax-related non-audit fees.  Moreover, when applying 
simultaneous equation models, it is important to test the appropriateness of the instruments 
(Chan et al., 2012).   
This study will examine the impact of the joint provision of audit and non-audit service on 
audit fees for AIM companies.  Given the consistent evidence of a positive relationship 
between the extent of non-audit services and audit fees for fully listed companies, it is 
reasonable to suggest that this positive relationship will hold for AIM companies.  
H10: There is a positive relationship between the amount of non-audit services simultaneously 
purchased from the auditor and audit fees in AIM companies. 
3.5 Internal Governance Issues 
Previous studies have identified corporate governance as an important determinant of audit 
fees.  Sullivan and Diacon (2002)argued that the quality of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms may have a negative influence on audit fees because companies with strong 
internal governance tend to conduct stricter control of auditing through either the board or 
an audit committee, which, it might be expected, would reduce the effort external auditors 
need to invest in the audit process.  However, other research suggests that good internal 
70 
 
governance may lead to a higher quality audit and, consequently, higher audit fees (Carcello 
et al., 2002).  Following Enron and other high-profile corporate scandals, the issue of 
corporate governance mechanisms and the relationship between auditors and internal 
governance has attracted much discussion. The main governance issues discussed in previous 
research can be categorized into three aspects: board characteristics, ownership structure, 
and audit committee characteristics.   
3.5.1 Board Characteristics 
Board size, independence, diligence and expertise are considered important board 
characteristics with regard to the effectiveness of decision making and internal control of the 
company.  The functions of independent directors primarily involve monitoring firms to 
ensure that they are effectively controlled, which, to a certain extent, leads to a requirement 
for higher audit quality and to more audit work for external auditors so that they can deliver 
a proper financial report to complement the non-executive monitoring.  Hence, board 
independence is expected to have positive an impact on audit fees.  Board diligence is 
commonly defined in terms of the number of board meetings held during a financial year and 
directors’ attendance at each meeting.  Vafeas (1999) argued that board effectiveness could 
be indexed by board diligence, because higher board diligence indicates stricter monitoring 
by the board on financial reporting processes and auditing procedures.  Therefore, greater 
board diligence requires more audit work, hence higher audit fees.  The explanation for the 
positive effect is that a board with more independent directors, greater diligence and more 
expertise would conduct better internal control and are willing to receive more suggestions 
from auditors, leading to a higher level of audit quality and, ultimately, higher audit cost 
(O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002). 
However, there is no consistent empirical evidence to confirm the relationship between board 
characteristics and audit fees.  Some research results indicate that larger boards, greater 
independence, higher levels of diligence and more financial expertise on boards would lead 
to higher audit fees since these boards would have higher requirements on the audit quality 
to protect their reputation capital, reduce legal liability, and to satisfy shareholders’ interests 
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(Tsui et al., 2001; Catcello et al., 2002); while others show no clear evidence (O’Sullivan, 1999; 
Peel and Clatworthy, 2001).  O’Sullivan (1999) examined the impact of boards composition or 
leadership on the audit fees of large UK companies in the post-Cadbury (1992) period and did 
not find a significant impact, and this result is supported by Peel and Clatworthy’s research 
(2001) which focusing on the relationship between board structure and audit fees in UK 
companies before the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee.  They argue that the lack 
of significant impact might due to the dual impact of governance characteristics that the 
better governance practices could lead to stronger internal controls and reduced audit 
demand, or result in more extensive audits and higher audit fees.  Conversely, Carcello et al.’s 
(2002) investigation of the impact of board independence, diligence and expertise on audit 
fees indicates a significant positive relationship.  O’Sullivan (2000) finds that board 
independence (measured by the proportion of non-executive directors) has a significant 
positive relationship with audit fees.  Similarly, Hay et al. (2008) indicate that corporate 
governance measurements are positively associated with audit fees.  The argument for the 
positive impact explains as the independent, diligent and expert boards pay more attention 
on their reputational capital and reducing legal liability and promoting shareholders’ interests 
through enhancing external audit tests and quality.  Meanwhile, Tsui et al. (2001) find evidence 
that the independence of corporate boards (measured by CEO/Chairman duality) is an 
important factor of audit fees, but their results indicate that this relationship is negative, and 
becomes weak for firms with high growth opportunities.   Boo and Sharma (2008) compare 
large listed companies and companies in non-regulated industries in the US and find that the 
influence of board independence and size on audit fees is weaker for regulated companies, 
and argue that the weaker impact is due to the reduced information asymmetry caused by 
stronger regulation which would then reduce the demand for external auditing.   
The research focus on the link between audit fees and board characteristics is largely 
attributed to widespread moves to strengthen the independence of company boards with an 
increased emphasis on the governance potential of greater use of non-executive directors 
and the separation of the leadership (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; and UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2012).  However, since most AIM companies are small or medium 
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sized and in their early stages of development, they are not required to comply with the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2012), but only encouraged to observe the recommendations 
contained in the Corporate Governance Guidelines for Small Quoted Companies (QCA, 2009)7.  
Given the extensive freedom with regard to governance arrangements, including board 
structure, and the less strict disclosure requirements, it is difficult to collect data on all four 
board characteristics.  This study will narrow the focus to board independence and leadership, 
and examine its influence on the audit pricing for AIM companies.  The diversity of both 
theoretical and prior empirical findings suggests that we should keep an open mind regarding 
the likely relationship between board independence and audit fees, and state the hypothesis 
in null form.  
H11: There is no significant relationship between board independence or leadership and audit fees 
in AIM companies.  
3.5.2 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure is regarded as a reflection of corporate control, with an associated 
impact on the intensity of the audit process.  Ownership structure was introduced to the audit 
pricing model by Chan et al. (1993), but their results showed a statistically insignificant impact.  
The different levels of ownership and the extent to which ownership and control are separate 
are expected to cause various agency problems (Collis et al., 2004).  Managerial ownership 
and large blockholder ownership are the most common factors examined, but present 
distinctly different impacts on audit fees.  A US-based study examining the relationship 
between ownership structure and audit fees has revealed that different ownership structures 
influence audit fees in different ways: diffused institutional stock ownership (with less than 5% 
individual shareholding) shows a significant positive relationship with audit fees; institutional 
blockholder ownership (with 5% or more individual shareholding) has a significant negative 
impact; and managerial stock ownership shows only a negative association with audit fees 
(Mitra et al., 2007).  It is argued that a high proportion of managerial ownership reflects higher 
                                                          
7 The latest version is the Corporate Governance Code for Small and Mid-sized Quoted Companies published in 2013. 
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director commitment and better internal monitoring, which would enhance internal audit 
assessment and reduce risk, hence reduce audit fees (Gotti et al., 2012).  O’Sullivan (2000) 
examined the ownership structure in UK companies prior to 1992, and found that the 
proportion of equity owned by executive directors has a negative impact on audit fees, which 
is supported by Peel and Clatworthy (2001) who also found that only directors’ ownership has 
a significant impact on audit fees.  A number of studies have focused on the potential impact 
of companies’ external shareholding on audit fees.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
dispersed owners are more likely to anticipate opportunities for managers to pursue their 
own interests at the owners’ expense.  There are two sides to the argument: From the 
managers’ perspective, concern regarding the shareholders’ perceptions of their credibility 
and transparency means that they are expected to push for a more comprehensive audit so 
as to signal their interest in the shareholders’ welfare (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002).  From the 
shareholders’ perspective, Chan et al. (1993) suggest that in widely dispersed ownership 
companies it is likely that there will be greater reliance on auditors as a means of managerial 
monitoring, and this will lead indirectly to higher quality audits and higher audit fees.  On the 
other hand, the major shareholders in companies with more concentrated ownership are 
more likely to be actively involved in monitoring managerial behaviour, thus reducing the 
dependence on the auditor; hence audit fees will be lower.  However, using UK data, 
O’Sullivan (2000) found no evidence that large blockholders have a significant impact on audit 
fees.  In two more recent UK studies, however, Zaman et al. (2011) and Adelopo et al. (2012) 
find evidences that greater ownership concentration (measured by the number of external 
blockholders) may have a negative impact on audit fees, which provides support for the 
notion that large external shareholders’ monitoring role of the companies’ internal 
governance and control mainly involves with the managerial behaviour hence reduces the 
external audit tests and costs.   
For many AIM companies, attracting large institutional shareholders represents opportunity 
for further expansion or acquisitions.  For these companies, large blockholders, especially 
institutional investors, possess significant equity ownership so are expected to involve in AIM 
companies’ internal control and monitor their governance practices.  Based on the findings of 
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recent UK studies, we expect that large blockholder ownership will have a negative influence 
on the audit fees of AIM companies. 
H12: There is a negative relationship between large blockholder ownership and audit fees in AIM 
companies.  
3.5.3 Nominated Advisor 
Nominated advisors (NOMADs) are central to the regulatory regime of AIM.  As ‘regulatory 
agents’ they are responsible for verifying a company’s financial health and suitability for AIM, 
and provide advice to keep the company up-to-date on corporate governance and regulatory 
issues in the post-listing period (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012).  The AIM Rules for Companies 
(London Stock Exchange, 2010) require that all applicants to AIM appoint an approved Nomad 
before the IPO and retain a Nomad throughout the whole period of listing.  The Nomads’ joint 
role of ‘gatekeeper’ to ensure the suitability of companies admitted to the exchange, and 
advisor to companies on compliance, is unique to AIM.  A Nomad can also act as the 
company’s broker, involving its own commercial interest in the company’s listing on AIM.  It 
is important for the financial advisory firm acting as Nomad to maintain its reputation in order 
to secure its business both within and outside AIM, hence Nomads with greater involvement 
with their clients or higher market share in AIM are more likely to improve the effective 
monitoring of their clients’ internal governance practice and information disclosure.  In order 
to maintain its reputation and secure the assurance from liability exposure, the Nomad may 
rely on the external auditors for the financial reporting quality and information disclosure, in 
which case that AIM companies who hiring Nomad also acting as their brokers or with higher 
market share in the market will acquire more comprehensive auditing with incremental tests 
which will then lead to higher audit cost.  On the other hand, similar as external auditors, 
Nomads also act as external monitors for AIM companies which means they might share part 
of monitoring duties in terms of financial reporting and information disclosure through 
enhancing the internal control and governance practice of the AIM companies which would 
then reduce the auditors’ effort.  As the first test to examine the impact of Nomad 
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involvement and reputation on the audit fees paid by AIM companies, it is reasonable to have 
an open mind and state the hypothesis in null form.     
H13a: There is no relationship between the Nomad acting as the broker and audit fees in AIM 
companies.  
H13b: There is no relationship between using the Nomad with higher market share and audit fees 
in AIM companies.  
3.5.4 Audit Committee Characteristics 
Audit committees have been adopted by most large listed companies as an important 
mechanism of internal governance, since they have “the potential to improve the quality of 
financial reporting by reviewing the financial statements on behalf of the board” (Cadbury, 
1992, p.67).  According to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the audit committee is “a committee 
established by and amongst the board of directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing 
the accounting and financial reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial 
statements of the issuer” (p.29).  In the US, the SOX Act (2002) requires every public company 
to establish an audit committee with independent directors, and at least one member needs 
to be qualified as a financial expert.  In the UK, the Smith Report (Smith Committee, 2003), 
the Combined Code (2003, 2006, 2008), and the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010, 2012) 
all provide detailed recommendations regarding audit committees: all UK-listed companies 
should establish audit committees composed of at least three independent directors (two in 
the case of smaller companies), of whom at least one should have recent and relevant 
financial experience; members should not serve for more than two terms (each term lasts 
three years); and the members should meet at least three times per year.  The roles and 
responsibilities of an audit committee include: 1) determining the level of non-audit services 
provided by external auditors and the hiring, fee negotiation and oversight of the external 
auditing process, and providing a bridge for employees to report accounting or auditing 
matters (SOX Act, 2002); or 2) monitoring the financial statements and the effectiveness of 
internal audit, making recommendations on the appointment and remuneration of the 
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external auditor, monitoring the external auditor’s independence and effectiveness, and 
developing and implementing policy on the non-audit services provided by the external 
auditor (Smith Committee, 2003).  Hence, the establishment of an audit committee is 
important to control the internal audit process and improve the quality of financial reporting.  
As part of internal corporate governance, the existence of an audit committee has been 
considered an indicator of strict control and monitoring in order to avoid financial fraud or 
misstatement.  Therefore, companies with audit committees tend to pay higher audit fees for 
more comprehensive audit tests and increasing effort (Collier and Gregory, 1996; Goodwin-
Stewait and Kent, 2006; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007).  Previous studies have examined the 
relationship between audit committee characteristics and audit fees, and have identified 
positive relationships between fees and specific audit committee characteristics such as size 
(Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Zaman et al., 2011), independence (Abbott et al. 2003a, Vafeas 
and Waegelein 2007, Zaman et al. 2011, Johl et al. 2012, Chan et al. 2013), financial expertise 
(Abbott et al., 2003a; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009; Zaman et 
al., 2011), and diligence of members (Goodwin-Stewait and Kent 2006, Hoitash and Hoitash 
2009, Zaman et al. 2011, Adelopo et al. 2012).  These findings support the explanations that 
audit committees with these characteristics are more likely to request a high level of internal 
control and audit assurance, hence leading to higher audit fees (Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2013); 
that such audit committees are more concerned with the effectiveness of their monitoring 
duties and supportive of external auditing, hence leading to increased requirements on audit 
effort; or that such audit committees indicate a lower level of risk, thus leading to reduced 
audit effort and audit fees (Abbott et al. 2003a).  
Previous studies measure audit committee size with the number of directors serving on the 
audit committee.  While some studies have found a positive relationship between audit 
committee size and audit fees (Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Zaman et al., 2011; Adelopo et al., 
2012), other research has failed to find a significant relationship (Chan et al., 2013).  It has been 
argued that the influence of audit committee size on audit fees could be subject to firm size 
(Chan et al., 2013).  The independence of audit committees can be measured by the proportion 
of independent directors.  Empirical evidence demonstrates that committee members’ 
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independence is positively associated with audit fees because the presence of more 
independent members on the audit committee enhances the efficacy of the internal auditor 
function and thereby increases audit quality, or it increases audit scope hence the audit effort 
(Abbott et al., 2003a; Lee et al., 2004; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Boo and Sharma, 2008; 
Zaman et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2013).   
Similar to board diligence, audit committee diligence refers to the number of audit committee 
meetings held in a year and the attendance of audit committee members.  As an indicator of 
the audit committee’s activities, it is argued that frequent audit committee meetings indicate 
a higher likelihood that companies are either experiencing high audit risk or demanding 
greater audit assurance, both of which lead to higher external audit cost.  Alternatively, more 
audit committee meetings could indicate an effective and functional internal audit mechanism, 
which also requires a high level of audit quality.  Empirical studies confirm that audit 
committee diligence is positively related to audit fees (Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin-Steward 
and Kent, 2006; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Zaman et al., 2011).   
The definition and measurements of audit committee expertise vary across countries.  In 
general, audit committee members with accounting expertise, finance expertise, or 
supervisory expertise could be considered as financial experts (Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2012).  
Most studies have found a significant positive impact of audit committee members’ expertise 
on audit fees (Abbott et al., 2003a; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009), 
which suggests that financial experts are more concerned about audit quality and may 
influence the demand for audit effort and scope; moreover, audit committee members with 
accounting knowledge or experience have better understanding of the importance of 
external auditing and are able to engage in more comprehensive discussion on accounting 
issues with external auditors in order to make more appropriate decisions.  Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009) then narrowed the definition of financial expertise down to audit 
committee members who have accounting knowledge and experience and reported that with 
restricted definition, accounting expertise exerts a negative influence on the audit costs.  They 
argue that this is because the existence of accounting experts reduces the audit risk, and 
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auditors value their expertise as increasing the effectiveness of the audit committee and 
reducing the need for external audit service.  Furthermore, DeZoort et al. (2003) report that 
audit committee members with CPAs and with greater experience provide greater support 
for the auditor than other audit committee members. 
Overall, the research indicates that the existence of an audit committee, its size, and 
committee members’ independence, expertise and diligence, are all positively associated with 
audit fees (Abbott et al., 2003a; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Zaman et al., 2011).  However, in 
their study of UK insurance companies, O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) failed to find clear 
evidence of this relationship.  In addition, Zaman et al. (2011) investigate the influence of 
overall audit committee effectiveness on audit fees using a composite variable comprising the 
four main recommended principles of good governance practice in the UK (audit committee 
independence, expertise, diligence and size), and find a significant positive association for 
large companies.  The positive impact indicate that effective audit committees concerns more 
about the potential litigation risk and their reputation capital and tend to enhance their 
monitor on external audit process and increase the audit scope to ensure the audit quality.   
For AIM companies, guidance on the establishment and governance role of audit committees 
is provided by the QCA Audit Committee Guide for Smaller Quoted Companies (2009)8, which 
includes a set of detailed recommendations on the composition and characteristics of audit 
committee membership, and the meeting obligations for audit committees.  According to The 
Guide (2009), the responsibilities of audit committees of AIM companies include reviewing 
the annual report and financial statements independently, managing relations with external 
auditors and monitoring the objectivity and independence of auditing, reviewing the firm’s 
risk management processes, and communicating with shareholders.  The Guide (2009) 
suggests that the smaller listed companies should follow the Combined Code (2008)’s 
guidance and establish an audit committee with “at least two independent non-executive 
directors” (QCA, 2009, p.6).  The Guide (2009) also mentions that the audit committee should 
not be too big in size, but better to have members who not only have “recent and relevant 
                                                          
8 The latest version is the Audit Committee Guide for Small and Mid-Size Quoted Companies (2014).  
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financial experience”, but also have “extensive business experience, knowledge of financial 
markets, understanding of management practices and operational risks, and knowledge of 
any relevant specialist regulatory or legal requirements” (QCA, 2009, p.6).   
Since previous studies on the relationship between audit committee characteristics and audit 
fees have focused mainly on large public listed companies, and the audit committee 
effectiveness and quality could be affected by firm size (Chan et al., 2013), it is important to 
examine the impact of audit committee characteristics on audit fees in small and medium 
sized firms.  In light of the above discussion, this study will examine the relationship between 
audit committee characteristics and audit fees in AIM companies.  Since AIM companies are 
not required to follow the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), their audit committee 
structures and composition differ from those of larger UK-listed companies; and according to 
the Guide (2009), audit committee members are acting as the bridge between management 
and internal auditors and external auditors.  Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the audit 
committee characteristics of AIM companies would have significant impact of the audit 
pricing.  Due to the relaxed disclosure requirements, it is difficult to collect enough data 
related to audit committee meetings; hence, in this study only audit committee size, 
independence and expertise will be examined to find out their influence on the audit pricing 
in small and medium sized companies, and some AIM-specific measurements for audit 
committee characteristics will be applied.  Based on findings from previous research on large 
public listed companies, the following hypotheses are proposed:  
H14a: There is a positive relationship between the size of audit committee and audit fees in AIM 
companies. 
H14b: There is a positive relationship between audit committee independence and audit fees in 
AIM companies. 
H14c: There is a positive relationship between audit committee expertise and audit fees in AIM 
companies.   
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed prior literature on audit pricing.  In order to research the 
competitiveness of the audit market and examine the contracting and independence issues 
related to the audit process, scholars study the factors that could influence audit pricing.  
Audit pricing knowledge can help the audit client to decide on a strategy in audit fee 
negotiation and to improve internal control in order to reduce their audit cost, and can also 
help auditors to determine an appropriate audit pricing model.  In the thirty-five years since 
Simunic (1980) first established an empirical model to explain audit fee determinants, scholars 
have verified and expanded the model with new factors and determinants, and explained the 
rationale with different theoretical frameworks such as supply and demand theory and 
agency theory.  These determinants can be classified as audit client characteristics, auditor 
characteristics, engagement characteristics, and internal governance issues.  Among audit 
client characteristics, company size is the most significant and consistent explanatory factor 
that is positively associated with audit fees.  A number of company complexity variables 
indicate that the more complex a company, the higher the fee it pays for audit services.  Audit 
risk variables such as companies’ profitability and leverage are found to have influence on 
audit pricing, with a higher fee being charged by auditors for extra audit effort or assurance.  
Auditor characteristics such as size, specialization, location and auditor change are also shown 
to have influence on audit pricing.  Big auditors, auditors with specialized experience and 
knowledge, and auditors located in major cities are more likely to charge higher audit fees; 
while using a local auditor or changing auditors might reduce audit fees.  A number of 
engagement attributes, such as whether the company’s financial year end falls during the 
auditor busy season, the length of time between the financial year end and the signing of the 
audit report, the presence of an audit qualification or modification, and the joint provision of 
non-audit services, have impact on audit fees.  However, due to the high concentration of the 
audit market and less selective power for large listed companies, some auditor characteristics’ 
impact become difficult to examine in recent years (i.e. auditor size).  Moreover, prior studies 
fail to find consistent results when examining the impact of the other factors (i.e. non-audit 
services, audit opinion, auditor change, and audit report lag) on the audit pricing.     
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Recently, an emerging strand of research has begun to investigate issues related to internal 
governance mechanisms and how they influence auditors’ pricing decisions.  Board 
characteristics such as size, independence, CEO/Chairman duality, and diligence; ownership 
structure; and audit committee characteristics including the existence of audit committee, 
number of members, independence, diligence and members’ expertise, are found to have 
influence on the fees companies pay for auditing services.  However, under the explain-or-
comply rule, most large listed UK companies choose to follow the corporate governance code 
which makes it difficult to investigate how diversified board and audit committee 
characteristics and ownership structure influence the audit pricing.   
The Alternative Investment Market is a secondary market dominated by small and medium 
sized companies with distinct characteristics compared with companies listed on the main 
market, in terms of company complexity, audit risk, requirement of audit service, ownership 
structure, and corporate governance regulations, so the determinants of audit fees in AIM 
companies and their impact could be different from those in the large listed companies.  Since 
it is difficult to fully investigate the impact of certain influential factors on audit pricing using 
large listed companies with high auditor concentration, less auditor selection power, and high 
homogeneity in terms of internal governance especially board structure and audit committee 
effectiveness, this study identifies the research gap of audit pricing research and overcome 
this issue by examining a secondary market with different company characteristics, less 
concentrated audit market, different external regulatory regime and diversified internal 
governance structures, aiming to modify the audit pricing model and find out the actual 
influence of some factors that could not be examined for a while.  Based on the reviewed 
literature and the characteristics of AIM companies, this chapter has outlined and justified 
hypotheses related to various influential factors which will lead to a comprehensive study of 
the audit pricing model.   
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology  
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology employed in the study. It begins by clarifying 
the research objective and questions to be investigated.  Next, it explains the justification for 
the choice of research sample, and outlines the principal sources of data used in the study, as 
well as the data collection process.  Since this is an empirical study, the chapter then goes on 
to identify and justify the dependent and independent variables used in the empirical analysis.  
The sub-sections explain in detail how the dependent variable (audit fee) and independent 
variables (audit client size, complexity, risk; auditor size, specialist, location, tenure; report lag, 
busy season, audit opinion, non-audit service; board independence, ownership structure, 
Nominated Adviser characteristics; and audit committee size, independence, expertise) are 
measured.  Next, the regression models employed to examine the determinants of audit 
pricing in AIM companies are explained.  Essentially, three models are used: 1) a traditional 
model to test whether the variables typically used in the studies of fully listed companies are 
suitable for AIM companies; 2) an AIM model including several AIM-specific variables to 
expand the traditional model; and 3) a model incorporating audit committee characteristics, 
which keys into recent debates related to the influence of audit committee effectiveness on 
companies’ audit pricing.  The AIM model is also used in several sub-samples, to investigate 
the differences in audit pricing models for different sized companies, companies choosing 
different sized auditors, and companies using Grant Thornton (i.e. AIM specialist auditor) or 
other firms as auditors.  Several additional and robustness tests for the AIM model are also 
included with more variables related to audit client risk, blockholder ownership, Nomad 
characteristics, audit opinion and the provision of non-audit services.  Moreover, for the audit 
committee model, several additional tests are also used to test the impact of audit committee 
financial expertise using different definitions.  The statistical techniques used in the univariate 
and bivariate analyses are also explained at the end of this chapter.       
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4.1 Research Objective 
The purpose of this research is to extend the understanding of the determinants of audit 
pricing by undertaking a study of companies listed on London’s Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM).  In view of the research aim and the literature review findings, this study 
investigates the following research questions: 
1) Do audit client characteristics (size, complexity, risk) influence the audit fees of AIM 
companies? 
2) Do auditor characteristics (auditor size, specialism, location, tenure) influence the audit 
fees of AIM companies? 
3) Do engagement characteristics (report lag, busy season, audit opinion, joint provision of 
non-audit services) influence the audit fees of AIM companies? 
4) Do internal governance issues (board characteristics, ownership structure, Nominated 
Adviser) influence the audit fees of AIM companies? 
5) Do audit committee characteristics (size, independence, expertise) influence the audit 
fees of AIM companies?   
4.2 Data Collection 
4.2.1 Sample Selection 
This research is an empirical study based on a large sample of companies listed on the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), a second-tier market owned and operated by the 
London Stock Exchange.  The sample selection started by identifying all companies registered 
on AIM at the end of December 2010.  The reason for choosing 2009/2010 as the sample of 
this study is because the QCA Guidelines were published in 2009 which for the first time 
provide recommendation on corporate governance for small and medium sized listed 
companies as those listed on AIM.  Although AIM companies are not required to comply with 
the Guidelines or explain if not, this Guidelines could still be considered as a breakpoint of 
corporate governance improvement for AIM companies.  The full list of AIM companies was 
taken from the December edition of AIM Market Statistics (London Stock Exchange, 2010).  On 
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31st December 2010, there were a total of 1,194 companies listed on AIM, with a total market 
value of £79,419.3 million.  Of these companies, 229 were international companies according 
the company’s country of incorporation.  Similar to previous audit pricing studies, all 
investment trusts and all overseas companies (based on the country of incorporation) were 
excluded from the research sample, since these companies have different financial reporting 
practices 9 and business structures, which may be subject to a variety of audit pricing models.  
Companies that had been admitted to AIM during 2010 were also excluded, since they would 
not have complete financial records for the 2009/2010 financial year.  The next step was to 
rank the remaining companies in terms of their market capitalization on 31st December 2010.  
Based on the Market Statistics published by the London Stock Exchange (Dec, 2010), only 9 
companies listed on AIM had a market value over £1,000m; together these had a total equity 
value of £11041.1 million.  The majority of the AIM companies had a market value within the 
range £10m to £50m (see Table 2.4, and Figure 4.1).  Therefore, I identified the largest 512 
companies, with market value higher than £10 million on 31st December 2010, as the focus of 
this study.  Since it was necessary to collect the majority of the data from companies’ annual 
reports, due to some unusual and inconsistent reporting by some firms, I excluded 35 
companies whose audit fee data could not be accessed.  The reasons for exclusion included 
lack of access to annual reports for the year 2009/2010, no disclosure of audit fee in the annual 
report, and disclosure that combined auditor remuneration, making it impossible to identify 
the exact audit fee or fees paid for non-audit services.  My final sample for the main model 
consists of 477 companies for the financial year 2009/2010.   Due to the difficulties of manually 
collecting all the information especially the corporate governance information which needs 
to be identifies from reading the description of the companies’ annual report and corporate 
governance report, only one year data is used in this study.  While since the sample period is 
after financial crisis and the AIM market is relatively stable in recent years, the company 
                                                          
9 According to A Guide to AIM (London Stock Exchange, 2010), the accounting standards AIM companies used 
to prepare and present the annual accounts after admission are determined by the company’s country of 
incorporation: If a company is incorporated in European Economic Area, its choice of accounting standards is 
IFRS as adopted by the European Union or national GAAP if not a parent company; if a company is incorporated 
outside European Economic Area, it can adopt one of the following accounting standards: IFRS as adopted by 
the European Union, US GAAP, Canadian GAAP, Australian IFRS, and Japanese GAAP.  
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characteristics and the audit market did not change much after 2010.  Although the QCA 
published a new corporate governance guideline in 2013, there is no much difference from the 
old version.  Hence although only one year data was used in this study, the quality and quantity 
of the data is sufficient to provide a comprehensive preliminary results of audit pricing 
research.     Table 4.1 provides an industrial breakdown of my main sample based on the 11 
industrial classifications used by the FTSE.  From Table 4.1 it can be seen that the industrial 
sector is the largest, with 20.8 per cent of the sample companies, followed by finance, with 
16.5 per cent.  Of the remainder, 12.4 per cent of the sample companies are from the oil and 
gas sector, while 14.3 per cent are from the basic materials sector; 11.9 per cent are classified 
as technology companies, with 10.9 per cent of the sample operating in the consumer services 
sector.  An interesting characteristic of AIM is that a significant proportion of companies have 
not been listed on the market for very long, since AIM only existed for 15 years prior to 2010.  
The data presented in Table 4.2 illustrates this, showing that 9.2 per cent of the sample had 
been listed for less than two years; 31.6 per cent for between two and four years, and 32.0 per 
cent for between four and six years.  Perhaps the most interesting statistic is that only 5.9 per 
cent of our sample companies had been on AIM for more than 10 years.  
Due to the absence of a corporate governance code for AIM companies, and relaxed 
disclosure requirements relating to the existence and composition of audit committees, the 
disclosure of audit committee related information in AIM companies varies greatly.  Hence, in 
order to examine the influence of audit committee characteristics, the audit committee 
sample includes only those companies with full disclosure of audit committee size, 
independence and expertise.  This leaves me with 319 companies in the audit committee 
sample, which covers all the AIM companies properly disclosed the audit committee related 
information.    The sample of this study covers all the UK companies in AIM with market 
capitalization above £10 million, which gives a comprehensive overview of the AIM and its 
companies, hence the results are fairly generalizable.  
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Table 4.1   Sample Companies by Industry Sector 
Industry Sector AIM Classification Number in Sample % in Sample 
Resource    
 Oil & Gas 59 12.4 
 Basic Materials 68 14.3 
  127 26.7 
Manufacture    
 Industrials 99 20.8 
 Consumer Goods 23 4.8 
 Health Care 31 6.5 
  153 32.1 
Service    
 Consumer Services 52 10.9 
 Telecommunications 6 1.3 
 Utilities 3 0.6 
 Technology 57 11.9 
  118 24.7 
Finance    
 Financials 79 16.5 
  79 16.5 
Total Number of 
Companies 
 477 100.0 
 
 
Figure 4.1   Distribution of Companies by Equity Market Value 
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Table 4.2   Number of Years since Admission to AIM 
Number of Listed Years Number of companies % of companies 
1 15 3.1 
2 29 6.1 
3 66 13.8 
4 85 17.8 
5 87 18.2 
6 66 13.8 
7 25 5.2 
8 27 5.7 
9 27 5.7 
10 22 4.6 
11 6 1.3 
12 3 0.6 
13 4 0.8 
14 7 1.5 
15 8 1.7 
Total Number of Companies 477 100.0 
 
4.2.2 Data Collection 
The main sources of data are companies’ annual reports, downloaded from companies’ 
official websites and from the FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) database.  Due to the 
relaxed disclosure requirements for the AIM companies, some data is difficult to obtain from 
the annual reports, especially information related to audit committee characteristics; 
therefore, alternative sources such as FAME, the Stock Exchange Yearbook and the Corporate 
Register are also included in the data collection process to help ensure completeness and 
consistency of the data10.  The data used for this study can be generally classified into four 
categories: audit fee data, audit client data, engagement/auditor associated data, and 
governance related data.  Audit client data accounts for the major part of the data collection 
process and is obtained mainly from companies’ financial statements for the 2009/2010 
financial year.  It is collected manually, directly from the companies’ annual reports, and 
includes data relating to audit client characteristics such as size, complexity, financial 
condition, and audit risk.  The engagement/auditor related data indicates engagement 
                                                          
10 The reason I did not use other data sources such as Boardex is because 1) it was not available; 2) the database 
does not have enough coverage of the AIM companies.  
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characteristics such as audit report lag, busy period and non-audit fees, and auditor 
characteristics including auditor size, location, change of auditor and information about audit 
specialists.  Most of the engagement/auditor related data is collected from the Report of the 
Independent Auditors contained in companies’ annual reports for the financial year 2009/2010.  
In order to maintain the completeness of the dataset, the missing engagement/auditor 
related data is completed using various editions of the Corporate Register for 2010 (based on 
the financial year end of different companies) as well as the Stock Exchange Yearbook for 2011.  
The internal governance related data, which covers companies’ board characteristics, 
ownership structures, and audit committee related data are mainly obtained from the 
Corporate Governance Reports of companies’ annual reports.  However, due to the relaxed 
disclosure requirements of AIM companies, some governance related information is not 
available from the Corporate Governance Reports; indeed, in some cases, the annual reports 
do not include a Corporate Governance Report.  Hence, the Stock Exchange Yearbook is used 
as an additional source to maintain the completeness and consistency of the data.  According 
to previous studies, the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and companies’ 
external audit fees can be measured based on four major dimensions: size (number of 
directors on the audit committee), independence (number of independent non-executive 
directors on the audit committee), diligence (frequency of meetings held by the audit 
committee) and expertise (information on audit committee members with finance expertise) 
of audit committees (Zaman et al., 2011).  However, due to the relaxed disclosure 
requirements on AIM companies’ audit committees, during the data collection process, I 
realize that only few companies chose to include information related to the frequency of audit 
committee meetings or members’ attendance to these meeting, hence it is difficult to 
maintain the sample size if including audit committee diligence data in the study.  Therefore, 
in this study, I only focus on three of the four dimensions which are audit committee size, 
audit committee members’ independence and expertise.  Similar to the other corporate 
governance related data, the majority of audit committee data is obtained from the 
companies’ Corporate Governance Reports manually by reading the information disclosed by 
each company in their annual reports.  For the purpose of this study, a substantial amount of 
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time and effort is invested to identify, extract and cross check information related to audit 
committee characteristics.  For example, the information on the size of the audit committee 
and the independence of the audit committee members was collected by hand from the Audit 
Committee Report in the corporate governance section of annual reports of each company.  
While given that there is no clear definition of ‘audit committee financial expertise’ for the UK 
companies, audit committee members with accounting and/or finance experience or 
professional accounting qualifications are identified as representing financial expertise 11 , 
based on the biographical information of each director disclosed in the annual report of every 
AIM company.  The information was then cross checked with the Corporate Register and the 
Stock Exchange Yearbook to make sure that all the information was complete and up to date.    
In this study, because of the range and breadth of data investigated from each individual 
company, only one year’s data is collected and used.  In total, the annual reports of 505 AIM 
companies for the financial year 2009/2010 were downloaded, and data for these companies 
was collected manually.  Since some companies use different currencies, all the financial data 
with different currencies was converted into GBP, using the currency exchange rate on the 
closing date of the companies’ 2009/2010 financial year based on IAS 21.  In the data collection 
process, 28 companies were excluded from the sample because either there is no disclosure 
of audit fee in the annual report, or the annual report discloses only total auditor 
remuneration, which makes it difficult to identify the exact audit fees paid for the audit 
services.  Hence, for the main model, AIM model and sub-samples, data was collected for 477 
companies.  While for the audit committee characteristics model, as explained above, due to 
problems of information disclosure, 319 companies’ information was fully collected from 
annual reports.  All the missing data related to companies’ external auditors, Nomads, board 
characteristics, ownership structure and audit committee characteristics was completed 
using the Stock Exchange Yearbooks and the Corporate Register.   
4.3 Measurement of Variables 
                                                          
11 The details of definition of audit committee finance expertise used in this study are explained in the following 
section.   
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The variables analysed in this study represent the determinants of audit fees in fully listed 
companies based on previous studies (e.g. Hay et al., 2006; McMeeking et al., 2006; Jong-Hag 
et al., 2008; Choi et al., 2009; Abidin et al., 2010; Zaman et al., 2011; Gotti et al., 2012; Chan et 
al., 2013; Hay, 2013), and the unique characteristics of the AIM companies.  The variables can 
be categorized as audit fee data; audit client characteristics; engagement characteristics; 
auditor and Nomad characteristics; and governance characteristics including a range of 
ownership structure, board, and audit committee characteristics.   
4.3.1 Dependent Variable - Audit Fee Data 
UK legislation requires companies to disclose the fees paid to auditors for both audit services 
and non-audit services.  The log of the reported audit fee is used as the dependent variable 
(LOGAUDIT).  
4.3.2 Independent Variables and Control Variables 
4.3.2.1 Audit client characteristics 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the single most important determinant of audit fees is 
company size.  Although there is some discussion as to which size measure is more 
appropriate, the majority of prior studies have utilized the log of total assets.  Furthermore, a 
significant number of AIM companies, especially those in the basic materials and oil and gas 
industry sectors, do not actually report a figure for revenue, which effectively prevents the 
usage of turnover as a consistent measure of size. Therefore, in this study, I use the log of 
total asset as the company’s size measurement (LOGASSET) and consider it as a control 
variable. 
The second category of variable of interest for this study is intended to represent audit client 
complexity.  Following previous research, I apply several measurements to represent the 
audit client complexity.  Specifically, I will employ a variable to represent the number of 
subsidiaries (NOSUB), a variable to represent the proportion of foreign subsidiaries of the 
total subsidiaries (FSUB), and another variable to represent the proportion of total assets in 
the form of receivables (RECEIVABLE).  Finally, four industry dummies will be employed to 
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signify industrial sectors.  The classification is based on the FTSE Industrial Classification 
Benchmark (London Stock Exchange, 2010), and following Mallin and Ow-Yong (2009) the 
four industry categories were then finalised as: oil and gas or basic resources industries 
(RESOURCES), which includes companies in the Oil & Gas or Basic Materials sector; a financial 
sector (FINANCE); a manufacturing sector (MANUFACTURE) with companies in the Industrial, 
Consumer Goods, or Health Care sectors; and a non-financial service sector (SERVICE) 
including Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities and Technology companies. 
The third category of interest is audit risk.  Prior research typically represents this by using 
measures of profitability/performance as well as some measure of financial gearing.  In this 
study, I use return on assets (ROA) to represent company profitability and a dummy variable 
indicating where the company incurred an operating loss during the financial year (LOSS).  For 
gearing, this study utilizes the total liabilities divided by total assets (GEARING).  Furthermore, 
a dummy variable is employed to represent instances where the company has one or more 
subsidiaries located in the US, since it is widely accepted that US-based activities expose the 
company (and auditor) to increased litigation risk (USSUB) (Seetharaman et al., 2002; 
O’Sullivan, 2009).  Since many AIM companies were in their early stage, I also use a dummy 
variable to represent companies that have no recorded revenues, since these companies may 
have higher audit risk due to the additional uncertainty of future revenues materializing 
(DUMREV).  Another variable included as an indicator of risk is the number of years a company 
has been listed on AIM (LISTYEAR), since a longer period of listing might indicate reduced 
litigation risk to auditors, and affect audit price accordingly.  
4.3.2.2 Engagement characteristics 
The argument that there exists an association between audit fees and the provision of non-
audit services has led to inconsistent results.  Some studies assert that the provision of both 
audit and non-audit services could reduce audit fees due to knowledge spill-over (Stein, 2006).  
However, more studies maintain that the joint provision of audit and non-audit fees could lead 
to higher audit fees, because the organization might require additional audit effort in order 
to assure the auditor’s independence (DeFond et al., 2002; DeZoort et al., 2002; Turley and 
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Zaman, 2004), or because organizations that purchase more non-audit services tend to be 
problematic, which would cause the auditors to charge fee premiums (Firth, 2002).  In order 
to examine the relationship between audit fee and non-audit service, the log of the reported 
non-audit fee paid to auditors is utilized as an independent variable (NONAUDIT).  Following 
prior studies (Abbott et al., 2003b; Lee, 2008; Ghafran, 2013), other variables are also 
employed to represent the joint provision of audit and non-audit services: the non-audit fee 
ratio (PROAUDIT) is measured as the proportion of non-audit fees to the total auditor 
remuneration, a proxy for the overall economic linkage between auditors and clients; while a 
dummy variable is used to represent companies which pay higher fees for non-audit services 
than for audit services (DUMAUDIT). 
In addition to the non-audit fee variables, this study employs several other variables to 
capture audit engagement characteristics.  I employ a variable measuring the length of time 
between the company’s financial year-end and the date of the audit report (LAGTIME).  
O’Sullivan (2000) finds that this has a significant influence on audit pricing, and provides 
evidence that the longer the period, the higher the audit fee.  In addition to this, I include a 
dummy variable indicating whether the audit process takes place during the financial busy 
period (between 31st December and 31st March) (BUSYDATE) to investigate whether auditors’ 
increased workload during the busy season results in higher audit fees.  The time frame of 
busy season follows Chan et al. (1993) and Firth (2002), since the end of December and March 
are the common financial year end for UK companies.  When facing problems in completing 
the audit, audit risk and/or audit work could increase, leading to an increase in the audit fee 
(Simunic, 1980).  Therefore, dummy variables are employed to indicate companies where 
there exist different types of audit problems, including qualified (QUALIFIED) or modified 
audit opinion and audit comments (e.g. going concern or minor comments) (COMMENT) and 
overall problematic audit opinion (AUDITISSUE).   
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4.3.2.3 Auditor characteristics  
Unlike the fully listed companies in the main market, among which there are significant levels 
of auditor concentration and domination by Big 4 audit firms 12 , AIM companies show a 
broader diversity in auditor selection, which is expected to lead to a more competitive market 
for audit services.  Although analysis of the market capitalization of AIM companies indicates 
that clients of the Big 4 auditors are far larger in market value than other firms (Accountancy 
Age, 2008), the mid-tier audit firms have the advantage in terms of the number of AIM clients, 
with Grant Thornton leading the market (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3).  AIM provides these 
second-tier audit firms with the opportunity and confidence to successfully audit these listed 
companies.  In order to investigate the audit market issues in AIM, this research includes 
variables to represent auditor size, auditor location, change of auditors and auditor specialism.  
In order to test whether the Big 4 auditors charge a premium for their audit services, the study 
also employs the most commonly used dummy variable in previous studies, Big 4.  Since AIM 
companies show a significantly richer variation in terms of auditor choice, with a much lower 
proportion of companies choosing Big 4 audit firms compared with the companies listed on 
the main market; and since non-Big 4 auditors undertake the majority of audits, it is possible 
to investigate the pricing strategies of mid-tier and small auditors, something that cannot be 
done in a study of the main market where Big 4 firms occupy a dominant position.  Therefore, 
I employ a dummy variable to indicate audits undertaken by mid-tier audit firms (MIDTIER) 
and another dummy variable to indicate all other local or regional audit firms (SMALL).  In this 
research, mid-tier audit firms include Baker Tilly, BDO, Grant Thornton, PKF, Mazars, and 
Moore Stephens.  This categorization is based on the AUDIT FIRM INCOME DATA 2010 obtained 
from Accountancy Age (2011).  Unlike in the main market where PWC is considered as the audit 
specialist (based on its market share), in the AIM market Grant Thornton has the largest 
number of clients and is considered the market leader, followed by some mid-tier and Big 4 
auditors (see Table 4.3).  Hence, I include a variable representing auditors’ market share of 
AIM audits to investigate the possibility of AIM specialists charging a fee premium for their 
                                                          
12 Big 4 audit firms are PriceWaterhouseCooper, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, and Ernst & Young. 
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expertise (AUDITSPE).  In order to ascertain Grant Thornton’s leading position in the AIM, I 
collected the auditors’ information of the whole AIM population and found that in 2010 Grant 
Thornton had the highest number of clients – 181 – representing 15.3 per cent of the total AIM 
population (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3). I then employ a dummy variable to investigate 
whether using Grant Thornton as the auditor would influence companies’ audit fees (GT). 
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Table 4.3   Main Auditors’ Market Share of AIM at December 2010 (auditors with more than 
10 AIM clients) 
Name of Auditor Number of clients Market share in AIM (%) 
Grant Thornton 181 15.3 
KPMG 145 12.3 
BDO 139 11.8 
PWC 104 8.8 
Deloitte 102 8.6 
Ernst&Young 79 6.7 
Baker Tilly 68 5.8 
PKF 36 3.0 
Mazars 30 2.5 
Nexia Smith&Williamson 24 2.0 
UHY Hacker Young 23 1.9 
RSM Tenon Audit 18 1.5 
Jeffreys Henry 16 1.4 
Littlejohn LLP 14 1.2 
Crowe Clark Whitehill LLP 13 1.1 
Chantrey Vellacott DFK 12 1.0 
Chapman Davis 12 1.0 
Kingston Smith 11 .9 
Moore Stephens 10 .8 
Total  1027 87.6 
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Figure 4.2   Auditors’ Market Share in AIM at December 2010 
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In addition, similar to previous UK studies, I employ a dummy variable to indicate those audits 
undertaken by London-based auditors (LONDON) and include this as a control variable, since 
there is reasonably consistent evidence that London auditors charge an audit premium 
(O’Sullivan, 2000; Hay, 2013).  Another dummy variable is used to capture instances where 
companies changed auditor between 2009 and 2010 financial year, in an attempt to ascertain 
whether companies receive an initial audit fee discount as a result of an auditor switch 
(CHANGE).   
4.3.2.4 Nominated Adviser characteristics 
The nominated adviser (Nomad) system is a unique feature of AIM, and central to its 
regulatory model.  Prior literature has argued that Nomads that also act as brokers tend to 
place more pressure on companies to comply with the QCA Guidelines and establish better 
governance structures because they suffer a relatively higher risk to both reputation and 
income (e.g. Mallin and Ow-Young, 2012).  Hence, I employ a dummy variable representing 
AIM companies who have a nominated adviser that also acts as broker (NOMAD), to 
investigate whether this has a significant relationship with companies’ external audit fees.  
According to previous literature, a Nomad’s reputation is a key consideration both for itself 
and for its client company (Espenlaub, 2012).  Hence, it is reasonable to expect that, similar to 
the audit market, the Nomad market also has a dominant group, with bigger Nomad firms 
being appointed by a majority of AIM companies, which might have an influence on the level 
of audit fees paid by their clients.  Therefore, I collected the Nomad information for the entire 
AIM population and analysed their market share.  The results shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 
4.5 indicate that, unlike the audit market, there is no single firm, or group of firms, with a 
dominant position in terms of number of AIM clients (i.e. over 10 per cent).  Hence, I only 
employ a variable to indicate the market share of each Nomad and investigate whether this 
has influence on their clients’ audit fees (NOMADSPE).   
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Table 4.4 Main Nomads’ Market Share in AIM at December 2010 (Nomads having more than 
10 AIM clients) 
Name of Nomad Number of clients Market share in AIM (%) 
Seymour Pierce 74 6.3 
Arbuthnot Securities 59 5.0 
Cenkos Securities 57 4.8 
FinnCap 56 4.7 
Evolution Securities 48 4.1 
WH Ireland 45 3.8 
Grant Thornton 43 3.6 
Brewin Dolphin 42 3.6 
Strand Hanson 38 3.2 
Northland Capital Partners 36 3.0 
Panmure Gordon&Co 36 3.0 
Numis securities 29 2.5 
Allenby Capital 28 2.4 
Canaccord Genuity 28 2.4 
Charles Stanley Securities 28 2.4 
Daniel Stewart&Company 28 2.4 
Merchant securities 26 2.2 
Shore Capital&Corporate 23 1.9 
Altium Capital 22 1.9 
Ambrian Partners 22 1.9 
Beaumont Cornish 22 1.9 
Fairfax I.S. 21 1.8 
Smith&Williamson Corporate 
Finance 
21 1.8 
Arden Partners 20 1.7 
Investec Investment Banking 20 1.7 
Westhouse Securities 20 1.7 
Singer Capital Markets 19 1.6 
Peel Hunt 18 1.5 
Collins Stewart Europe 17 1.4 
Davy Corporate Finance 17 1.4 
Zeus Capital 17 1.4 
Religare Capital Markets 16 1.4 
Collins Stewart 13 1.1 
Liberum Capital 13 1.1 
Matrix Corporate Capital 13 1.1 
Cairn Financial Advisers 11 .9 
Oriel Securities 11 .9 
Total 1046 89.5 
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Figure 4.3   Nomads’ Market Share in AIM at December 2010 
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4.3.2.5 Internal governance characteristics 
A high level of effectiveness of boards and audit committees can improve internal control, 
financial reporting and audit quality (Goodwin-Stewait and Kent, 2006; Beasley et al., 2009; 
Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009; Redmayne et al., 2011).  The boards and audit committees 
are responsible for improving the transparency and reliability of financial statements and for 
reducing the auditor’s risk of providing incorrect information (Turley and Zaman, 2004; Zaman 
et al., 2011).  The ownership structure of companies reflects the investors’ influences on the 
corporate governance practices and the requirements on the intensity of the audit process 
and audit quality (Mitra et al., 2007; Adelopo et al., 2012; Gotti et al., 2012).  Moreover, good 
governance practices could protect auditor independence by providing clear responsibilities 
on the appointment and remuneration of auditors and an independent platform for external 
auditors to communicate.  Hence in this study, the governance variables of board 
characteristics, ownership structure, and audit committee effectiveness characteristics are 
included, to examine the association between corporate governance characteristics and the 
audit fee.  
Board and ownership structure 
In common with a number of recent studies, this research employs several governance 
variables.  Because of the less regulated market environment, AIM companies tend to utilize 
various governance structures, which provide an ideal opportunity to study how these 
different governance structures impact audit fees.  Several board-related variables are applied: 
First, a dummy variable to indicate whether the posts of CEO and chairman are occupied by 
the same individual (CEOCHAIR) is included.  This situation is increasingly being discouraged, 
since it raises the possibility of the CEO/chairman possessing too much power and influence 
over the company, a situation in which the consequent lack of checks and balances may result 
in sub-optimal executive behaviour and/or inadequate board monitoring (UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010).  Secondly, a variable is included to represent the proportion of board 
members who are non-executives (NED).  Current governance recommendations state that a 
significant non-executive board membership is desirable in order to ensure that executive 
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decision-making is adequately monitored and the interests of shareholders are constantly 
pursued.  However, it should be emphasized that AIM companies are not obliged either to 
comply with or to explain non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010, 2012), 
so they possess much greater freedom relating to board composition and leadership than do 
fully listed firms.  Thirdly, since attracting investment from institutional or larger investors is a 
major reason that companies choose to list on AIM, I employ two variables representing 
ownership structure of the AIM companies, one representing the proportion of equity owned 
by large blockholders (BLOCKHOLD) and a second representing the natural log of value of the 
equity owned by large blockholders (VBLOCKHOLD), to examine the potential influence of 
blockholders on the audit fees.  Consistent with existing UK literature, external blockholders 
are defined as those possessing 3 per cent or more of issued equity.   
Audit committee characteristics 
To examine the impact of audit committee characteristics on the quality of auditing, existing 
research utilizes four dimensions of audit committee effectiveness in fully listed companies: 
size of the audit committee, independence of audit committee members, expertise of audit 
committee members and the diligence of the audit committee (Zaman et al., 2011).  This is 
primarily influenced by the disclosures required as part of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010, 2012).   However, in this study of AIM companies, due to the lack of disclosure 
requirements relating to the composition of the audit committee, the information regarding 
audit committee diligence (frequency of meetings) is incomplete.  According to the dataset 
of this study, with only 251 companies disclosed information related to audit committee 
meetings in 2009/2010 financial year and a significant amount of these companies only 
explained that they had followed the recommendation and held at least one or two audit 
committee meetings during the year without detailed information about meeting frequency 
or attendance.  Hence, in this research, only three dimensions of audit committee 
effectiveness are measured: audit committee size, independence and expertise of audit 
committee members. 
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According to previous literature, an audit committee with more members tends to be more 
powerful and resourceful to discover problems and influence audit effort and quality (Vafeas 
and Waegelein, 2007; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Zaman et al., 2011).  Hence, a variable is 
included to represent the number of directors on the audit committee (NOACDIR).   The Higgs 
Report defines audit committee independence as follows: ‘A non-executive director is 
considered independent when the board determines that the director is independent in 
character and judgment, and there are no relationships or circumstances which could affect, 
or appear to affect, the director’s judgment’ (2003, paragraph A.3.4, p.81).  The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) states that an audit committee should have ‘at least three, or in the 
case of smaller companies two independent non-executive directors’ (p.23), which indicates 
that fully listed companies do not have much diversity in terms of audit committee 
independence.  Since AIM companies do not need to follow the UK Corporate Governance Code, 
they show great variance in audit committee composition.  Previous research (e.g. Zaman et 
al., 2011) tends to follow the Higgs Report (2003) and use whether all the audit committee 
members are independent non-executive directors as the measure of audit committee 
independence.  However, since AIM does not require disclosure on directors’ independence, 
it is difficult to determine whether a non-executive director is to be considered independent 
or not.  Meanwhile, since AIM does not need to comply with the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, many companies have executive directors as members of the audit committee which is 
not permitted in fully-listed companies. The existence of executive directors on the audit 
committee indicates a serious issue around its independence.  Hence, in order to examine the 
independence of audit committee members of AIM companies, a new variable is introduced 
in this study that is a dummy variable representing companies with at least one executive 
director on the audit committee (ACEXDIR).   
Previous studies indicate that the different definitions of audit committee financial expertise 
influence the research findings.  In this study, three sets of variables are utilized to indicate 
the three different levels of definitions for audit committee financial expertise of AIM 
companies.  The first level is based on the SEC (2003) definition of financial expertise, with a 
variable is employed to represent the number of overall financial experts on the audit 
103 
 
committee (NOACEXP).  The notion of overall financial expertise includes audit committee 
members with accounting related work experience such as a certified public accountant, 
auditor, chief financial officer, financial controller or accounting officer; finance related work 
experience such as an investment banker and financial analyst; or with any other financial 
management role and/or a chief executive officer, chairman or company president.  Hence, 
based on the directors’ biography in the annual reports, if they have accounting, finance or 
supervisory related work experience in recent years, then they are considered as financial 
experts in the audit committees.  The second level is based on the SEC’s narrow definition of 
financial expertise and on the work of DeFond et al. (2005), Krishnan and Lee (2009), Krishnan 
and Visvanathan (2009) and Dhaliwal et al. (2010) which narrows the definition of finance 
expertise down to accounting expertise.  The notion of accounting expertise only includes 
those audit committee members with recent work experience directly related to accounting 
and auditing, so only audit committee members who recently are certified accountants, chief 
financial officers, controllers and auditors are counted as accounting expertise.  Three 
variables are employed under this level of definition: one dummy variable representing audit 
committees that have one or more member with recent and relevant accounting experience 
(DACCEXP), a variable representing the number of accounting experts on the audit committee 
(NOACCEXP) and one representing directors with accounting expertise as a proportion of all 
members in the audit committee (PROACCEXP).  The third level further narrows the definition 
of financial expertise to chartered accountants only, which only include audit committee 
members who hold a professional accounting qualification or is a member of the professional 
accounting bodies in EU, US, Canada, Australia, and Japan13.  Three variables are employed 
based on this definition: a dummy variable representing audit committees that have one or 
more chartered accountants (DCACCEXP), a variable representing the number of chartered 
accountants in the audit committee (NOCACCEXP), and one representing the chartered 
accountants as a proportion of all members in the audit committee (PROCACCEXP).   
                                                          
13 The reason for the selection of countries is according to A Guide to AIM (London Stock Exchange, 2010), the 
financial statements of AIM listed companies should follow one of these countries’ accounting standards.   
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4.4 Empirical Research Models  
The original model to explain audit pricing was established by Simunic (1980), and then 
expanded and verified by a large number of subsequent studies.  Previous audit fee 
determinants models initially focused on auditee and auditor characteristics, then auditor 
engagement issues, and more recently governance issues.  Consistent with prior research, in 
this study I commence the analysis by employing the following multivariate regression models 
to address my research questions (see Table 4.5 for more specific variable definitions):   
4.4.1 Main Model 
Model 1: Audit Fee Model 
LOGAUDIT = f {SIZE, ROA, RECEIVABLE, GEARING, SUB, USSUB, NONAUDIT, BIG4, MID-TIER, SMALL, 
LONDON, BUSYDATE, LAGTIME, CHANGE, DUALITY, NED, INDUSTRY} 
This audit pricing model is based on previous empirical and theoretical audit pricing literature, 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the audit fee (LOGAUDIT), and the 
independent variables include auditee size (SIZE), audit complexity (SUB, and RECEIVABLE), 
audit risk (ROA, GEARING, and USSUB), non-audit service (NONAUDIT), auditor size (BIG4, 
MIDTIER, SMALL), auditor location (LONDON), busy season (BUSYDATE), audit report lag 
(LAGTIME), auditor change (CHANGE), governance/board characteristics (NED, and DUALITY), 
and industry controls (RESOURCE, MANUFACTURE, SERVICE, and FINANCE).  This audit 
pricing model employs the most commonly used influential factors of audit fees in previous 
research including audit client factors, auditor factor, engagement factors, and corporate 
governance factors to test whether these factors also suit for AIM companies, and also 
examines the audit pricing in different sized auditors which could not be tested in large 
companies due to the high audit market concentration.    
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Model 2: AIM Model 
LOGAUDIT = f {SIZE, ROA, RECEIVABLE, GEARING, DUMREV, LISTYEAR, SUB, USSUB, NONAUDIT, 
BIG4, MID-TIER, SMALL, GT, LONDON, BUSYDATE, LAGTIME, CHANGE, DUALITY, NED, BLOCKHOLD, 
NOMAD, INDUSTRY} 
As discussed in the previous chapter, AIM has different characteristics compared to the main 
market, due to the lighter regulation of AIM companies and the absence of specific reporting 
requirements.  This makes the study of audit pricing for AIM companies particularly 
interesting.  First, since AIM is a relatively new market, with a history of less than 20 years, 
many companies are in their early stages and are yet to show a profit; most are seeking 
funding primarily to pursue their business aspirations.  Hence, some AIM companies may 
present a more significant and identifiable audit risk than more mature and long-established 
fully listed firms, which might lead to a different basis for audit pricing decisions. Secondly, as 
the regulatory system of AIM, the nominated advisers act as gatekeepers and advisers.  Since 
previous literature has argued that Nomads that also act as brokers tend to exert more 
pressure on companies’ governance practice (Mallin and Ow-Young, 2012), this situation could 
impact companies’ auditor choices and the setting of audit prices.  Thirdly, since many AIM 
companies are looking to raise relatively small amounts of capital, they are expected to have 
significant institutional blockholder ownership.  Large institutional investors normally pay 
more attention to companies’ governance, which could result in more effort being invested 
in higher quality external auditing.  Fourthly, AIM companies show great diversity in auditor 
selection, and tend to use non-Big 4 specialist firms, with Grant Thornton owning over 15 per 
cent of AIM companies as its clients.  This makes it possible to re-examine the audit market 
issues, especially whether the existence of an audit specialist (Grant Thornton) influences the 
auditor choice of AIM companies and the audit pricing setting of audit firms. 
The AIM model focuses on the AIM-specific characteristics, namely audit risk (LISTYEAR and 
DUMREV), Nominated Adviser as broker (NOMAD), ownership characteristics (BLOCKHOLD), 
and auditor specialist (GT).  
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4.4.2 Sub-Samples 
Model 1: Size sub-sample based on companies’ total assets 
Company size is considered the most significant and important determinant of the fee it pays 
for audit services.  Hence it is reasonable to believe that companies of different size 
(measured by total assets in this research) have diverse audit requirements, which could lead 
to different audit pricing models.  In this study, AIM companies are separated into two sub-
samples based on their total assets in order to examine the different factors that could 
determine their audit pricing model. 
Model 2: Size sub-sample based on companies’ market capitalization 
AIM companies have significant differences in their market values, ranging from over £1,000m 
to less than £10m (Table 2.4).  With regard to the audit market, prior surveys of market 
capitalization of AIM companies show that clients of the Big 4 audit firms are far larger in 
market value than are companies using other audit firms; while mid-tier audit firms have the 
advantage in terms of number of AIM clients, with Grant Thornton leading the market 
(Accountancy Age, 2008).  Hence, it is reasonable to assume that AIM companies with greater 
market value may have different audit requirements and distinctive determinants of audit 
fees compared to those with smaller market capitalization.  In this study, companies are 
separated into two sub-samples based on their market capitalization in order to examine the 
differences in the audit pricing models.   
Model 3: Auditor size sub-sample 
One of the interesting aspects of the audit market for AIM companies is the diversity of 
auditors involved.  As illustrated in Table 4.3, in 2010 less than 40 per cent of AIM companies 
were audited by Big 4 firms.  It is reasonable to expect that significant differences exist in the 
determinants of audit fee variables between the various types of auditors.  Hence, this study 
will examine the differences between sub-sample companies that employed Big 4, mid-tier 
and small audit firms in 2010.  
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Model 4: Grant Thornton sub-sample 
Unlike in the main market, where PWC is considered as the audit specialist, in AIM, Grant 
Thornton has the largest number of clients and is considered the market leader (Accountancy 
Age, 2008).  As shown in Table 4.3, in 2010 Grant Thornton had 181 clients, accounting for 15.3 
per cent of the whole market.  It is reasonable to believe that the factors influencing the Grant 
Thornton audit pricing model could be different from those influencing other audit firms, and 
that this could attract more AIM companies to choose Grant Thornton.  Hence, in this study, 
AIM companies that employ Grant Thornton are separated from other companies in order to 
examine the differences between their audit pricing models.  
4.4.3 Additional and Robustness Tests on the AIM Model 
Additional test 1: Companies suffered loss in 2010 
The first additional test aims to test different measurements of audit risk, where LOSS 
(dummy variable of companies’ profitability) is employed instead of ROA or DUMREV (dummy 
variable of companies’ revenue).   
Additional test 2: Value of blockholding 
This additional test applies VBLOCKHOLD (natural logarithm of value of the equity own by 
blockholders) as a measurement of blockholder ownership instead of BLOCKHOLD 
(percentage of blockholder ownership).  
Addtional test 3: Nomad specialist 
Every AIM company is required to employ a Nomad as financial adviser and market regulator.  
Nomads with more AIM clients might have greater influence on companies’ audit quality and 
governance practice due to their specialism.  This test aims to test the influence of Nomad 
specialists on AIM companies with a variable representing the proportion of AIM companies 
employing each Nomad (NOMADSPE). 
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Additional test 4: Audit opinion 
The audit opinion can impact the audit pricing, since companies with qualified audit reports 
or audit comments (either going concern or minor comments) tend to have increased audit 
risk, hence the auditor might charge a higher premium.  This test focuses on the influence of 
auditor opinion on the audit pricing by employing two dummy variables of audit opinion to 
separately represent companies with qualified audit report (QUALIFIED), companies whose 
audit report with either going concern or minor comments (COMMENT).  I also include a 
dummy variable to represent those companies with any audit report issues including qualified 
report and audit comments (AUDITISSUE).   
Additional test 5: Audit specialist 
The AIM auditor data indicates that AIM shows great variation in choice of auditor, with a 
large number of companies using second-tier or small audit firms.  The data also shows that 
although Big 4 firms do not dominate the market, there are several audit specialists with 
better knowledge and experience relevant to AIM companies.  This situation would also 
influence the audit pricing setting of audit firms.  Hence, this test utilizes an audit specialist 
variable representing the proportion of AIM companies using each auditor (AUDITSPE), to 
examine the influence of auditor specialists on AIM companies’ audit fees.   
Robustness test: Joint provision of audit and non-audit services 
Besides fees paid for non-audit services, previous literature has also used other 
measurements to examine the auditor independence, such as the non-audit fee ratio, non-
audit fee to audit fee ratio and dummy variables (Frankel et al., 2002; Lee, 2008).  Hence, in 
this study, two further variables are utilized to test the influence of the joint provision of audit 
and non-audit services on audit pricing.  
Robustness test a: Companies paid higher non-audit fee than audit fee 
In this test, a dummy variable representing companies that paid higher fees for non-audit 
services than for audit services (DUMAUDIT) is employed as a substitute for NONAUDIT.     
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Robustness test b: Non-audit fee ratio 
In this test, non-audit fee ratio – the percentage of non-audit fee as a proportion of total 
auditor remuneration (PROAUDIT) – is utilized instead of NONAUDIT.   
Robustness test: Foreign subsidiaries 
Since prior work identifies that the extent of foreign subsidiaries exert a positive association 
on audit pricing.  It is reasonable to think that from a financial reporting perspective, it is more 
difficult to prepare and audit financial reports of an organization with many foreign 
subsidiaries all over the world, especially in countries with different financial reporting 
requirements.  Hence, I add a variable (FSUB) representing the proportion of foreign 
subsidiaries of total subsidiaries in this robustness test to further examine how companies’ 
subsidiaries impact their complexity hence audit fees.  
4.4.4 Audit Committee Model 
LOGAUDIT = f {SIZE, ROA, RECEIVABLE, GEARING, DUMREV, LISTYEAR, SUB, USSUB, NONAUDIT, 
BIG4, MID-TIER, SMALL, GT, LONDON, BUSYDATE, LAGTIME, CHANGE, DUALITY, NED, BLOCKHOLD, 
NOMAD, NOACDIR, ACEXDIR, NOACEXP, INDUSTRY}  
The absence of a corporate governance code for AIM companies means that, unlike their fully 
listed counterparts, there are no disclosure requirements relating to the existence and 
composition of audit committees.  This provides an opportunity to ascertain whether audit 
committee characteristics influence the quality of auditing undertaken in AIM firms.  Since 
almost all the AIM companies have established audit committees, in this study, I will analyse 
the impact of audit committee size (NOACDIR), independence (ACEXDIR), and expertise 
(NOACEXP) on the level of audit fees.   
4.4.5 Additional Tests on Audit Committee Expertise 
Although financial expertise of audit committee members has been considered an important 
dimension of audit committee effectiveness, there is no clear definition of ‘financial expertise’ 
in the UK.  The Smith Report (2003, paragraph 3.16) explains that financial experts on the audit 
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committee should have ‘significant, recent and relevant financial experience, for example as 
an auditor or a finance director of a listed company’ (p.9), and the UK Corporate Governance 
Code 2010 merely requires that ‘at least one member of the audit committee has recent and 
relevant financial experience’ (p. 19).  In the USA, the definition of audit committee financial 
expertise is clearer and more specific.  The notion of overall financial expertise is measured 
based on the SEC (2003) definition, as used by Krishanan and Visvanathan (2008), Krishnan 
and Lee (2009), and Dhaliwal et al. (2010), which includes members with work experience as 
a certified public accountant (CPA), auditor, chief financial officer (CFO), financial controller, 
or accounting officer; as well as directors with non-accounting financial work experience such 
as investment banker, financial analyst, or any other financial management role, and/or 
members with experience of supervising the preparation of financial statements, such as chief 
executive officer, chairman or company president.  Hence, when examining the impact of 
expertise of audit committee members on the audit pricing, more detailed definition is 
employed for further investigation. 
Additional test 1: Accounting expertise 
As mentioned in the previous section, in this study audit committee members with recent 
accounting and auditing experience, including auditors, accountants, chief financial officers 
(CFO), controllers and accounting officers, are considered as accounting experts.  Hence, the 
existence of accounting expertise in AIM companies’ audit committees (DACCEXP), the 
number of audit committee members with accounting expertise (NOACCEXP), and the 
proportion of members with accounting expertise to the overall number of audit committee 
members (PROACCEXP) are utilized in the model representing audit committee expertise in 
order to examine its influence on the companies’ governance and fees paid to auditors.    
A: Existence of accounting expertise 
In this test, a dummy variable representing the existence of accounting expertise in AIM 
companies’ audit committees (DACCEXP) is employed as a substitute for the audit committee 
financial expertise variable used in the audit committee model.     
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B: Number of members with accounting expertise   
In this test, a variable representing the number of audit committee members with accounting 
expertise (NOACCEXP) is employed as a substitute for the audit committee financial expertise 
variable used in the audit committee model. 
C: Proportion of members with accounting expertise 
In this test, a variable representing the proportion of members with accounting expertise to 
the overall number of audit committee members (PROACCEXP) is employed as a substitute 
for the audit committee financial expertise variable used in the audit committee model.  
Additional test 2: Chartered accountant expertise 
In this model, only chartered accountants are considered as having expertise in audit 
committees.  As mentioned in previous section, the definition of chartered accountants 
include audit committee members who is member of the professional accounting bodies or 
hold professional accounting qualification in the EU countries, Canada, Australia, US, and 
Japan, since they should be familiar with the AIM approved accounting standards utilized by 
the AIM company they work for.  Similar to the previous model, the existence of chartered 
accountant (DCACCEXP), number of chartered accountants in the audit committee 
(NOCACCEXP), and proportion of chartered accountants (PROCACCEXP) are employed to 
examine whether qualified accountants are more influential on the audit fees paid by AIM 
companies.   
A: Existence of chartered accountant as expert 
In this test, a dummy variable representing the existence of chartered accountant (DCACCEXP) 
is employed as a substitute for the audit committee financial expertise variable used in the 
audit committee model.   
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B: Number of chartered accountants 
In this test, a variable representing the number of audit committee members qualified as 
chartered accountants (NOCACCEXP) is employed as a substitute for the audit committee 
financial expertise variable used in the audit committee model. 
C: Proportion of chartered accountants 
In this test, a variable representing the proportion of chartered accountants as the overall 
number of audit committee members (PROCACCEXP) is employed as a substitute for the audit 
committee financial expertise variable used in the audit committee model. 
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Table 4.5   Definition of Variables1,2 
Variables Definition Label Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Audit fee Natural logarithm of audit fee LOGAUDIT  
Auditee size Natural logarithm of total assets LOGASSET + 
Audit 
complexity 
 
Number of subsidiaries SUB + 
Number of foreign subsidiaries as a proportion of 
total subsidiaries 
FSUB + 
Percentage of total assets represented by 
receivables 
RECEIVABLE + 
Audit risk 
 
Binary variable of US subsidiaries (=1 if company 
has US subsidiary; =0 if otherwise) 
USSUB + 
Operating profit as a proportion of total assets ROA - 
Percentage of total assets represented by total 
liabilities 
GEARING + 
Number of years admitted to AIM LISTYEAR - 
Binary variable of Revenue (=1 if company has no 
revenue in 2010; =0 otherwise) 
DUMREV + 
Binary variable of companies’ profitability (=1 if 
company suffered loss in 2010; =0 if otherwise) 
LOSS + 
Non-audit 
service 
 
Natural logarithm of non-audit fee NONAUDIT + 
Binary variable of non-audit fee (=1 if company 
paid higher non-audit fee than audit fee in 2010; =0 
if otherwise) 
DUMAUDIT + 
Percentage of non-audit fee as a proportion of 
total auditor remuneration 
PROAUDIT + 
Governance 
 
Non-executive directors as a proportion of all 
directors 
NED ? 
Binary variable: (=1 if chairman also serves as CEO; 
=0 if otherwise) 
DUALITY ? 
Percentage of blockholder ownership BLOCKHOLD - 
Natural logarithm of value of the equity owned by 
large blockholders 
VBLOCKHOLD - 
Auditor size 
 
Binary variable: (=1 if audit undertaken by Big 4 
auditor-KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst and 
Young, and PricewaterhouseCoopers; =0 if 
otherwise) 
BIG 4 + 
Binary variable: (=1 if audit undertaken by Baker 
Tilly, BDO, Grant Thornton, PKF, Mazars, Moore 
Stephens; =0 if otherwise) 
MIDTIER + 
Binary variable: (=1 if auditor is neither Big Four 
nor Mid-tier; =0 if otherwise) 
SMALL - 
Auditor 
specialist 
 
Binary variable: (=1 if auditor is Grant Thornton; =0 
if otherwise) 
GT + 
Proportion of AIM companies using each auditor AUDITSPE + 
Auditor 
location 
Binary variable: (=1 if auditor located in London; =0 
otherwise) 
LONDON + 
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Audit opinion Binary variable of audit issue (=1 if company 
received qualified or modified audit opinion or audit 
comments in 2010; =0 if otherwise)  
AUDITISSUE ? 
Binary variable of audit issue (=1 if company 
received qualified audit report in 2010; =0 if other 
wise) 
QUALIFIED ? 
Binary variable of audit issue (=1 if company 
received audit comments in 2010; =0 if otherwise) 
COMMENT ? 
Busy season Binary variable: (=1 if company’s financial year end 
is between December and March (inclusive); =0 if 
otherwise) 
BUSYDATE + 
Audit report 
lag 
Natural logarithm of report lag (days) between 
fiscal year end and audit date 
LAGTIME + 
Audit tenure Binary variable: (=1 if auditor changed in 2010 
financial year; =0 if otherwise) 
CHANGE - 
Nominated 
Advisor 
 
Binary variable: (=1 if the company has a joint 
Nomad and Broker; =0 otherwise) 
NOMAD ? 
Proportion of AIM companies using each Nomad NOMADSPE ? 
Industry 
 
Binary variable: (=1 if the company is an 
exploration or mining company; =0 otherwise) 
RESOURCE Control 
Binary variable: (=1 if the company is a 
manufacturing company; =0 otherwise) 
MANUFACTURE Control 
Binary variable: (=1 if the company is a non-
financial services company; =0 otherwise) 
SERVICE Control 
Binary variable: (=1 if the company is a financial 
company; =0 otherwise) 
FINANCE Control 
Audit 
committee 
size 
Number of Audit Committee directors 
NOACDIR + 
Audit 
committee 
independence 
Binary variable: (=1 if company has an executive 
director(s) on the audit committee; =0 if 
otherwise) 
ACEXDIR - 
Audit 
committee 
expertise 
Number of members with financial expertise on 
the audit committee 
NOACEXP + 
Binary variable: (=1 if company’s audit committee 
has one or more members with accounting 
experience; =0 if otherwise) 
DACCEXP + 
Number of audit committee members with 
accounting experience 
NOACCEXP + 
Number of members with accounting expertise as 
a proportion of overall membership of audit 
committee  
PROACCEXP + 
Binary variable: (=1 if company’s audit committee 
has one or more chartered accountants; =0 if 
otherwise) 
DCACCEXP + 
Number of audit committee members who are 
chartered accountants 
NOCACCEXP + 
Number of chartered accountants as a proportion 
of overall audit committee members 
PROCACCEXP + 
Notes: 
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1 All variables relate to year 2010. 
2 All data sourced from each company’s annual report for year 2010. 
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4.5 Statistical Techniques 
The statistical techniques used in this study for univariate and multivariate analysis begin with 
descriptive analysis, including the basic sample values such as the mean, median, standard 
deviation and skewness and kurtosis of the sample variables.  Then the Pearson correlation 
matrix is conducted to investigate the bivariate association amongst the variables, also 
examines the multicollinearity issues of the independence variables.  For the company size, 
auditor size and Grant Thornton sub-samples, in order to investigate the mean and median 
differences of variables for large and small companies, companies using different sized 
auditors, and companies using Grant Thornton as auditors or not, a univariate analysis is 
employed using independent t-test and Mann Whitney test.  Then OLS multivariate regression 
is performed to examine the relationship between the dependent variable and various 
explanatory variables.  According to the previous literature, in order to ensure the validity of 
the OLS regression analysis, the sample needs to fulfil the following five fundamental 
assumptions: 1) Normality – the residual should be normally distributed; 2) Linearity – the 
relationship between the predictors and response variable should be linear; 3) 
Homoscedasticity – the residual variance should be constant; 4) Independence – the residual 
associated with one observation should not be correlated with residuals of other 
observations; 5) Multicollinearity – no exact collinearity should exist among predictors (Chen 
et al., 2003; Hair et al., 2010).  Hence, the OLS regression analysis technique is used to conduct 
the multivariate regression analysis.  For each OLS regression, the collinearity between the 
independence variables are tested through correlation and variance inflation factors (VIF).  
This research also considered the existence of single equation bias between the influence of 
joint non-audit service on the audit fees, and applied two-stage least squares to examine the 
joint determination issue (Whisenant et al., 2003; Zaman et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, various other tests are performed to check for multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity.  The statistical software is used to conduct all the statistical analyses.   
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4.6 Summary 
This chapter explains the research methodology used in this study.  Following an introduction 
to the structure of the chapter, it outlines the purpose of the study and the research questions 
to be investigated: 1) Do audit client characteristics (size, complexity, and risk) influence the 
audit fees of AIM companies? 2) Do auditor characteristics (size, specialist, location, and 
tenure) influence the audit fees of AIM companies? 3) Do engagement characteristics (report 
lag, busy season, audit opinion, and non-audit services) influence the audit fees of AIM 
companies? 4) Do internal governance issues (nominated adviser characteristics, board 
characteristics, ownership structure, and audit committee characteristics) influence the audit 
fees of AIM companies?  These questions draw heavily from the literature reviewed in the 
Chapter Three in order to establish an academic rationale for the various aspects of enquiry 
pursued.  Then, the chapter explains the research sample selection and describes where and 
how the data was collected.  The population for this study comprises the largest 512 
companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market, with market capitalization over £10 
million on 31st Dec 2010.  Due to the relaxed disclosure requirements in AIM, the data collection 
process was very difficult and time-consuming; hence the study is limited to only the 
2009/2010 financial year.  In the light of differences in financial reporting regulations, the 
sample excludes overseas companies and financial trusts.  The final sample for the main model, 
AIM model and sub-sample models consists of 477 firm observations.  Since the disclosure of 
audit committee information of AIM companies is inconsistent, audit committee data was 
collected for 319 companies; hence for the audit committee characteristics model, the 
research sample is reduced to 319 companies.  All the data was manually collected from 
companies’ annual reports, and other sources such as Stock Exchange Yearbooks and the 
Corporate Register were used to ensure the completeness and consistency of information.  
Because this research is a quantitative empirical study, a significant part of this chapter 
identifies and justifies the dependent and independent variables used in the subsequent 
models.  The fourth section then illustrates the measurement of dependent variable (audit 
fee) and independent variables and discussed them in detail.  Then, the regression models 
employed to examine the determinants of audit fees of AIM companies are outlined.  The 
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regression models comprise a model to test whether the traditional model is suitable for AIM 
companies; an AIM model with AIM-specific variables; four sub-samples to identify the 
differences in audit pricing models between large and small companies (measured by total 
assets, and by total market capitalization), companies using Big, second tier and small auditors, 
and companies using Grant Thornton and other firms as their auditors; and a model for 
investigating how the audit committee characteristics influence audit fees, due to the 
different size of the sample where this variable is included.  The final section of the chapter 
outlines the statistical techniques used in the univariate and bivariate analysis.  The following 
chapters will present the results and findings of the empirical analyses.      
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Chapter 5 Empirical Analysis I – Audit pricing in AIM 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results and findings of the empirical analysis investigating the 
determinants of audit pricing in AIM using the traditional and AIM models.  It begins by 
presenting the descriptive statistics of the variables utilized in the empirical analysis.  The 
descriptive analysis comprises a comprehensive analysis of the overall sample and a detailed 
analysis of the statistics at industry level.  The descriptive statistics include the basic sample 
values such as mean, median, standard deviation and skewness and kurtosis of the overall 
sample variables, and the mean and median of variables for different number of years listed, 
and for different industries.  Then, a correlation matrix is presented.  This shows a two-way 
Pearson correlation between the variables employed in the study, identifying the correlation 
between audit fee and each explanatory variable as well as the significant correlations among 
the independent variables.  This is followed by the presentation of the results of multivariate 
regression analysis utilizing the models demonstrated in the previous chapter to investigate 
the hypotheses set out in this study.  The models tested include the traditional audit fee model 
based on previous empirical and theoretical audit pricing literature, and an AIM model which 
expands the traditional audit pricing model with AIM-specific characteristics.   The 
multivariate analysis also includes several sub-samples to investigate the different audit 
pricing models for companies with different characteristics, and a set of additional tests of 
the influence of various variables on audit fees.  The chapter concludes by summarizing the 
results and findings of the first empirical analysis. 
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Table 5.1   Descriptive Statistics 
Variable1 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis N 
AUDITFEE(£) 97783.283 63000.0 112198.793 5000.0 862000.0 3.489 15.680 477 
TOTALASSET(£000) 88724.915 40090.245 300082.420 128.253 6131900.0 17.463 347.618 477 
LOGAUDIT 4.818 4.799 0.375 3.699 5.936 0.168 0.468 477 
LOGASSET 7.564 7.603 0.576 5.98 9.788 -0.350 1.100 477 
SUB 9.100 7.0 8.545 0.0 62.0 2.540 9.025 457 
RECEIVABLE (%) 16.933 11.643 17.441 0.0 98.412 1.714 3.531 477 
USSUB 0.290 0.000 0.456 0.0 1.0 0.907 -1.182 449 
ROA (%) -5.495 1.855 32.853 -383.173 56.790 -5.076 44.191 477 
GEARING (%) 43.975 35.587 86.381 0.0 1327.383 13.202 191.422 477 
LISTYEAR 5.590 5.0 2.920 1.0 15.0 1.124 1.306 477 
DUMREV 0.130 0.0 0.332 0.0 1.0 2.264 3.139 477 
LOSS 0.450 0.0 0.498 0.0 1.0 0.207 -1.965 477 
NONAUDITFEE(£) 53152.646 20289.0 108766.554 0.0 1566656.0 7.380 84.650 477 
NONAUDIT 3.791 4.307 1.648 0.0 6.195 -1.601 1.234 477 
DUMAUDIT 0.170 0.0 0.372 0.0 1.0 1.805 1.262 477 
PROAUDIT (%) 28.128 25.641 21.328 0.0 86.054 0.520 -0.451 477 
NED (%) 53.708 50.0 17.070 0.0 100.0 0.246 0.488 477 
DUALITY 0.120 0.0 0.330 0.0 1.0 2.293 3.273 477 
BLOCKHOLD (%) 44.798 44.570 20.958 0.0 98.780 0.015 -0.443 461 
VALUEBLOCK (£000) 37502.546 13640.515 71271.740 0.0 666137.291 4.642 27.961 461 
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Variable1 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis N 
VBLOCKHOLD 7.092 7.135 1.081 0.0 8.824 -4.808 29.897 461 
BIG 4 0.400 0.0 0.490 0.0 1.0 0.417 -1.834 477 
MIDTIER 0.440 0.0 0.497 0.0 1.0 0.250 -1.946 477 
SMALL 0.160 0.0 0.370 0.0 1.0 1.825 1.337 477 
GT 0.170 0.0 0.378 0.0 1.0 1.745 1.048 477 
AUDITSPE (%) 8.761 8.800 4.836 0.1 15.300 -0.318 -1.098 477 
LONDON 0.450 0.0 0.498 0.0 1.0 0.207 -1.965 477 
BUSYDATE 0.660 1.0 0.473 0.0 1.0 -0.699 -1.517 477 
LAGTIME 1.985 1.964 0.147 1.447 2.551 0.119 0.380 463 
CHANGE 0.090 0.0 0.293 0.0 1.0 2.773 5.711 474 
NOMAD 0.780 1.0 0.412 0.0 1.0 -1.382 -0.082 477 
NOMADSPE (%) 2.939 2.500 1.667 0.100 6.300 0.293 -0.800 477 
AUDITISSUE 0.100 0.0 0.304 0.0 1.0 2.625 4.913 477 
RESOURCE 0.270 0.0 0.442 0.0 1.0 1.061 -0.878 477 
MANUFACTURE 0.320 0.0 0.467 0.0 1.0 0.770 -1.412 477 
SERVICE 0.250 0.0 0.432 0.0 1.0 1.175 -0.623 477 
FINANCE 0.170 0.0 0.372 0.0 1.0 1.805 1.262 477 
Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; RECEIVABLE 
= percentage of total assets represented by receivables; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; ROA = return on assets; GEARING = percentage 
of total assets represented by total liabilities; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 
2010; LOSS = dummy variable representing company suffered loss in 2010; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; DUMAUDIT = dummy variable representing 
company paid higher non-audit fee than audit fee; PROAUDIT = percentage of non-audit fee as a proportion of total auditor remuneration; NED = non-executive director as 
a proportion of all directors; DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; 
VBLOCKHOLD = natural log of value of the equity owned by large blockholders; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 
audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies 
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whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; AUDITSPE = the market share of each auditor by the 
number of AIM clients; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; AUDITISSUE = dummy variable representing company received 
qualified or modified audit opinion or audit comments in 2010; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and 
March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable 
representing companies changed auditor in 2010; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; NOMADSPE = market share of Nomad 
as the number of AIM clients; RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = dummy variable representing manufacturing 
company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company.
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5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics – Full Sample 
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study are presented in Table 5.1.  The audit 
fee paid by AIM companies in the sample ranges from a minimum of £5,000 to a maximum of 
£862,000. The average audit fee is £97,783, with a median fee of £63,000. The total asset of 
the sample companies ranges from £0.128 million to £6131.9 million; the average is £88.7 
million, and the median is £40.1 million.   
The sample companies possess, on average, 9.1 subsidiaries, with a median of 7.  Twenty-nine 
per cent of the sample companies have one or more subsidiary located in the US.  The average 
listing time for the companies in our sample is 5.59 years, with a median of 5 years.  The 
average receivable level as a percentage of total asset is 16.93.  The average ROA of the 
sample firms is -5.50 per cent, and gearing levels are on average 43.98 per cent.  As discussed 
earlier, 13 per cent of the sample companies did not report a revenue figure, and 45 per cent 
suffered a loss for the financial year 2009/2010, reflecting the fact that many AIM companies 
are in their early stages and seek a listing to raise funds for more speculative ventures, often 
in relation to mining and oil and gas exploration.  The fees paid for non-audit services by the 
sample companies, on average, is £53,152; and the range is from zero to maximum £1,566,656 
which is far more than fee paid for audit services.  The statistics also reveal that, on average, 
17 per cent of the sample companies paid higher fees for non-audit services than for audit 
services in 2010. The average percentage of non-audit fee in the total audit remuneration 
stands at 28.13, with a median of 25.64.  The statistics also show that 27 per cent of the sample 
companies operate in the natural resources sector, 32 per cent of the firms are manufacturing 
companies, 25 per cent are in the non-financial service companies, and 17 per cent operate in 
the financial sector.   
Forty per cent of AIM companies in this study use one of the Big 4 audit firms, while 44 per 
cent use one of the mid-tier firms, and the remaining 16 per cent use smaller firms.  O’Sullivan 
(2002) reported that in 1992, on average, 86 per cent of the audits for fully-listed companies 
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were conducted by Big 6 auditors; more recently Grafran and O’Sullivan (2013) show that in 
2007-2010, 95.5 per cent of the FSTE-350 companies were audited by Big 4 audit firms.  These 
statistics reflect the greater diversity in the audit market for AIM companies, which provides 
great opportunities for mid-tier and small auditors to expand their market share.  Seventeen 
per cent of the sample companies were audited by Grant Thornton.  Among the sample 
companies, 45 per cent were audited by London-based auditors, which is far lower than for 
large firms listed on the main market, where 61 per cent of audits are undertaken by London-
based auditors (Grafran and O’Sullivan, 2013).  Nine per cent of companies changed their 
auditor in 2010. Sixty-six per cent of the sample companies have a financial year end at 31st 
December so their external audits are undertaken during the period between 31st December 
and 31st March.  The statistics also reveal that, on average, 10 per cent of the sample 
companies reported qualified or modified audit opinions and audit comments in 2010.   
Boards in the sample have an average of 53.71 per cent non-executive representation, with a 
median of 50.00 per cent.  This is especially interesting as it suggests that, despite the absence 
of prescriptive governance recommendations, AIM companies still possess, on average, a 
majority of non-executive directors.  Furthermore, only 12 per cent of the sample companies 
have the same individual as CEO and chairman, which suggests that the majority of AIM 
companies realize the importance of chair independence and try to enhance the supervisory 
role of executive directors through the separation of the role of CEO and chairman.  On 
average, 44.8 per cent of AIM companies’ equity is owned by large blockholders, with a 
median of 44.57 per cent ownership.  The blockholder ownership ranges from zero to 98.78 
per cent, which suggests that although many AIM companies are looking for investment from 
large institutional investors, the ownership structures of AIM companies still show great 
variety.    In terms of the value of equity held by blockholders, it ranges from zero to 
£666,137,291 with average of £37,502,545.  The statistics show the actual value of the 
blockholders’ shareholding and indicate that some large companies have large blockholders 
(maybe institutional investors).  The statistics also reveal that 78 per cent of the sample 
companies hired the same firms as the nominated adviser and nominated broker.   
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5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics – By Industry  
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for different industries.  Following the London 
Stock Exchange classification list of industries, 11 industrial classifications were identified.  
After combining similar industries together, four categories were derived based on Mallin and 
Ow-Yong (2008), which are resources industries, manufacturing companies, non-financial 
services companies, and the financial sector. 
The results show that, on average, financial companies listed on AIM are larger in size and pay 
higher fees for audit services and non-audit services, while the median for non-audit fees is 
the second lowest among four industries. In 2010 the mean value of financial companies’ total 
asset was £205.614 million, and the average audit fee was £131,202.  The non-financial service 
companies are the smallest among the four industries, with average total assets of £60.433 
million, and they pay the lowest audit fees (£80,744).  Although natural resources companies 
have similar size with manufacturing companies (£67.333 million and £67.947 million 
respectively), the latter pay much higher audit fees – about £20,000 on average.  The 
difference might be due to the variation in audit complexity between these sectors.   The 
natural resources companies pay lowest average non-audit fees which might indicate they 
require less non-audit services.  
The analysis shows that, on average, natural resources companies have been listed on the 
market for 4.98 years, manufacturing companies for 5.66 years, non-financial service firms for 
6.15 years and finance firms for 5.61 years.  On average, manufacturing companies and 
financial firms have more subsidiaries (over ten) than the other industrial sectors.  Service 
companies have the highest percentage in possession of US subsidiaries (45 per cent), while 
finance companies have the lowest (14 per cent).  Due to the difference between industries, 
22.74 per cent of total assets in the manufacturing companies are represented by receivables, 
whereas in the natural resources industries this figure is only 6.40 per cent.  The average ROA 
is highest for the finance sector at 1.03 per cent, followed by the manufacturing sector with 
ROA of -7.19 per cent; the service sector is at -3.85 per cent, while the resources sector has the 
lowest ROA, at -15.56 per cent.  While the statistics of median ROA shows a different story 
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that manufacturing sector having the highest of 5,70 per cent, followed by the service sector 
with median ROA of 4.10 per cent, the finance sector with 1.36 per cent, and similar to the 
average ROA the resources sector has the lowest median as well , at -7.19 per cent.  Service 
companies have the highest level of gearing (67.89 per cent), while natural resources firms 
have the lowest level (23.42 per cent).  Forty-one per cent of natural resources companies did 
not generate a revenue stream in 2010, whereas only 3 per cent of manufacturing companies 
had no revenue, which suggests that manufacturing companies would start generating 
revenue in a shorter period.  Similarly, the natural resources sector has the highest proportion 
(77 per cent) of firms experiencing a loss, and manufacturing has the lowest (28 per cent).   
The statistics also reveal that in the finance sector, only 10 per cent of companies pay a higher 
fee for non-audit services than for audit services; while in the non-financial sector, 21 per cent 
of firms pay higher non-audit fee than audit fee.  17 per cent of companies in the resource 
sector and 16 per cent in the manufacturing sector pay more for non-audit services compared 
to audit fees.  Similarly, 24 per cent of total remuneration paid by finance companies to their 
auditors is for non-audit services, whereas the percentage increases to 32.99 per cent in non-
finance service firms. 
In terms of the selection of auditors, more than half (53 per cent) of the financial firms choose 
Big 4 audit firms, compared with less than one third (30 per cent) of natural resources firms.  
Nearly half (48 per cent) of non-financial service companies used mid-tier auditors in 2010, and 
24 per cent of natural resources firms chose small auditors.  The statistics show that, on 
average, 9 per cent of natural resources companies, 24 per cent of manufacturing companies, 
21 per cent of non-financial service companies and 11 per cent of finance companies use Grant 
Thornton as their auditors.  The analysis also reveal that 69 per cent of companies in the 
resources sector choose London-based audit firms, which is the highest proportion among 
the four industrial sectors, while the manufacturing sector has the lowest percentage with 
only 28 per cent of the companies using London-based auditors.  For all four sectors, around 
67 per cent of companies have their financial year end in the period between 31st December 
and 31st March.  Meanwhile, 9 per cent of companies in the resources and manufacturing 
sectors, 12 per cent in the service sector and 8 per cent in the finance sector changed their 
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auditor in 2010.  On average, around 5 per cent of companies in the manufacturing sector (6 
per cent), non-financial services sector (6 per cent) and finance sector (4 per cent) reported 
qualified or modified audit opinion, while 34 per cent of companies in the natural resources 
sector reported audit problems.  
On average, in every industry over 50 per cent of the directors of the boards are non-executive 
directors, with the finance sector having the highest proportion, at over 60 per cent.  The 
proportion of companies with the same individual as CEO and chairman is 17 per cent in the 
natural resources sector, followed by the finance sector at 14 per cent and the manufacturing 
and service sectors, each with 10 per cent.  The average percentage of large blockholder 
equity ownership is over 40 per cent in all four industrial sectors; it is highest in the natural 
resources sector, at 47.19 per cent, followed by the service sector, at 43 per cent.  In terms of 
the average value of equity held by the blockholder, natural resources still have the highest 
value and the manufacturing companies have the lowest. The analysis also reveals that 67 per 
cent of natural resources companies, 87 per cent of manufacturing companies, 86 per cent of 
service companies, and 78 per cent of finance companies use the same financial firms as both 
Nomad and broker.    
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Table 5.2   Descriptive Statistics – by Industry 
Variable1 
Natural Resources 
(127 firms) 
Manufacturing 
(153 firms) 
Service 
(118 firms) 
Finance 
(79 firms) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AUDITFEE(£) 83854.093 53596.764 105231.365 70000.0 80744.137 52701.602 131201.887 85937.414 
TOTALASSET(000) 67333.411 30260.114 67947.023 39700.0 60432.770 37520.197 205613.672 69752.0 
LOGAUDIT 4.730 4.729 4.859 4.845 4.765 4.722 4.960 4.934 
LOGASSET 7.503 7.481 7.560 7.599 7.467 7.574 7.814 7.844 
SUB 6.460 5.0 10.550 7.0 8.820 7.0 10.990 7.0 
RECEIVABLE 6.403 3.199 22.737 18.296 20.961 18.791 16.501 8.023 
USSUB 0.220 0.0 0.310 0.0 0.460 0.0 0.140 0.0 
ROA (%) -15.558 -7.194 -1.784 5.696 -3.848 4.095 1.033 1.358 
GEARING (%) 23.419 18.145 43.435 41.460 67.890 42.981 42.347 37.923 
LISTYEAR 4.980 5.0 5.660 5.0 6.150 5.0 5.610 5.0 
DUMREV 0.410 0.0 0.030 0.0 0.020 0.0 0.030 0.0 
LOSS 0.770 1.0 0.280 0.0 0.350 0.0 0.410 0.0 
NONAUDITFEE(£) 39281.576 14000.0 48580.288 25000.0 59095.716 28000.0 75430.042 19000.0 
NONAUDIT 3.525 4.146 3.954 4.398 4.127 4.447 3.402 4.279 
DUMAUDIT 0.170 0.000 0.160 0.0 0.210 0.0 0.100 0.0 
PROAUDIT (%) 25.613 22.414 28.591 26.442 32.991 29.566 24.011 21.466 
NED 55.790 57.143 49.978 50.0 51.846 50.0 60.366 57.143 
DUALITY 0.170 0.0 0.100 0.0 0.100 0.0 0.140 0.0 
BLOCKHOLD (%) 47.190 47.620 43.997 41.890 42.996 44.0 45.135 45.130 
VALUEBLOCK (£000) 51964.318 19362.221 25304.738 12112.299 35214.035 11810.860 33700.304 23424.90 
VBLOCKHOLD 7.357 7.291 6.902 7.091 7.025 7.110 7.128 7.110 
BIG 4 0.300 0.0 0.420 0.0 0.380 0.0 0.530 1.0 
MIDTIER 0.460 0.0 0.440 0.0 0.480 0.0 0.330 0.0 
SMALL 0.240 0.0 0.130 0.0 0.140 0.0 0.140 0.0 
GT 0.090 0.0 0.240 0.0 0.210 0.0 0.110 0.0 
AUDITSPE (%) 7.233 8.600 9.482 8.800 9.132 8.800 9.268 11.800 
LONDON 0.690 1.0 0.280 0.0 0.400 0.0 0.470 0.0 
BUSYDATE 0.670 1.0 0.670 1.0 0.660 1.0 0.660 1.0 
LAGTIME 2.042 2.072 1.961 1.949 1.962 1.952 1.974 1.949 
CHANGE 0.090 0.0 0.090 0.0 0.120 0.0 0.080 0.0 
NOMAD 0.610 1.0 0.870 1.0 0.860 1.0 0.780 1.0 
NOMADSPE (%) 2.845 2.500 3.101 3.0 3.162 2.500 2.444 1.900 
AUDITISSUE 0.240 0.0 0.060 0.0 0.060 0.0 0.040 0.0 
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Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; RECEIVABLE 
= percentage of total assets represented by receivables; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; ROA = return on assets; GEARING = percentage 
of total assets represented by total liabilities; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 
2010; LOSS = dummy variable representing company suffered loss in 2010; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; DUMAUDIT = dummy variable representing 
company paid higher non-audit fee than audit fee; PROAUDIT = percentage of non-audit fee as a proportion of total auditor remuneration; NED = non-executive director as 
a proportion of all directors; DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; 
VBLOCKHOLD = natural log of value of the equity owned by large blockholders; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 
audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies 
whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; AUDITSPE = the market share of each auditor by the 
number of AIM clients; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; AUDITISSUE = dummy variable representing company received 
qualified or modified audit opinion or audit comments in 2010; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and 
March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable 
representing companies changed auditor in 2010; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; NOMADSPE = market share of Nomad 
as the number of AIM clients; RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = dummy variable representing manufacturing 
company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company.
130 
 
5.2 Correlation Matrix 
Table 5.3 contains two-way Pearson correlations amongst the dependent and independent 
variables subsequently to be used in the multivariate analysis.  It is interesting to examine the 
correlations in this study because they identify both the univariate relationship between the 
dependent variable (audit fee) and the explanatory variable, and the significant 
interrelationships among the independent variables.  The single and double asterisks in Table 
5.3 identify the Pearson correlations significant at five per cent and one per cent respectively.   
The first column of the correlation matrix highlights that a number of explanatory variables 
are significantly associated with the log of audit fees.  For example, as expected, the size of 
audit client, the number of subsidiaries, the existence of US subsidiary, return on asset, the 
use of Big 4 auditor, companies’ financial year end coordinating with auditors’ busy period, 
and the level of non-audit fees are all significantly and positively correlated with audit fees.  
On the other hand, the use of mid-tier auditors and small auditors is negatively correlated with 
audit fees.  The negative correlation between companies that were without revenue stream 
or suffered loss in 2010 and the audit fee may reflect the fact that for those companies, instead 
of suffering fee penalties for higher audit risk, they paid lower audit fees because they are less 
complex to audit, which reduces the required audit effort.  The study also shows a significant 
and positive association between the use of auditors with higher market share in AIM and 
audit fee, which is consistent with prior studies such as Francis et al. (2005) and Carson (2009).  
However, it is interesting to find that the use of Grant Thornton, the market leader in AIM, has 
a significant and negative relationship with audit fee, which is inconsistent with the results of 
the other audit specialist variables.  This finding might indicate that price strategy is an 
important reason why Grant Thornton has become the market leader in AIM, which would 
make it very interesting to investigate how Grant Thornton differs from other auditors in 
terms of the determinants of its pricing strategy.  However, the significant and negative 
correlation between the use of Nomad with higher market share and audit fee is somewhat 
counter-intuitive, since I had expected that larger Nomads would have higher requirements 
with regard to companies’ corporate governance and audit quality, and hence exert more 
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audit effort and charge higher audit fees; however, it may indicate that large Nomads have 
influence on the selection of the auditors in order to control the fee paid for auditing services, 
or large Nomads share the external monitoring role of external auditors.  The study also 
shows a significant and positive relationship between the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board and audit fee, and between the proportion of equity owned by large 
blockholders and audit fee, which is consistent with the findings of some prior studies that 
independent boards and large blockholders have higher requirement on audit quality, which 
means a higher audit fee.   
As expected, the size variable is also significantly correlated with other explanatory variables, 
since company size simultaneously impacts many of the complexity and risk measures.  The 
analysis indicates that companies with larger size (total asset) are significantly positively 
correlated with more subsidiaries and higher non-audit fees, which suggests that they are 
more complex to audit and have more requirements for non-audit services.  They tend to have 
better performance, indicated by their significant positive correlation with return on asset and 
negative correlation with gearing level, the existence of operating loss, and lack of revenue 
stream.  Large firms also have higher requirement for audit quality, since the study reveals 
that firm size is positively correlated with the use of Big 4 audit firms or auditors with special 
knowledge and experience of the market, and is negatively correlated with the existence of 
qualified or modified audit opinions.  Moreover, the findings reveal a negative correlation 
between firm size and audit report lag time, as well as the selection of Nomads with higher 
market share.  The study also shows that large companies have better board independence, 
with a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board, while the higher proportion 
and value of equity held by large blockholders indicates that large companies in AIM have 
better opportunities to attract institutional investors.  All these correlations suggest that large 
companies have different characteristics compared with smaller companies in terms of 
complexity, performance, internal governance control, and the selection of auditors and 
Nomads; hence it is interesting and necessary to investigate whether there are differences in 
the influential factors regarding audit fees between large and small companies. 
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The correlations in columns 8, 9 and 10 show that companies choosing Big 4, mid-tier and 
small auditors are correlated with different explanatory variables.  In addition to being 
significantly correlated with audit fee and size, companies using Big 4 auditors are also 
positively correlated with non-audit fee, paying higher non-audit fee than audit fee, and the 
proportion of total audit remuneration in the form of non-audit fee.  The analysis also shows 
a positive relationship between the use of Big 4 auditors and the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board, which may suggest that companies with higher board independence 
have higher requirement on auditor reputation and audit quality; however, it is unclear 
whether this has any influence on audit fee.  Meanwhile, the correlations also show a negative 
association between the use of Big 4 auditor and the use of London-based auditor.  In contrast, 
companies using small auditors have a significant positive association with the use of London-
based auditors.  The study also reveals that the use of small auditors has a positive association 
with audit report lag time, and companies with no reported revenue.  The choice of small 
auditors also has a positive correlation with hiring the same individual as CEO and chairman, 
and a negative association with the proportion of firms’ equity owned by large blockholders.  
This evidence suggests that firms choosing Big 4 and small auditors are distinctive; hence they 
could be investigated separately on the determinants of their audit fees. 
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Table 5.3   Correlations 
No Variable1,2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 LOGAUDIT 1             
2 LOGASSET 0.696** 1            
3 SUB 0.495** 0.405** 1           
4 RECEIVABLE 0.034 -0.115* 0.122** 1          
5 USSUB 0.144** -0.010 0.128** 0.099* 1         
6 ROA 0.151** 0.403** 0.100* 0.109* -0.060 1        
7 GEARING -0.032 -0.143** 0.043 0.374** 0.002 -0.057 1       
8 BIG 4 0.386** 0.344** 0.091 -0.066 0.036 0.085 -0.007 1      
9 MIDTIER -0.134** -0.148** 0.000 0.101* 0.007 -0.080 0.001 -0.719** 1     
10 SMALL -0.331** -0.257** -0.123** -0.047 -0.058 -0.006 0.007 -0.360** -0.390** 1    
11 LONDON 0.063 -0.001 -0.030 -0.142** -0.050 -0.070 -0.028 -0.200** 0.036 0.217** 1   
12 CHANGE -0.047 -0.062 0.014 0.023 0.049 -0.008 -0.005 0.061 -0.083 0.031 0.011 1  
13 BUSYDATE 0.122** 0.046 -0.013 -0.024 -0.005 -0.061 0.063 -0.002 0.028 -0.034 0.034 -0.058 1 
14 LAGTIME -0.019 -0.135** -0.035 -0.164** -0.066 -0.227** 0.017 -0.102* -0.046 0.196** 0.170** 0.084 0.109* 
15 NONAUDIT 0.168** 0.112* 0.063 0.130** 0.177** 0.082 0.042 0.122** -0.068 -0.071 -0.060 -0.088 -0.021 
16 NED 0.109* 0.154** 0.011 -0.214** -0.069 -0.081 -0.157** 0.123** -0.084 -0.050 -0.008 0.061 0.074 
17 DUALITY -0.074 -0.068 -0.052 0.018 -0.081 0.012 0.064 -0.072 -0.049 0.161** 0.032 0.030 0.038 
18 NATURERES -0.142** -0.064 -0.188** -0.364** -0.094* -0.185** -0.143** -0.122** 0.023 0.131** 0.286** -0.016 0.006 
19 MANUFACTURE 0.075 -0.004 0.117* 0.229** 0.017 0.078 -0.004 0.037 0.009 -0.061 -0.232** -0.008 0.003 
20 SERVICE -0.081 -0.097* -0.018 0.133** 0.208** 0.029 0.159** -0.020 0.052 -0.043 -0.058 0.048 -0.004 
21 FINANCE 0.169** 0.193** 0.099* -0.008 -0.152** 0.089 -0.008 0.121** -0.098* -0.029 0.018 -0.027 -0.006 
22 LISTYEAR -0.080 -0.068 -0.074 0.106* 0.082 0.057 0.019 0.014 -0.030 0.023 -0.058 0.031 -0.028 
23 DUMREV -0.251** -0.184** -0.187** -0.263** -0.178** -0.250** -0.133** -0.115* -0.029 0.191** 0.179** 0.052 -0.079 
24 LOSS -0.216** -0.290** -0.203** -0.290** -0.060 -0.536** -0.081 -0.071 0.019 0.068 0.127** 0.011 -0.002 
25 GT -0.140** -0.081 -0.016 0.104* 0.039 -0.016 0.055 -0.371** 0.516** -0.201** -0.132** -0.053 0.029 
26 AUDITORSPE 0.225** 0.208** 0.116* 0.060 0.057 -0.001 0.025 0.146** 0.372** -0.693** -0.200** -0.028 0.068 
27 DUMAUDIT -0.080 0.011 -0.004 0.036 0.065 0.006 -0.018 0.110* -0.064 -0.060 -0.141** -0.048 0.006 
28 PROAUDIT -0.063 0.055 -0.044 0.092* 0.067 0.056 0.028 0.135** -0.078 -0.074 -0.144** -0.082 0.022 
29 AUDITISSUE -0.075 -0.161** -0.094* -0.162** -0.015 -0.169** 0.058 -0.021 0.007 0.018 0.111* -0.039 -0.037 
30 BLOCKHOLD 0.092* 0.109* 0.015 -0.114* -0.006 -0.086 0.049 -0.118* -0.016 -0.135** -0.052 0.060 -0.018 
31 VBLOCKHOLD 0.116* 0.177** 0.051 -0.105* 0.006 -0.006 -0.069 0.115* -0.064 -0.067 0.113* -0.027 -0.013 
32 NOMAD -0.030 -0.102* 0.094* 0.178** 0.072 0.017 0.067 -0.073 0.094* -0.030 -0.090* 0.062 -0.017 
33 NOMADSPE -0.189** -0.184** -0.085 0.093* 0.017 -0.027 -0.002 -0.174** 0.108* 0.085 -0.090* 0.070 -0.059 
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No 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
14 1               
15 -0.221** 1              
16 0.029 -0.015 1             
17 0.093* -0.092* -0.091* 1            
18 0.234** -0.097* 0.074 0.076 1           
19 -0.113* 0.068 -0.150** -0.054 -0.414** 1          
20 -0.090 0.117* -0.063 -0.038 -0.345** -0.394** 1         
21 -0.032 -0.105* 0.174** 0.021 -0.268** -0.306** -0.255** 1        
22 -0.061 0.089 -0.055 0.031 -0.126** 0.016 0.110* 0.002 1       
23 0.221** -0.154** 0.033 0.050 0.515** -0.206** -0.188** -0.135** -0.068 1      
24 0.270** -0.115* 0.109* 0.020 0.391** -0.232** -0.117* -0.039 -0.126** 0.421** 1     
25 -0.105* -0.017 -0.060 -0.036 -0.124** 0.115* 0.061 -0.068 0.024 -0.106* -0.053 1    
26 -0.200** 0.037 0.041 -0.136** -0.191** 0.103* 0.044 0.047 0.013 -0.189** -0.067 0.617** 1   
27 -0.058 0.326** 0.076 -0.065 0.000 -0.004 0.071 -0.077 0.085 -0.067 0.018 -0.024 0.046 1  
28 -0.205** 0.714** 0.046 -0.093* -0.071 0.015 0.131** -0.086 0.105* -0.116* -0.054 -0.008 0.055 0.725** 1 
29 0.278** -0.020 0.024 0.083 0.265** -0.099* -0.082 -0.095* -0.050 0.226** 0.292** -0.044 -0.095* -0.002 -0.062 
30 -0.004 0.013 0.287** -0.032 0.069 -0.026 -0.049 0.007 -0.025 0.005 0.080 -0.015 0.064 0.006 0.006 
31 0.014 0.153** 0.100* -0.138** 0.149** -0.121** -0.035 0.015 -0.049 0.075 0.026 -0.103* -0.047 0.040 0.120* 
32 -0.135** 0.069 -0.062 -0.035 -0.260** 0.142** 0.112* 0.001 0.053 -0.170** -0.141** 0.050 0.030 0.028 0.070 
33 0.099* -0.003 -0.075 0.038 -0.034 0.067 0.077 -0.132** 0.056 0.003 0.030 0.074 -0.062 -0.018 0.002 
                
No 29 30 31 32 33 
29 1     
30 0.065 1    
31 -0.011 0.485** 1   
32 -0.125** -0.016 -0.098* 1  
33 0.054 -0.031 -0.108* 0.147** 1 
Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; RECEIVABLE 
= percentage of total assets represented by receivables; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; ROA = return on assets; GEARING = percentage 
of total assets represented by total liabilities; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 
2010; LOSS = dummy variable representing company suffered loss in 2010; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; DUMAUDIT = dummy variable representing 
company paid higher non-audit fee than audit fee; PROAUDIT = percentage of non-audit fee as a proportion of total auditor remuneration; NED = non-executive director as 
a proportion of all directors; DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; 
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VBLOCKHOLD = natural log of value of the equity owned by large blockholders; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 
audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies 
whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; AUDITSPE = the market share of each auditor by the 
number of AIM clients; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; AUDITISSUE = dummy variable representing company received 
qualified or modified audit opinion or audit comments in 2010; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and 
March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable 
representing companies changed auditor in 2010; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; NOMADSPE = market share of Nomad 
as the number of AIM clients; RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = dummy variable representing manufacturing 
company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company.  
2 *, **denote statistically significant differences at 5% and 1% respectively. 
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As mentioned above, another interesting correlation to emerge from Table 5.3 
relates to the distinction between companies that report revenues and companies 
that do not.  In addition to revenue reporting being significantly correlated with 
audit fees and size, it is also highly negatively correlated with both subsidiary 
variables, the presence of an operating loss and return on asset, and the level of 
non-audit fees, highly positively correlated with the resource industry classification 
and negatively correlated with the other three.  This evidence suggests that the 
negative correlation between companies with no revenue and audit fee may be 
because those companies are actually easier (and consequently cheaper) to audit 
than their revenue-reporting counterparts.  This might be because these 
companies possess few or lower levels of the size, complexity and risk features that 
have been observed as being important influential factors of audit fees in previous 
audit pricing studies of fully-listed firms.  The correlation matrix also shows that 
companies with no reported revenue have positive correlations with the use of 
smaller auditors, London-based auditors and longer audit report lag time.    
One reason why it is important to conduct bivariate correlation analysis is that 
higher correlation between variables suggests a higher possibility of 
multicollinearity issues, which would restrict the findings derived from multivariate 
regression analysis.  Previous literature suggests that a correlation value below 
0.80 is considered to be safe for the variables to be used in the same multivariate 
regression analysis (Gujarati, 2003).  Consistent with prior studies, the correlation 
value between the audit fee variable (log of audit fee) and audit client size variable 
(log of total assets) is as high as 0.696, which satisfies the safety level mentioned 
above.  There are other variables in the correlation matrix that are highly correlated 
with each other, such as -0.719 between the use of Big 4 auditors and mid-tier 
auditors, and 0.725 for dummy variable representing companies paying higher non-
audit fees than audit fees and the proportion of total audit remuneration in the 
form of non-audit fees.  However, all these highly correlated variables will be 
included in different regression models, and none of the variables used in either 
model has a correlation value higher than 0.80.  In each regression, the VIF 
(variance inflation factor) is also checked to ensure there are no multicollinearity 
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issues.  
5.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
According to the skewness and kurtosis values shown in Table 5.1, some of the 
variables were transformed to natural logarithm in order to satisfy the normality 
assumption.  In order to test the homoscedasticity and linearity of the variables, 
residuals analysis and Q-Q plot analysis were conducted.  The other fundamental 
assumption that all audit pricing studies need to be conscious of is the 
multicollinearity of the variables.  As shown in Table 5.3, although some of the 
independent variables show significant correlations, the values of the variables 
included in each regression model are at an acceptable level.  This study also 
calculates the variance inflation factors (VIF) for all the regressions, and finds that 
all the VIF values are significantly less than 10, which is acceptable (Gujarati, 2003).  
In fact, with the exception of log of total assets, which shows a VIF value of 2 on a 
few occasions, the VIF values for all the other variables are significantly less than 2 
in all the regressions.  In this section, the results of the audit pricing model, AIM 
model and several additional tests are presented.   
5.3.1 Main Model 
Audit pricing model 
Table 5.4 presents the results of three OLS regressions examining the influence of 
traditional audit pricing explanatory variables generalized from fully-listed 
companies on the log of audit fees in a multivariate setting.  The explanatory 
variables include the measure of audit client size, complexity and audit risk 
identified and discussed in previous chapters.  In addition, I include explanatory 
variables representing selected auditor characteristics such as auditor size, audit 
tenure and auditor location; engagement characteristics including busy season, 
audit report lag and non-audit fee; and governance factors such as board 
independence and leadership.  The three regressions test separately the impact of 
different sized auditors on audit fees.  The first regression includes a dummy 
variable to represent Big 4 auditors, while the second substitutes the Big 4 variable 
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with a dummy variable to represent mid-tier auditor, and the third substitutes the 
Big 4 and mid-tier auditor with a dummy variable to represent small auditor.  For all 
the regressions in this study, industry dummies are included to control for variation 
among industrial sectors.   
The results of all the regressions in Table 5.4 show that company size, as 
represented by log of total assets, is the most significant influence on audit fees, 
with a very positive impact.  This is consistent with almost all previous studies of 
audit pricing and with the expectation that the larger the company, the higher the 
fee paid for audit services.  In terms of complexity, the results reported in Table 5.4 
show that the number of subsidiaries and the proportion of assets in the form of 
receivables also exert a positive and significant impact on audit fees.  These findings 
are consistent across all three regressions presented in Table 5.4.  Therefore, the 
impact of audit client complexity variables extracted from fully-listed companies is 
consistent with the expectation that increased complexity has a positive impact on 
audit fees.  In terms of audit risk, this study employs three risk measures commonly 
used in previous audit pricing research – the existence of US subsidiary, return on 
asset, and gearing ratio.  In all the regressions in Table 5.4, the presence of a US-
based subsidiary shows a positive impact on audit fees, while companies’ financial 
performance represented by return on assets shows a negative impact.  These 
findings are consistent with the expectation that a US presence increases auditors’ 
litigation exposure, while weaker financial performance increases the risk of 
subsequent financial problems and, consequently, possible litigation/reputation 
costs for the auditor.  The theoretical underpinning of audit pricing research 
suggests that auditors respond to this increased risk either by more extensive and 
expensive testing or by including an insurance premium in the audit fee.  These 
findings suggest that clients presenting increased audit risk are indeed charged a 
fee premium.   However, the results in all three regressions show no influence of 
gearing on audit fees.   
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Table 5.4 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the 
Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM companies – Audit Pricing Model  
Variables1 
Model 1 (N=434) Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient T-Statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 
RESOURCE -0.061 -1.811* -0.071 -2.061** -0.076 -2.258** 
SERVICE -0.064 -2.124** -0.068 -2.157** -0.075 -2.461** 
FINANCE 0.015 0.411 0.021 0.563 0.022 0.629 
DUALITY -0.009 -0.276 -0.017 -0.482 0.007 0.194 
NED 0.000 -0.476 0.000 -0.253 -5.211E-05 -0.076 
BIG4 0.134 5.390*** -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -0.033 -1.392 -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -0.167 -5.082*** 
LONDON 0.096 4.041*** 0.072 2.974*** 0.096 3.993*** 
BUSYDATE 0.060 2.543** 0.058 2.360** 0.051 2.160** 
LAGTIME 0.252 3.110*** 0.237 2.817*** 0.306 3.721*** 
CHANGE -0.051 -1.365 -0.035 -0.899 -0.029 -0.782 
SUB 0.010 6.421*** 0.009 5.947*** 0.009 5.980*** 
USSUB 0.084 3.285*** 0.087 3.298*** 0.087 3.406*** 
LOGASSET 0.383 14.461*** 0.420 15.972*** 0.399 15.465*** 
ROA -0.001 -3.134*** -0.001 -3.546*** -0.001 -3.123*** 
RECEIVABLE 0.003 3.384*** 0.002 3.031*** 0.002 2.775*** 
GEARING -1.977E-05 -0.108 -3.089E-06 -0.016 -3.747E-05 -0.204 
NONAUDIT 0.016 2.227** 0.019 2.567** 0.021 3.016*** 
       
Constant 1.125 4.362*** 0.939 3.510*** 0.956 3.754*** 
       
Adjusted R2 0.614  0.589  0.611  
F-test 41.461***  37.444***  40.983***  
Note: 
1 Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = 
dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-
financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = 
dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a 
proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a 
Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier 
audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy 
variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME 
= the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit 
report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number 
of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural 
logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by 
receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural 
logarithm of non-audit fee. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.4a Results of Two-Stage Least Squares Regression – Audit Pricing Model  
Variables1 
Model 1a  Model 2a Model3a 
Coefficient T-statistic3 Coefficient T-statistic3 Coefficient T-statistic3 
RESOURCE -.061 -1.822 * -.071 -2.072** -.077 -2.301** 
SERVICE -.061 -2.009 ** -.063 -2.016** -.070 -2.312** 
FINANCE .007 .202 .012 .323 .013 .359 
DUALITY -.012 -.360 -.021 -.606 .002 .060 
NED .000 -.416 .000 -.190 1.635E-05 .024 
BIG4 .140 5.680 *** -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.041 -1.740* -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.164 -4.984*** 
LONDON .098 4.089 *** .072 2.984*** .095 3.966*** 
BUSYDATE .060 2.529 ** .057 2.353** .051 2.133** 
LAGTIME .222 2.775 *** .198 2.395** .263 3.248*** 
CHANGE -.059 -1.575 -.044 -1.140 -.038 -1.027 
SUB .010 6.400 *** .009 5.927*** .009 5.929*** 
USSUB .092 3.607 *** .096 3.665*** .098 3.848*** 
LOGASSET .386 14.598 *** .425 16.193*** .407 15.831*** 
ROA -.001 -3.059 *** -.001 -3.482*** -.001 -3.064*** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.558 *** .003 3.241*** .002 2.985*** 
GEARING 4.740E-06 .026 2.745E-05 .146 -2.446E-06 -.013 
NONAUDITa2 .025 2.227 ** .030 2.567** .034 3.016*** 
       
Constant 1.213 4.763 *** 1.048 3.970*** 1.058  
4.192*** 
 
       
Adjusted R2 0.614  0.589  0.611  
F-test 41.461 ***  37.444***  40.983***  
Note: 
1 Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = 
dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-
financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = 
dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a 
proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a 
Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier 
audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy 
variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME 
= the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit 
report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number 
of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural 
logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by 
receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities. 
2 NONAUDITa is the fitted value of NONAUDIT, which is the standardised residual of NONAUDIT regressing 
onto the exogenous variables in the audit pricing model.  It is used as an instrumental variable to control for 
the incremental effect of audit fee on the level of non-audit fee.  
3 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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As mentioned in previous chapters, one of the interesting characteristics of AIM companies is 
the expectation that board composition choices are relatively free from regulatory 
recommendations.  Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether the proportion of non-
executive directors firms choose to use exerts an impact on audit fees.  The results of all three 
regressions show that board composition and board leadership have no significant impact on 
audit fees, which fails to support the argument that a more independent board would lead to 
more intensive external audit (Carcello et al., 2002).     
Another interesting point in studying the AIM companies is the rich variation in their auditor 
choice.  The regression results in model 1 suggest that, in the case of AIM companies, Big 4 
auditors do charge a fee premium for their audits.  This is not unexpected, but is contrary to 
the findings of McMeeking et al. (2006) on the UK market, and may suggest that AIM 
companies are prepared to pay a premium either for a higher quality audit or perhaps to 
benefit from the signalling value of using auditors perceived to be of superior quality.  The 
regression results of model 3 show that choosing small auditors has negative and significant 
impact on audit fees, which also supports the prediction of the impact of auditor size on the 
audit fee.  Hence, the results of the three models indicate that comparing with national/local 
auditors, both Big 4 and mid-tier auditor charge higher fees; and Big 4 auditors charge highest 
premium for their services.  This might indicate that different sized auditors offer various 
products or different quality.  The regression results of all three models also indicate that 
audits undertaken by London-based auditors are more expensive, reflecting the higher costs 
of running a London-based practice as well as the greater (and more costly) expertise held by 
London-based offices, which is consistent with previous UK-based research (Ezzamel et al., 
1996; O’Sullivan, 2000).  Around 9 per cent of AIM companies changed their auditors in the 
2009/2010 financial year; however the regression results in all three models show no statistical 
significance, and thus there is no indication of a ‘low balling’ strategy whereby new audit 
engagements are associated with lower fees.   
In terms of engagement characteristics, the regressions reported in all three models show 
that having audits undertaken in the busy audit season does exert a positive influence on audit 
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fees.  Consistent with O’Sullivan (2000), this study finds evidence that longer time period 
between a company’s financial year end and the signing of the audit report is also associated 
with higher audit fees.  This is consistent with the interpretation that these companies need 
additional/more specialized audit work, as evidenced by the delay, and consequently require 
more time and resources for their auditing to be completed adequately, hence the higher fees.  
The value of non-audit services purchased from the auditor does exert a positive and very 
significant impact on audit fees, a finding consistent with previous research in the context of 
fully-listed companies.  Since some research argued about the endogeneity issue related to 
the relationship between audit fees, non-audit fees and other explanatory variables, this study 
then applied simultaneous-equation estimation to test whether the results obtained from the 
audit pricing model is biased 14.  The results of 2SLS tests in Table 5.4a indicate that after 
controlling for the joint determination the fees, in all the models, non-audit fees still show 
significant positive impact on the audit fees paid by AIM companies.  This clearly indicates that, 
if the auditor also provides non-audit services to its client, the level of these services does 
positively influence the audit fee.     
In terms of variation among different industrial sectors, the results in all three regressions 
indicate that companies in the natural resources sector and non-financial service sector pay 
significantly lower audit fees, which, based on the statistics shown in Table 5.2, might be 
because firms in these industrial sectors are either small in size or in their early stages. 
In summary therefore, the empirical results shown in Table 5.4 indicate that the traditional 
audit pricing model and most of the explanatory variables used in the studies of fully-listed 
companies could also explain the audit pricing strategy in AIM.  Consistent with previous 
research (i.e. Hay et al., 2006; McMeeking et al., 2006; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007), the findings 
show that audit client size, complexity and risk have a positive association with audit fees; and 
some engagement characteristics, including audits undertaken during the busy season, the 
                                                          
14 Following Whisenant et al. (2003), this study use an instrumental variables approach – two –stage least squares 
(2SLS) to examine the impact of joint determination of audit and non-audit fees.  In the 2SLS, instead of using 
the actual value of NONAUDIT in the audit pricing model, I substitute the standardized residuals of NONAUDIT 
by regressing NONAUDIT on the exogenous variables in the audit fee model.   
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length of time between a company’s financial year end and the signing of the audit report, 
and joint provision of non-audit services, also show significant and positive relationship with 
audit fees paid by AIM companies for external auditing.  Although this study finds no 
significant impact of board independence or leadership on audit fees, it is still consistent with 
previous UK-based studies, such as O’Sullivan (1999) and Peel and Clatworthy (2001), who also 
show no clear impact.  While McMeeking et al. (2006) suggest that the larger auditor premium 
has been eroded in recent years in the UK, the findings of this study strongly support Peel and 
Roberts's (2003) conclusion that among small and medium sized companies (i.e. AIM 
companies), Big 4 auditors do charge a fee premium for their audits, and local and regional 
auditors charge significantly lower fees.  Consistent with previous UK studies, the current 
study also finds that London-based auditors charge higher audit fees, but it does not show 
any significant relationship between change of auditors and audit fees in AIM companies.   The 
F-statistics of each regression in Table 5.4 are significant at one per cent level, suggesting that 
the models are statistically valid.  The adjusted R2 for all three regressions ranges between 
58.9 per cent and 61.4 per cent, which indicates that each model has a high explanatory power.  
The total number of observations in Table 5.4 is 434.  
AIM model  
As mentioned in previous chapters, AIM companies have different characteristics compared 
to the fully-listed companies.  In this model, several AIM-specific variables are included to 
expand the traditional model, and the influences of these AIM characteristics on audit fees 
are examined in a multivariate setting.  In addition to the variables tested in the audit pricing 
model, the AIM model includes several explanatory variables to represent unique features of 
AIM companies, including two variables to represent the more identifiable audit risk of AIM 
companies, one to represent the Nominated Adviser also acting as broker, one to test the 
influence of AIM companies’ ownership structure, and one to test the impact of Grant 
Thornton as the auditor specialist in the market on the audit pricing. Table 5.5 shows the 
results of four main multivariate regression models with the log of audit fee as the dependent 
variable.  The first three models are the same as in the traditional audit pricing model, but 
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examine separately the influence of different sized auditors - Big 4, mid-tier and local and 
regional auditors - on the fees paid by AIM companies for audit services.  The fourth regression 
includes a dummy variable to represent Grant Thornton as the auditor specialist since it has 
the largest number of clients (as shown in Table 4.3 - Auditors’ market share of AIM) in AIM.  
In the AIM model, industrial sector variations are controlled for in all the four regressions. 
The results of the first three regressions indicate that after including AIM-specific variables, 
the influence of general explanatory variables are broadly consistent with the regression 
models in Table 5.4.  The log of total assets, the number of subsidiaries, the existence of a US-
based subsidiary and the proportion of assets in the form of receivables show consistent 
significant and positive impact with audit fees, while companies’ financial performance in the 
form of return on assets has a significantly negative impact on audit fees.  In model 4, with 
the dummy variable of Grant Thornton as auditor specialist, all the traditional explanatory 
variables representing audit client size, complexity and risk show the same influence on AIM 
companies’ audit pricing.  As mentioned above, two AIM-specific variables are included in this 
model to represent potential risk issues that could influence the companies’ audit pricing.  
One represents the length of time the AIM company has been listed on the market, and the 
other is a dummy variable representing the fact that AIM companies do not immediately 
generate an income stream.  The results in all four regressions indicate that there is no 
significant relationship between the number of years a company has been listed on AIM and 
the fee it pays for audit services.  However, regressions 1, 2, and 4 indicate that the dummy 
variable signifying companies with no revenue stream has significant influence on audit 
pricing, albeit in the opposite direction to the expectation.  The results indicate that 
companies that generated no revenue in 2009/2010 paid significantly lower audit fees, and 
that companies with revenue are more costly to audit.  This may suggest that the additional 
work and effort that revenue stream generates for auditing significantly outweigh the risks 
arising from potential financial uncertainties.  The results in Table 5.5 also show that 
companies in the service sector pay significantly lower audit fees.  Meanwhile, unlike what is 
shown in Table 5.4, companies in the natural resources sector show no statistically significant 
impact on audit fees.   
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Results in Table 5.5 for the engagement characteristics in all four AIM regressions show a 
similar association with audit pricing as the results in the audit pricing models in Table 5.4.  The 
regression results for all four models show that audits undertaken in the busy audit season in 
the UK are associated with higher audit fees.   However, the levels of significance vary, with 
regressions 1, 2, and 4 showing significance at 5 per cent level while regression 3 is at 10 per 
cent level.  Consistent with the traditional audit pricing models and previous studies, the 
length of delay between a company’s financial year end and the date of signing the audit 
report also shows a significant and positive impact on audit fees in all four regressions.  The 
results also indicate that, consistent with Table 5.4, the joint provision of non-audit services 
from the auditors still has significant positive influence on audit fees after considering the 
AIM-specific variables and the market auditor specialist.   Similar to the audit pricing model, 
the joint determination issue of audit and non-audit fees is also considered and tested using 
the instrumental variable approach.  Results of 2SLS in Table 5.5a are consistent with 
non0audit fees having directly significant positive impact on audit fees after controlling the 
incremental effect of audit fees on the level of non-audit services.   
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Table 5.5 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – AIM Model  
Variables1 
Model 1 (N=420) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 
RESOURCE -.037 -1.028 -.048 -1.274 -.058 -1.600 -.059 -1.593 
SERVICE -.068 -2.169** -.070 -2.176** -.076 -2.422** -.074 -2.333** 
FINANCE .016 .451 .023 .600 .023 .630 .017 .468 
DUALITY -.013 -.370 -.021 -.583 .002 .052 -.024 -.678 
NED .000 -.394 .000 -.337 -2.634E-05 -.036 .000 -.350 
BIG4 .135 5.286*** --- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.036 -1.466 -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.165 -4.857*** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.099 -3.043*** 
LONDON .093 3.737*** .067 2.670*** .092 3.684*** .059 2.387** 
BUSYDATE .052 2.131** .050 2.000** .046 1.886* .053 2.136** 
LAGTIME .257 3.077*** .244 2.819*** .305 3.597*** .228 2.658*** 
CHANGE -.048 -1.238 -.031 -.789 -.023 -.598 -.032 -.815 
SUB .009 5.894*** .009 5.475*** .009 5.569*** .009 5.455*** 
USSUB .074 2.770*** .076 2.775*** .077 2.873*** .075 2.751*** 
LOGASSET .380 13.788*** .417 15.165*** .397 14.705*** .415 15.335*** 
ROA -.001 -3.159*** -.002 -3.563*** -.001 -3.227*** -.002 -3.628*** 
RECEIVABLE .002 3.154*** .002 2.827*** .002 2.504** .002 2.791*** 
GEARING -5.005E-05 -.268 -3.920E-05 -.204 -6.702E-05 -.357 -4.843E-06 -.025 
NONAUDIT .016 2.198** .019 2.462** .021 2.892*** .018 2.392** 
LISTYEAR -.003 -.785 -.003 -.729 -.003 -.709 -.003 -.674 
BLOCKHOLD .000 .185 .000 .611 -2.401E-05 -.042 .000 .585 
NOMAD .012 .424 .006 .203 .001 .019 .002 .051 
DUMREV -.070 -1.672* -.075 -1.742* -.060 -1.428 -.080 -1.862* 
Constant 1.150 4.195*** .970 3.420*** 1.006 3.697*** 1.029 3.681*** 
Adjusted R2 .608  0.583  0.604  0.591  
F-test 32.008***  28.923***  31.488***  29.774***  
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Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; 
SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; 
BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable 
representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.5a Results of Two-Stage Least Squares Regression – AIM Model  
Variables1 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a 
Coefficient T-statistic3 Coefficient T-statistic3 Coefficient T-statistic3 Coefficient T-statistic3 
RESOURCE -.035 -.966 -.045 -1.196 -.056 -1.539 -.058 -1.556 
SERVICE -.065 -2.081** -.067 -2.072** -.072 -2.311** -.072 -2.248** 
FINANCE .009 .242 .014 .367 .013 .366 .009 .236 
DUALITY -.016 -.448 -.025 -.693 -.002 -.070 -.028 -.782 
NED .000 -.388 .000 -.340 -1.898E-05 -.026 .000 -.345 
BIG4 .140 5.532*** --- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.043 -1.768* -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.162 -4.758*** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.106 -3.271*** 
LONDON .093 3.777*** .067 2.675*** .091 3.654*** .059 2.363** 
BUSYDATE .052 2.139** .050 2.014** .046 1.892* .053 2.151** 
LAGTIME .225 2.732*** .204 2.404** .260 3.126*** .190 2.254** 
CHANGE -.056 -1.470 -.041 -1.050 -.033 -.868 -.041 -1.052 
SUB .009 5.893*** .009 5.475*** .009 5.550*** .009 5.440*** 
USSUB .080 3.028*** .084 3.060*** .086 3.216*** .082 3.030*** 
LOGASSET .384 13.940*** .422 15.386*** .405 15.056*** .420 15.586*** 
ROA -.001 -3.093*** -.002 -3.504*** -.001 -3.176*** -.002 -3.578*** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.305*** .002 3.007*** .002 2.683*** .002 2.942*** 
GEARING -2.387E-05 -.128 -7.989E-06 -.042 -3.132E-05 -.167 2.733E-05 .143 
LISTYEAR -.002 -.594 -.002 -.515 -.002 -.452 -.002 -.460 
BLOCKHOLD .000 .232 .000 .689 3.167E-05 .055 .000 .654 
NOMAD .013 .441 .007 .227 .001 .026 .002 .052 
DUMREV -.074 -1.757* -.080 -1.850* -.065 -1.551 -.084 -1.969** 
NONAUDITa2 .025 2.198** .029 2.462** .033 2.892*** .028 2.392** 
Constant 1.238 4.565*** 1.074 3.833*** 1.106 4.097*** 1.125 4.066*** 
Adjusted R2 .608  0.583  0.604  0.591  
F-test 32.008***  28.923***  31.488***  29.774***  
Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
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= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; 
SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; 
NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 NONAUDITa is the fitted value of NONAUDIT, which is the standardised residual of NONAUDIT regressing onto the exogenous variables in the AIM model.  It is used as an 
instrumental variable to control for the incremental effect of audit fee on the level of non-audit fee.  
3 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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In terms of the board characteristics, consistent with the results in the audit pricing model, 
the results shown in Table 5.5 indicate that all four regressions fail to show any statistical 
significance on the relationship between board independence or leadership and AIM 
companies’ audit pricing.  In order to examine the influence of large blockholders on audit 
pricing of AIM companies, in the AIM model a variable is included to represent the proportion 
of equity held by large shareholders, especially institutional shareholders; however, the 
results of all four regressions show no evidence that external blockholder ownership has a 
significant impact on audit fees.  As the central element of the AIM regulatory regime, the 
nominated adviser plays an important role in encouraging the company to pursue appropriate 
governance practice, which could influence the firm’s internal control and auditor selection, 
especially when the Nomad also acts as the company’s broker, and thus has more extensive 
involvement with its client.  However, the results in Table 5.5 show that AIM companies using 
the same firm as nominated adviser and broker do not pay a differential fee for auditing 
services.  In summary, therefore, the evidence presented here suggests that governance 
characteristics do not influence auditors’ pricing decisions in AIM companies.   
In terms of the auditor characteristics, results in the first three regressions of Table 5.5 indicate 
that, consistent with the evidence shown in the audit pricing model, using Big 4 auditors still 
has significant and positive influence on audit pricing, and the small auditor dummy shows a 
negative and significant impact with audit fees.  As the market leader with the greatest 
number of clients in AIM, the Grant Thornton dummy, as in regression 4, shows a negative 
and significant impact on audit fees.  Unlike in the main market, where auditor specialists 
charge a fee premium for their experience and expertise (Francis et al., 2005; Carson, 2009), 
AIM companies using Grant Thornton as their auditor pay lower fees.  This finding helps to 
explain how Grant Thornton is able to compete with the Big 4 auditors in the market and 
acquire more AIM clients, as it may use its experience and knowledge of AIM to increase 
efficiency and reduce audit fees.  Table 5.5 also shows that, consistent with the results of the 
audit pricing model, audits undertaken by London-based auditors are still significantly and 
positively associated with audit fees, while change of auditors in 2009/2010 shows no 
evidence of significant impact on audit pricing for AIM companies.    
151 
 
Table 5.5 also show evidence that the selection of different auditor also have influence on the 
impact of other explanatory variables on audit fees.  For example, though audit service 
undertaken during the busy period show consistent significant positive impact on audit fees 
in four AIM models, the statistical significance reduces when the auditors getting smaller.  This 
might indicate that for audit service during busy period, Big 4 auditor charge higher fees 
comparing with smaller auditors, and local and national auditors charge lower fee premium.  
Comparing the results in regression 1, 2, and 3, the impact of joint provision of non-audit 
services on audit fees also vary among AIM clients of different sized auditing firms.  In the 
three regressions, when the size of auditors getting larger, the level of statistical significances 
increase (i.e in regression 1, p-value = 0.29; in regression 2, p-value=0.14; and in regression 3, 
p-value=0.04).  These evidences might indicate that Big 4 auditors have less concerned about 
the non-audit services comparing with smaller auditors.   
In summary, the empirical findings in Table 5.5 indicate that the number of years that AIM 
companies have been listed on the market has no impact on the audit fees, while the other 
AIM specialist audit risk variable – the dummy variable for companies without a revenue 
stream – shows a negative impact on audit fees.  This latter finding, although contrary to 
expectation, indicates that companies without revenue might be less complex to audit.  
Neither blockholder ownership nor the Nomad variable show a significant influence on audit 
pricing in AIM companies.  Among previous studies, Francis et al. (2005) and Carson (2009) 
found that market specialist auditors are associated with higher audit fees, since clients are 
willing to pay a premium for specialized skills and higher audit quality.  However, in this study, 
clients of Grant Thornton paid significantly lower audit fees, which may suggest that better 
knowledge and experience of AIM enables Grant Thornton to reduce its price and gain a 
greater market share.  The F-statistics for each regression are significant at the one per cent 
level, suggesting that the models are statistically valid.  The adjusted R2 for all regressions 
ranges between 58.3 per cent and 60.8 per cent, indicating that each model in Table 5.5 has a 
high explanatory power.  The total number of observations in this table is 420.  
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5.3.2 Sub-Samples 
Audit client size sub-sample I (based on total asset): 
Based on the results of current and previous studies, audit client size is considered the most 
significant and positive influential factor for companies’ audit fees.  It is reasonable to believe 
that companies of different sizes have different audit requirements or influential factors, 
which could lead to different audit pricing models.  In this study, AIM companies are separated 
into two sub-samples based on their total assets to examine the differences between large 
and small companies in terms of audit pricing models.  First, univariate comparisons of all the 
variables used in the AIM model between large and small AIM companies are undertaken, and 
the results are shown in Table 5.6.   
The results in Table 5.6 indicate significant differences between large and small companies 
listed on AIM.  Consistent with previous findings from regression models, univariate 
comparison also shows that AIM companies with larger total assets pay significantly higher 
audit fees.  Table 5.6 indicates that AIM companies with more total assets have more 
subsidiaries and better financial performance, experience shorter period between financial 
year end and signing date of the auditor report, and purchase higher levels of non-audit 
services.  Meanwhile, large AIM companies are more likely to generate revenue in the 
2009/2010 financial year.  In terms of auditor characteristics, large AIM companies are more 
likely to choose Big 4 rather than mid-tier or small auditors, while the statistics show no 
difference with regard to choosing auditor specialist, London-based auditor or change of 
auditor.  In terms of governance practices, large AIM companies employ a higher proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board, have a higher proportion of equity held by large 
blockholders, and have lower preference for using the same financial adviser as both Nomad 
and broker.  The results in Table 5.6 also indicate that AIM companies with more assets are 
more likely to be operating in the finance sector and less likely to be in the natural resources 
sector.   
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Table 5.6 Mean and Median Comparison between Large and Small AIM Companies based 
on Total Assets 
Variables1 
Big (N=238)  Small (n=239)  Mean difference Medium difference 
Mean Median  Mean Median  T-test2,3 Z 2, 3 
LOGAUDIT 5.022 4.976  4.615 4.623  14.091 *** -12.395 *** 
RESOURCE 0.230 0.000  0.300 0.000  -1.735 * -1.732 * 
MANUFACTURE 0.310 0.000  0.330 0.000  -0.458 -0.459 
SERVICE 0.240 0.000  0.260 0.000  -0.397 -0.398 
FINANCE 0.220 0.000  0.110 0.000  3.125 *** -3.096 *** 
DUALITY 0.110 0.000  0.140 0.000  -1.234 -1.233 
NED 55.645 55.556  51.778 50.000  2.487 ** -1.759 * 
BIG4 0.540 1.000  0.260 0.000  6.677 *** -6.390 *** 
MIDTIER 0.380 0.000  0.490 0.000  -2.462 ** -2.449 ** 
SMALL 0.080 0.000  0.250 0.000  -5.320 *** -5.174 *** 
GT 0.150 0.000  0.190 0.000  -1.192 -1.191 
LONDON 0.450 0.000  0.440 0.000  0.225 -0.225 
BUSYDATE 0.670 1.000  0.660 1.000  0.355 -0.355 
LAGTIME 1.966 1.954  2.005 1.991  -2.877 *** -2.790 *** 
CHANGE 0.090 0.000  0.100 0.000  -0.439 -0.440 
SUB 11.610 8.000  6.490 5.000  6.709 *** -6.837 *** 
USSUB 0.290 0.000  0.290 0.000  -0.006 -0.006 
LOGASSET 8.008 7.908  7.122 7.226  26.269 *** -18.894 *** 
ROA 2.352 4.096  -13.310 -3.153  5.355 *** -5.190 *** 
RECEIVABLE 16.769 11.489  17.095 11.773  -0.204 -0.295 
GEARING 45.465 45.108  42.492 26.109  0.376 -6.045 *** 
NONAUDIT 3.943 4.607  3.641 4.119  2.007 ** -6.328 *** 
LISTYEAR 5.440 5.000  5.740 5.000  -1.136 -1.287 
BLOCKHOLD 47.231 45.740  42.333 43.780  2.524 ** -2.399 ** 
NOMAD 0.750 1.000  0.820 1.000  -1.695 * -1.691 * 
DUMREV 0.070 0.000  0.180 0.000  -3.614 *** -3.569 *** 
Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; RESOURCE = dummy variable representing 
exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = dummy variable representing manufacturing company; SERVICE = dummy 
variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; 
DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a 
proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit 
firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = 
dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the 
company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; 
BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); 
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LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; 
CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB 
= dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return 
on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets 
represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company 
admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have 
their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 T-Tests are used to compare means and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Z-test is used to compare medians. 
3 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
155 
 
Table 5.7 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for ‘Large’ and ‘Small’ AIM 
Companies based on Total Assets (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1,2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Big (n=218) Small(n=201) Big Small Big Small Big Small 
Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat 
RESOURCE -.015 -.274 -.048 -.966 -.024 -.423 -.055 -1.085 -.057 -1.068 -.058 -1.174 -.058 -1.037 -.055 -1.092 
SERVICE -.096 -2.155** -.032 -.710 -.097 -2.060** -.033 -.732 -.116 -2.563** -.030 -.689 -.103 -2.206** -.039 -.869 
FINANCE -.050 -1.044 .097 1.665* -.040 -.796 .098 1.650 -.042 -.871 .102 1.760* -.053 -1.054 .102 1.746* 
DUALITY -.058 -1.098 -.011 -.228 -.069 -1.230 -.016 -.312 -.049 -.904 .009 .189 -.073 -1.313 -.023 -.464 
NED 
8.813E-
05 
.083 -.001 -1.039 
9.738E-
05 
.087 -.001 -.853 
-5.095E-
05 
-.047 -.001 -.710 .000 .187 -.001 -1.129 
BIG4 .171 5.098*** .103 2.657*** -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -- -- -.089 -2.470** 0.007 0.193 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.272 -4.484*** -.129 -3.122*** -- -- -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.126 -2.452** -.100 -2.290** 
LONDON .090 2.622*** .122 3.333*** .065 1.826* .099 2.736*** .076 2.226** .132 3.589*** .058 1.637 .086 2.368** 
BUSYDATE .021 .593 .096 2.687*** .024 .667 .091 2.507** .013 .373 .092 2.599** .021 .580 .101 2.808*** 
LAGTIME .349 2.598** .138 1.223 .302 2.146** .156 1.350 .403 2.931*** .183 1.623 .285 2.020** .126 1.108 
CHANGE -.147 -2.672*** .049 .879 -.139 -2.407** .070 1.229 -.107 -1.922* .067 1.210 -.130 -2.252** .065 1.166 
SUB .007 3.943*** .012 3.134*** .007 3.596*** .011 2.842*** .007 3.658*** .011 2.879*** .007 3.502*** .011 2.929*** 
USSUB .110 2.994*** .055 1.389 .113 2.934*** .054 1.348 .119 3.205*** .055 1.399 .111 2.882*** .057 1.430 
LOGASSET .435 7.548*** .358 6.293*** .457 7.559*** .396 6.993*** .478 8.262*** .369 6.650*** .463 7.693*** .396 7.123*** 
ROA -.001 -1.028 -.001 -2.690*** -.002 -1.276 -.002 -3.009*** -.001 -1.128 -.001 -2.718*** -.002 -1.358 -.002 -3.132*** 
RECEIVABLE .003 2.523** .001 .984 .002 2.199** .001 .942 .002 1.936* .001 .664 .003 2.248** .001 .789 
GEARING .001 .825 
-4.958E-
05 
-.246 .001 .696 
-4.943E-
05 
-.241 .000 .646 
-6.032E-
05 
-.302 .001 .718 
2.566E
-06 
.013 
NONAUDIT .008 .829 .015 1.273 .011 1.098 .018 1.468 .014 1.372 .020 1.715* .010 .928 .018 1.496 
LISTYEAR -.006 -1.089 -.002 -.307 -.006 -1.097 -.001 -.205 -.005 -.847 -.002 -.419 -.007 -1.225 .000 -.020 
BLOCKHOLD .000 .534 .000 -.538 .001 .835 .000 -.237 .000 .229 -.001 -.635 .001 .841 .000 -.233 
NOMAD -.006 -.165 .050 1.146 -.008 -.201 .037 .836 -.011 -.285 .035 .813 -.022 -.537 .041 .926 
DUMREV -.209 -2.844*** .005 .098 -.225 -2.915*** -.002 -.034 -.164 -2.182** -.003 -.054 -.220 -2.854*** -.005 -.101 
Constant .571 1.151 1.517 3.115*** .618 1.177 1.235 2.506** .271 .540 1.405 2.952*** .623 1.183 1.325 2.761*** 
Adjusted R2 .524 .373 .477 .348 0.511 .382 .477 .367 
F-test 12.409*** 6.665*** 10.466*** 6.092*** 11.835*** 6.885*** 10.45*** 6.517*** 
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Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable 
representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier 
audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant 
Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end 
is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit 
report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing 
companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by 
receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years 
company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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The univariate comparison results in Table 5.6 indicate significant differences in the influential 
factors of audit fees between large and small AIM companies separated according to total 
assets.  In order to have a better understanding of the differences between the audit pricing 
models of different sized companies, separate OLS regressions were undertaken and the 
results are shown in Table 5.7.  Similar to the AIM model in Table 5.6, four different models are 
employed, with dummy variables representing Big 4, mid-tier, small auditor and Grant 
Thornton respectively.  In each model, AIM companies with different size (based on their total 
assets) are separately examined on the determinants of audit pricing.    
In the case of AIM companies classed as large in terms of total assets, all regressions in the 
four models highlight the positive impact of company size, the number of subsidiaries, the 
proportion of total assets in the form of receivables, the existence of US-based subsidiary, 
time lag between companies’ financial year end and date of signing of the auditor report, and 
the use of London-based auditors.  Moreover, use of Big 4 auditors also shows a significant 
and positive association with audit fees, while companies using mid-tier and small auditors, as 
well as Grant Thornton, also pay significantly lower audit fees.  The results show that the 
impact of Big 4 auditors is statistically more significant than in other models.  In addition, in all 
regressions the reporting of no revenue stream in 2010, and operating in the service sector, 
both show a significant and negative impact on audit fees.  This might because that for large 
AIM companies, no revenue stream means significant reduce of audit effort rather than 
increasing of audit risk.  However, companies’ financial performance, audits undertaken 
during the busy season, and the joint provision of non-audit services have no significant 
impact on audit fees.  The findings also indicate that, in the case of large AIM companies, audit 
fees are particularly influenced by change of auditors which, consistent with Gregory and 
Collier (1996) and Bedard et al. (2008), suggests the existence of a ‘low balling’ strategy, 
where the rotation of auditors would allow companies to benefit from lower audit fees.  This 
is different from the results of full samples where no significant impact was found in any 
regressions.  This also indicates that the ‘low balling’ strategy might be subject to the audit 
client size, or larger AIM companies have better bargain power on changing and selecting 
their external auditors.  
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For the small companies sub-sample (based on total assets), company size, the number of 
subsidiaries, and the use of London-based auditors have a positive and significant impact on 
audit fees in all regressions.  Unlike large AIM companies, small companies with audit 
undertaken during the busy season do pay significantly higher audit fees. Furthermore, small 
companies’ financial performance shows a significant and negative association with audit 
pricing.  Consistent with other models, regressions in model 1 indicate that Big 4 auditors do 
charge a fee premium for their services, which is supported by the results in model 3 where 
the small auditor dummy shows a significant and negative impact.  The results in model 4 
indicate that the Grant Thornton dummy variable also has significant and negative association 
with audit fees.  Regressions in models 1, 3, and 4 also show that small company size has a 
positive impact on audit fee for companies operating in the finance sector, but this is only 
significant at ten per cent level.   
In summary, the findings reported in Table 5.7 show that the models explaining the 
determinants of audit fees for large and small AIM companies are different.  This is not 
surprising, since the comparison between large and small companies in Table 5.6 illustrates 
very significant differences in many of the explanatory variables, with large companies being 
more complex, and having better financial performance, shorter audit report lag time, and 
more chance of generating revenue in 2010.  The findings in Table 5.7 suggest that in addition 
to company size, complexity, auditor size, market specialist auditor, and London-based 
auditor, the audit fees in large AIM companies are influenced by the audit report lag time, 
change of auditor, the presence of US-subsidiary, whether the company reported revenue or 
not, and whether the company operates in the service sector; while audit fees of small 
companies are associated with companies’ financial performance and whether the audit is 
undertaken during the busy season.   
The F-statistics of each regression in Table 5.7 are significant at one per cent level, suggesting 
that the models are statistically valid.  The adjusted R2 for all regressions in Table 5.7 ranges 
between 34.8 per cent and 52.4 per cent, indicating the high explanatory power of the models.  
The total numbers of observations in the models of large and small AIM companies (based on 
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total assets) are 218 and 201 respectively. 
Audit client size sub-sample II (based on market capitalization): 
AIM companies show significant differences in their market values, ranging from less than 
£10m to over £1,000m.  AIM companies with different market capitalization may have different 
audit requirements and distinctive influential factors of audit fees.  Here, AIM companies are 
separated into two sub-samples based on their market capitalization, to examine the 
differences in the audit pricing models.  Table 5.8 shows the results of the univariate 
comparisons of the explanatory variables used in the AIM model to illustrate the differences 
between the companies within the two sub-samples. 
The results shown in Table 5.8 indicate that AIM companies with large market values pay 
significantly higher audit fees.  On average, large companies with more market capitalization 
have larger total assets, more subsidiaries, lower level of receivables and better financial 
performance, and experience shorter time lag between the financial year end and the auditor 
report signing date.  The results also show that larger companies with higher market values, 
on average, have a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board and are less 
likely to use the Nomad as the broker.  In terms of auditor characteristics, larger companies 
are more likely to use Big 4 auditors rather than mid-tier or small auditors; they tend to use 
London-based auditors but show lower preference for Grant Thornton.  Table 5.8 also shows 
that AIM companies with larger market capitalization are more likely to operate in the natural 
resources sector, but not the manufacturing industry.  
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Table 5.8 Mean and Median Comparison between Large and Small AIM Companies based 
on Market Capitalization 
Variables1 
Big (N=238)  Small (n=239)  Mean difference Medium difference 
Mean Median  Mean Median  T-test2, 3 Z 2, 3 
LOGAUDIT 4.928 4.916  4.709 4.708  6.672 *** -6.079 *** 
RESOURCE 0.320 0.000  0.220 0.000  2.420 ** -2.408 ** 
MANUFACTURE 0.240 0.000  0.400 0.000  -3.640 *** -3.594 *** 
SERVICE 0.250 0.000  0.250 0.000  0.026 -0.026 
FINANCE 0.190 0.000  0.140 0.000  1.623 -1.620 
DUALITY 0.110 0.000  0.140 0.000  -0.955 -0.955 
NED 55.307 57.143  52.115 50.000  2.049 ** -1.671 * 
BIG4 0.520 1.000  0.280 0.000  5.424 *** -5.269 *** 
MIDTIER 0.370 0.000  0.510 1.000  -3.027 *** -3.002 *** 
SMALL 0.110 0.000  0.210 0.000  -2.972 *** -2.948 *** 
GT 0.120 0.000  0.220 0.000  -2.911 *** -2.889 *** 
LONDON 0.490 0.000  0.410 0.000  1.700 * -1.697 * 
BUSYDATE 0.680 1.000  0.650 1.000  0.548 -0.549 
LAGTIME 1.974 1.959  1.996 1.973  -1.655 * -1.314 
CHANGE 0.080 0.000  0.110 0.000  -1.351 -1.349 
SUB 10.330 7.000  7.850 6.000  3.121 *** -3.088 *** 
USSUB 0.290 0.000  0.300 0.000  -0.237 -0.237 
LOGASSET 7.821 7.828  7.307 7.377  10.880 *** -10.413 *** 
ROA -2.823 2.730  -8.157 0.186  1.777 * -3.459 *** 
RECEIVABLE 15.159 9.909  18.699 14.231  -2.226 ** -2.362 ** 
GEARING 38.911 35.284  49.018 36.921  -1.278 -0.479 
NONAUDIT 3.911 4.511  3.672 4.146  1.582 -4.937 *** 
LISTYEAR 5.680 5.000  5.510 5.000  0.652 -1.049 
BLOCKHOLD 45.064 44.080  44.534 45.160  0.271 -0.060 
NOMAD 0.710 1.000  0.860 1.000  -4.209 *** -4.137 *** 
DUMREV 0.130 0.000  0.120 0.000  0.569 -0.569 
Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; RESOURCE = dummy variable representing 
exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = dummy variable representing manufacturing company; SERVICE = dummy 
variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; 
DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a 
proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit 
firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = 
dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the 
company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; 
BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); 
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LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; 
CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB 
= dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return 
on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets 
represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company 
admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have 
their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 T-Tests are used to compare means and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Z-test is used to compare medians. 
3 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
162 
 
Table 5.9 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for ‘Large’ and ‘Small’ AIM 
Companies based on Market Capitalization (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1,2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Big (n=214) Small(n=206) Big Small Big Small Big Small 
Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat Coef T-stat 
RESOURCE .045 .853 -.118 -2.160** .045 .811 -.141 -2.530** .037 .691 -.142 -2.631*** .036 .654 -.149 -2.722*** 
SERVICE -.075 -1.634 -.043 -.917 -.071 -1.486 -.056 -1.184 -.076 -1.658* -.057 -1.220 -.071 -1.510 -.061 -1.302 
FINANCE .016 .308 .034 .613 .030 .558 .026 .453 .047 .917 .021 .374 .030 .557 .021 .376 
DUALITY -.011 -.211 -.023 -.448 -.022 -.407 -.025 -.469 -.008 -.156 .002 .044 -.027 -.519 -.028 -.532 
NED -4.056E-05 -.042 -.001 -.860 -9.032E-05 -.091 -.001 -.712 9.279E-05 .097 -.001 -.504 .000 -.106 -.001 -.773 
BIG4 .132 3.922*** .128 3.140*** -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -- -- -.044 -1.278 -.022 -.610 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.219 -4.116*** -.130 -2.765*** -- -- -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.106 -2.174** -.082 -1.815* 
LONDON .108 3.083*** .065 1.696* .086 2.416** .037 .970 .095 2.771*** .071 1.800* .078 2.222** .029 .760 
BUSYDATE .060 1.787* .040 1.079 .062 1.774* .034 .902 .058 1.711* .033 .898 .068 1.959* .036 .962 
LAGTIME .153 1.315 .378 2.869*** .152 1.256 .370 2.731*** .211 1.816* .416 3.115*** .143 1.195 .356 2.646*** 
CHANGE -.056 -.947 -.063 -1.152 -.055 -.889 -.043 -.775 -.029 -.493 -.046 -.842 -.053 -.869 -.043 -.786 
SUB .008 4.094*** .010 3.522*** .007 3.655*** .011 3.473*** .008 4.032*** .010 3.327*** .007 3.747*** .010 3.374*** 
USSUB .080 2.156** .069 1.665* .080 2.100** .071 1.685* .086 2.333** .073 1.749* .081 2.146** .066 1.575 
LOGASSET .402 10.371*** .393 7.879*** .427 10.804*** .426 8.496*** .410 10.724*** .412 8.387*** .423 10.795*** .425 8.591*** 
ROA -.001 -2.728*** -.002 -2.012** -.001 -2.992*** -.002 -2.256** -.001 -2.679*** -.002 -2.002** -.002 -3.077*** -.002 -2.193** 
RECEIVABLE .003 2.389** .002 1.845* .002 1.943* .002 1.784* .002 1.996** .002 1.490 .002 2.074** .002 1.659* 
GEARING .001 1.115 .000 -.897 .001 1.203 .000 -.875 .001 1.052 .000 -.881 .001 1.202 .000 -.689 
NONAUDIT .006 .653 .032 2.592** .009 .881 .033 2.640*** .011 1.161 .035 2.860*** .009 .894 .032 2.584** 
LISTYEAR .001 .103 -.006 -.956 .001 .169 -.006 -.905 .003 .615 -.007 -1.110 .001 .251 -.006 -.877 
BLOCKHOLD .000 -.172 .001 .645 .000 .200 .001 .793 .000 -.484 .000 .427 2.590E-05 .034 .001 .889 
NOMAD .004 .108 .018 .353 .007 .176 .006 .118 -.007 -.197 -.004 -.069 .000 .006 .004 .080 
DUMREV -.176 -3.073*** .045 .690 -.201 -3.404*** .056 .830 -.171 -2.989*** .066 1.006 -.200 -3.425*** .046 .683 
Constant 1.155 3.108*** .811 1.780* 1.042 2.690*** .645 1.377 1.057 2.877*** .675 1.486 1.094 2.853*** .702 1.519 
Adjusted R2 .628 .513 .602 .488 .631 .507 .608 .496 
F-test 18.133*** 11.285*** 16.325*** 10.304*** 18.338*** 11.056*** 16.732*** 10.606*** 
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Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; 
SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; 
BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable 
representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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As noted in the comparisons presented in Table 5.9, there are significant differences between 
AIM companies with large and small market capitalization in relation to many of the variables 
identified as being influential in the AIM audit pricing model.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
examine the AIM audit pricing model for the two types of AIM companies separately, and find 
out whether the explanatory variables used in Table 5.5 also fit the sub-samples.  In Table 5.9, 
the analysis replicates the OLS regressions of Table 5.5 for the two types of AIM companies.  
Four different models are employed, with dummy variables representing Big 4, mid-tier, small 
auditor and Grant Thornton respectively.  In each model, AIM companies with different 
market values are separately examined on the determinants of audit pricing.   
In the case of AIM companies with larger market values, all regressions in the four models 
reported in Table 5.9 highlight the positive impact of company size, number of subsidiaries, 
proportion of assets in the form of receivables, presence of US-based subsidiary, and use of 
London-based auditors.  In addition, in all regressions the company’s financial performance 
has a negative impact on audit fees.  Table 5.9 also indicates that no revenue reported in 2010 
has a significant negative impact on a company’s audit fees.  Moreover, the regression results 
confirm that, consistent with findings in other models, using Big 4 auditors incurs a higher 
audit fee, while small auditors are associated with lower audit fees.  Model 4 indicates that 
the use of Grant Thornton also has a significant and negative association with audit fees.  
Furthermore, all four regressions indicate that audit undertaken during the busy season has a 
positive impact on audit fees, while the significance is at ten per cent level.   
For the sub-sample of AIM companies with smaller market capitalization, company size, 
number of subsidiaries, and the length of time between company financial year end and the 
date of signing the auditor report have a positive and significant impact on audit fees in all 
regressions, while company’s financial performance shows a negative impact.  The presence 
of US subsidiary also shows a positive association with audit fees, although only significant at 
ten per cent level.  Unlike large AIM companies with higher market values, for small AIM 
companies the joint provision of non-audit services has a significant and positive influence on 
audit fees, and operating in the natural resources sector has a significant and negative 
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association with audit pricing.  Consistent with other models, Big 4 auditors have a significant 
and positive impact, while small auditors show a negative association.  As reported in Table 
5.9, model 4 indicates that the use of auditor specialist – Grant Thornton – has a negative 
influence on audit fees, although only at ten per cent level.  Results in Table 5.9 also indicate 
that only in models 1 and 3 does the use of London-based auditor show a positive impact, 
while in models 1, 2, and 4, the level of receivables shows a positive influence significant at ten 
per cent.   
In view of the findings reported in Table 5.9, it is clear that the audit pricing models for 
companies with high and low market capitalization are different.  Results suggest that audit 
fees in larger companies with higher market values are influenced by audit client 
characteristics and auditor characteristics including auditor size, audit specialist and London-
based auditor; while for smaller companies, in addition to company characteristics, the audit 
pricing is predominately influenced by auditor size, the level of non-audit services, and the 
time lag between the financial year end and the date the auditor report is signed.  For AIM 
companies with higher market capitalization, using London-based auditors will significantly 
increase the audit cost; while for smaller AIM companies, the influence is less significant. Table 
5.9 also shows evidence that larger AIM companies with no revenue stream in 2009/2010 
financial year pay significantly lower audit fees which indicate that for these companies, 
revenue related audit is costly and required considerable amount of effort, so no revenue 
stream would save significant amount of audit effort and cost.  While, for smaller companies, 
the reduction of audit complexity or the increase of potential risk caused by no revenue 
stream shows no significant impact on audit fees. The results also indicate that for companies 
with higher market capitalization, the receivables are more complex to audit hence has more 
significant impact on audit fees comparing with companies with lower market capitalization.  
The results in table 5.9 also indicate that for smaller companies, the joint provision of non-
audit services and longer audit report lag have more significant impact on audit fees which 
might indicate that smaller companies who have extensive non-audit services or longer time 
period between financial year end and audit report signing date are more complex to audit; 
while for larger AIM companies in terms of market capitalization the level of non-audit service 
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or audit report lag shows no significant impact on audit fees.  Another interesting finding in 
companies the audit pricing model of AIM companies with high and low market capitalization 
is large companies using Grant Thornton as their auditor receiving more fee reduction 
comparing with smaller companies, which might because that the knowledge and experience 
Grant Thornton held as market specialist could save more time and effort for auditing large 
companies.  For larger companies, the dummy variables for industry show no influence on 
audit fees, while among small companies, operating in the natural resources sector has a 
negative association with audit pricing.    
The F-statistics of each regression in Table 5.9 are significant at one per cent level, suggesting 
that the models are statistically valid.  The adjusted R2 for all regressions in Table 5.9 ranges 
from 48.8 per cent to 63.1 per cent, indicating the high explanatory power of the models.  The 
total numbers of observations in the models of large and small AIM companies (based on 
market capitalization) are 214 and 206 respectively. 
 Auditor size sub-sample: 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the audit market for AIM companies involves great 
auditor diversity.  As shown in Table 5.1, 60 per cent of the sample companies are audited by 
a non-Big 4 audit firm.  Tables 5.4 and 5.5 also indicate that Big 4 auditors charge a fee premium 
for their audit services, while local and regional audit firms charge significantly lower audit 
fees.  In order to further our understanding of the auditor diversity, univariate comparisons 
were undertaken of all the variables used in the AIM model investigating AIM companies using 
Big 4, mid-tier and small auditors respectively, and the results are presented in Table 5.10.  In 
terms of Big 4 audit clients versus mid-tier audit clients, the results show a few significant 
differences.  First, larger companies with greater assets tend to use Big 4 auditors, since these 
companies require more time and resources to conduct the audit, and Big 4 audit firms are 
more able to satisfy the requirements.  Secondly, Big 4 auditors are used by firms that 
purchase significantly greater amounts of audit and non-audit services from their auditors, 
which might be because these firms need more experienced auditors or auditors with better 
reputation. Thirdly, firms in the financial sector are more likely to use Big 4 auditors; this might 
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be because financial companies are generally larger in size (see Table 5.2) and they have a 
stricter regulatory regime in terms of financial reporting and governance structure.  
Meanwhile, AIM companies using mid-tier auditors are more likely to employ a London-based 
auditor, and more likely to employ their Nomad as broker. This might be because for mid-tier 
auditors, London-based offices could provide more skilled staff with more experience, and 
Nomad acting as broker would offer better advice and supervision on regulations and 
governance practices. 
The comparison in Table 5.10 also illustrates significant differences between clients of Big 4 
auditors and clients using local and regional audit firms.  For example, clients of Big 4 auditors 
are significantly larger, possess more subsidiaries, have lower levels of gearing, are less likely 
to have the same person acting as CEO and chairman, have significantly higher levels of 
blockholder ownership and experience a shorter time lag between their financial year end and 
the audit report date.  All these indicate that companies using Big 4 auditors are larger in size, 
more complicated to audit, have better governance practices and more concentrated 
ownership structure.  Moreover, Big 4 auditors tend to provide significantly more audit and 
non-audit services than smaller auditors.  On the other hand, clients of small auditors are more 
likely to use London-based offices, perhaps to improve the audit quality.  Clients of small 
auditors are more likely to be operating in the natural resources industries, and less likely to 
report a revenue stream, suggesting that these companies are more likely to be in their early 
stages.  Table 5.10 also indicates that the characteristics of mid-tier versus small auditors more 
or less mirror comparisons between Big 4 and smaller auditors, with a notable exception 
being the absence of any significant difference in the average amount of non-audit services 
provided by mid-tier and smaller auditors to their clients.   
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Table 5.10 Mean and Median Comparison between AIM Companies using Different Sized Auditors  
 
Variables1 
Big 4 (n=190)  Mid-tier (n=209)  Small (n=78)  Big4 – Mid-tier  Big4 - Small  Mid-tier - Small 
Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean difference2,3 
Median 
difference2,3  
Mean 
difference2,3 
Median 
difference2,3  
Mean 
difference2,3 
Median 
difference2,3 
LOGAUDIT 4.996 4.960  4.761 4.740  4.538 4.481  6.863*** -6.590***  9.955*** -8.615***  5.092*** -5.154*** 
RESOURCE 0.200 0.000  0.280 0.000  0.400 0.000  -1.812* -1.807*  -3.418*** -3.352***  -1.960* -1.951* 
MANUFACTURE 0.340 0.000  0.330 0.000  0.260 0.000  0.354 -0.354  1.369 -1.367  1.126 -1.125 
SERVICE 0.240 0.000  0.270 0.000  0.210 0.000  -0.819 -0.820  0.561 -0.561  1.169 -1.168 
FINANCE 0.220 0.000  0.120 0.000  0.140 0.000  2.579** -2.561**  1.495 -1.491  -0.373 -0.373 
DUALITY 0.090 0.000  0.110 0.000  0.240 0.000  -0.349 -0.349  -3.260*** -3.203***  -3.016*** -2.974*** 
NED 56.281 57.143  52.084 50.000  51.792 50.000  2.486** -1.814*  1.908* -1.529  0.132 -0.147 
LONDON 0.330 0.000  0.470 0.000  0.690 1.000  -2.926*** -2.899***  -5.809*** -5.483***  -3.430*** -3.368*** 
BUSYDATE 0.660 1.000  0.680 1.000  0.630 1.000  -0.345 -0.345  0.544 -0.545  0.816 -0.817 
LAGTIME 1.967 1.949  1.977 1.959  2.050 2.045  -0.715 -0.912  -4.234*** -4.364***  -3.788*** -3.853*** 
CHANGE 0.120 0.000  0.070 0.000  0.120 0.000  1.721* -1.716*  0.038 -0.038  -1.331 -1.329 
SUB 10.040 7.000  9.100 7.000  6.650 5.000  1.069 -1.073  2.798*** -3.517***  2.202** -2.839*** 
USSUB 0.310 0.000  0.300 0.000  0.230 0.000  0.339 -0.340  1.273 -1.271  1.040 -1.040 
LOGASSET 7.807 7.804  7.467 7.513  7.229 7.251  6.494*** -5.923***  8.094*** -7.240***  3.208*** -3.408*** 
ROA -2.056 3.929  -8.457 0.833  -5.939 -1.264  1.871* -1.435  1.256 -1.973**  -0.497 -0.930 
RECEIVABLE 15.514 11.385  18.917 13.158  15.073 9.036  -1.968* -1.447  0.206 -1.214  1.536 -2.275** 
GEARING 43.223 40.624  44.117 35.429  45.427 24.993  -0.131 -1.586  -0.195 -3.963***  -0.091 -3.089*** 
NONAUDIT 4.039 4.597  3.665 4.217  3.526 3.886  2.231** -4.722***  2.349** -5.487***  0.654 2.618*** 
LISTYEAR 5.640 5.000  5.490 5.000  5.740 5.000  0.517 -0.481  -0.238 -0.347  -0.689 -0.133 
BLOCKHOLD 47.797 47.200  44.421 44.940  38.481 38.020  1.592 -1.321  3.255*** -3.244***  2.171** -2.336** 
NOMAD 0.750 1.000  0.830 1.000  0.760 1.000  -1.972** -1.965**  -0.155 -0.155  1.366 -1.364 
DUMREV 0.080 0.000  0.110 0.000  0.270 0.000  -1.205 -1.204  -4.274*** -4.142***  -3.248*** -3.195*** 
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Notes: 
1 Definitions of variables: LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = 
dummy variable representing manufacturing company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing 
financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; 
BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable 
representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 T-Tests are used to compare means and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Z-test is used to compare medians. 
3 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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The univarate comparisons reported in Table 5.10 illustrate the significant differences in the 
determinant factors of audit fees for AIM companies audited by different sized auditor firms.  
In view of this, I also undertake separate audit fee regressions for the different sized auditors 
to investigate the variance of the determinants of audit pricing.  The results of the three 
multivariate regression models are presented in Table 5.11.  In broad terms, regardless of 
auditor size, audit fees are significantly and positively influenced by audit client size, as 
represented by log of total assets, which is consistent with the findings in previous models as 
well as other research.  However, the remaining findings do show some differences.   
The regression results in column 1 show the influential factors of audit pricing for AIM 
companies using Big 4 auditors.  As can be seen from column 1, the proportion of assets in the 
form of receivables and the number of subsidiaries a company possesses have significant 
positive association with audit fees, which, consistent with the main model, suggests that 
companies with a higher proportion of receivables and more subsidiaries are more complex 
and require more time and effort to audit.  Big 4 auditors based in London also charge a fee 
premium for their audits.  However, in light of the univariate comparisons, where Big 4 auditor 
clients requested significantly higher levels of non-audit services, the level of non-audit 
services provided shows no influence on audit fees for clients of Big 4 auditors, which might 
suggest that the average higher level of non-audit fees comes from the size difference of the 
auditor clients.  The results also show that firms in the non-financial service sector have a 
significant negative relationship with audit fees.  However, none of the audit risk variables or 
engagement characteristics show significant impact on the audit fees.   
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Table 5.11 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Explaining the Determinants of 
Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM Companies based on Auditor Size (Dependent Variable is 
log of audit fee) 
Variables1 
Big 4 (n=177) Mid-tier (n=177) Small (n=66) 
Coefficient T-Statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE .067 1.121 -.149 -2.677 *** .034 .371 
SERVICE -.095 -2.059 ** -.056 -1.166 -.055 -.580 
FINANCE -.002 -.046 .003 .056 .045 .416 
DUALITY -.010 -.173 .040 .670 .002 .028 
NED .000 .279 -.001 -.718 -.001 -.462 
LONDON .107 2.734 *** .137 3.635 *** .018 .244 
BUSYDATE .034 .918 .038 .993 .079 1.207 
LAGTIME .156 1.213 .402 2.931 *** .462 1.721 * 
CHANGE -.067 -1.291 .021 .276 .024 .227 
SUB .008 3.528 *** .009 3.229 *** .009 1.757 * 
USSUB .053 1.432 .133 2.984 *** -.037 -.449 
LOGASSET .446 10.408 *** .347 8.006 *** .277 3.796 *** 
ROA -.001 -1.275 -.001 -2.335 ** -.002 -.922 
RECEIVABLE .003 2.374 ** .000 .123 .007 2.376 ** 
GEARING .001 1.088 -9.531E-05 -.472 .000 -.273 
NONAUDIT -.004 -.359 .027 2.292 ** .053 2.222 ** 
LISTYEAR -.002 -.279 -.006 -.781 -.003 -.276 
BLOCKHOLD .001 .940 .000 -.350 -.002 -1.125 
NOMAD .018 .425 .011 .212 .011 .158 
DUMREV -.084 -1.106 -.030 -.435 -.068 -.781 
Constant .955 2.286 ** 1.204 2.625 ** 1.343 1.710 * 
Adjusted R Square .612 .547 .442 
F-test 14.905 ***  11.619 ***  3.570 ***  
Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: 
RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-
financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable 
representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing 
company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number 
of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing 
companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing 
companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = 
percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; 
NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = 
percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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The regression in column 2 shows the influential factors of audit fees for AIM companies 
audited by mid-tier auditors.  The results indicate that, unlike Big 4 clients, companies in the 
natural resources sector pay significantly lower fees, while companies in other sectors show 
no difference.  Also, in contrast to the clients of Big 4 auditors, for mid-tier auditor clients the 
proportion of receivables shows no impact on audit fees.  Therefore, the only indicator of 
company complexity that has significant influence on audit fee for mid-tier audit clients is the 
number of subsidiaries a company possesses.  The results indicate that audit risk variables 
have significant influence on the audit pricing for mid-tier clients, which is not replicated in 
the case of Big 4 or smaller auditor clients.  For example, the presence of a US-based subsidiary 
does exert a significant and positive impact on audit fees, and companies’ financial 
performance shows a significant and negative influence.  All these suggest that mid-tier 
auditors care more about audit risk and either spend more time and effort on riskier clients 
with US-based subsidiaries and those that have financial problems, or charge extra fees for 
insurance.  Similar to the Big 4 auditors, mid-tier auditors located in London also charge a fee 
premium for their services.  The results indicate that for the clients of mid-tier auditors, the 
length between the financial year end and the audit report date also has significant positive 
association with audit fees.  Moreover, the level of non-audit services provided shows a 
significant positive relationship with audit pricing, which according to Chan et al. (2012) may 
suggest that firms with extensive consultancy requirements are undertaking significant 
corporate restructuring or experiencing specific financing events which will then increase the 
audit cost.   
Column 3 shows that for AIM companies using local and regional auditors, other than 
company size, company complexity as represented by the level of receivables and the number 
of subsidiaries also has significant and positive impact on audit fees, although the number of 
subsidiaries variable is significant only at ten per cent level.  Like mid-tier auditors, small 
auditors also charge significantly higher fees when the clients simultaneously purchase high 
levels of non-audit services.  The report lag variable also shows positive influence on audit 
fees, again with significance at ten per cent level.  Similar to the situation with Big 4 auditors, 
none of the audit risk variables has any significant impact on audit fees paid to small auditors.   
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In summary, the results of univariate comparisons in Table 5.10 and the multivariate 
regressions presented in Table 5.11 both highlight the different characteristics of clients of the 
different sized audit firms and, consequently, the different emphasis these auditors place on 
each audit fee factor.  However, for auditors of all sizes, governance characteristics show no 
influence at all on audit pricing.  The F-statistics of each regression in Table 5.11 are significant 
at one per cent level, suggesting that the models are statistically valid.  The adjusted R2 for all 
regressions in Table 5.11 ranges between 44.2 per cent and 61.2 per cent, indicating the high 
explanatory power of the models.  The total numbers of observations in each model are 177, 
177 and 66 respectively. 
Grant Thornton sub-sample: 
Another special aspect of the AIM audit market is that the market leader with the greatest 
number of clients is not one of the Big 4, but a second tier auditor – Grant Thornton.  As shown 
in Table 4.3, 15.3 per cent of the companies (181 firms) listed on AIM in 2010 were audited by 
Grant Thornton.  Indeed, as shown in Table 5.1, 17 per cent of the sample companies (82 
companies) in this study are clients of Grant Thornton.  The results of model 4 in Table 5.5 
show that audits undertaken by Grant Thornton have a significant and negative association 
with audit fees, which is inconsistent with previous studies on auditor specialist.  In order to 
further our understanding of the audit pricing strategy of Grant Thornton and figure out how 
it differs from that of other firms, I undertake univariate comparisons of the variables used in 
the AIM model between companies audited by Grant Thornton and other firms; the results 
are presented in Table 5.12.   
The results in Table 5.12 indicate that compared with other auditors, on average, Grant 
Thornton’s clients possess lower total assets, have higher levels of receivables, and 
experience a significantly shorter time lag between their financial year end and audit report 
signing date.  Meanwhile, companies whose audit is undertaken by Grant Thornton are less 
likely to employ a London-based auditor or to report no revenue stream for the financial year 
2009/2010.  Consistent with previous findings reported in Table 5.5, Grant Thornton charges 
significantly lower audit fees than other firms.  In terms of industries, clients of Grant 
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Thornton are more likely to operate in the manufacturing sector and less likely to be in the 
natural resources sector.   Table 5.12a further bread down the sample into Grant Thornton, 
the constituents of the Big 4, BDO and other firms to show the difference among the 
companies audited by different auditors.  The results in Table 5.12a indicate that comparing 
with Big 4 and BDO, Grant Thornton’s clients pay lower audit fees, are more likely in the 
manufacturing industry and less likely from finance sector, are less likely to change auditor, 
and tend to have shorter lagtime, smaller size in terms of assets, larger proportion of 
receivables and higher gearing.    
The univariate comparisons results in Table 5.12 and Table 5.12a present the significant 
differences in the influential factors of audit fee between companies audited by Grant 
Thornton and those audited by other audit firms.  Table 5.13 shows the results of separate OLS 
regressions for Grant Thornton and other auditing firms, in order to figure out how the audit 
pricing strategy of Grant Thornton differs from that of its counterparts. 
Consistent with previous results, audit client size still has the most significant and positive 
influence on audit fees for AIM companies audited by both Grant Thornton and non-Grant 
Thornton auditors.  In addition, companies’ financial performance represented as return on 
asset shows a consistent significant and negative association with audit pricing in both 
regressions.  Although the existence of US-subsidiary shows a positive impact on audit fees in 
both regressions, its impact for non-Grant Thornton audited companies is much more 
significant than for those audited by Grant Thornton 15 .  Similarly, the results of both 
regressions in Table 5.13 indicate that London-based audit offices do charge significantly 
higher fees for their audit services, while the influence for Grant Thornton clients is more 
significant than for companies audited by other firms16.   
 
                                                          
15 The US-subsidiary dummy variable is significant at five per cent in the non-Grant Thornton model, but at ten 
per cent in the Grant Thornton model.   
16 The London-based auditor variable is significant at one per cent in the Grant Thornton model, but at ten per 
cent in the non-Grant Thornton model.   
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Table 5.12 Mean and Median Comparison between Grant Thornton Sub-Samples 
Variables1 
Grant Thornton 
(N=82)  Others (n=395)  
Mean 
difference2, 3  
Median 
difference 2,3 
Mean Median  Mean Median  T-test  T-test 
LOGAUDIT 4.703 4.653  4.842 4.835  -3.076 ***  -3.304 *** 
RESOURCE 0.150 0.000  0.290 0.000  -2.715 ***  -2.697 *** 
MANUFACTURE 0.440 0.000  0.300 0.000  2.533 **  -2.519 ** 
SERVICE 0.300 0.000  0.240 0.180  1.326  -1.325 
FINANCE 0.110 0.000  0.180 0.000  -1.496  -1.494 
DUALITY 0.100 0.000  0.130 0.000  -0.789  -0.789 
NED 51.468 50.000  54.173 50.000  -1.307  -1.324 
LONDON 0.300 0.000  0.480 0.000  -2.896 ***  -2.873 *** 
BUSYDATE 0.700 1.000  0.660 1.000  0.643  -0.643 
LAGTIME 1.951 1.944  1.992 1.982  -2.257 **  -2.461 ** 
CHANGE 0.060 0.000  0.100 0.000  -1.153  -1.152 
SUB 8.790 6.500  9.160 7.000  -0.345  -.154 
USSUB 0.330 0.000  0.290 0.000  0.818  -.819 
LOGASSET 7.461 7.526  7.585 7.632  -1.772 *  -1.963 ** 
ROA -6.655 3.284  -5.254 1.358  -0.351  1.056 
RECEIVABLE 20.917 13.446  16.105 11.345  2.284 **  -2.262 ** 
GEARING 54.389 38.244  41.813 35.512  1.200  -.697 
NONAUDIT 3.732 4.248  3.804 4.322  -0.360  -1.439 
LISTYEAR 5.74 5.00  5.56 5.00  0.513  -.770 
BLOCKHOLD 44.102 44.785  44.940 44.500  -0.321  -.147 
NOMAD 0.830 1.000  0.770 1.000  1.092  -1.092 
DUMREV 0.050 0.000  0.140 0.000  -2.319 **  -2.308 ** 
Notes: 
1 Definitions of variables: LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; RESOURCE = dummy variable representing 
exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = dummy variable representing manufacturing company; SERVICE = dummy 
variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; 
DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a 
proportion of all directors; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = 
dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the 
natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy 
variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on 
assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets 
represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company 
admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have 
their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 T-Tests are used to compare means and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Z-test is used to compare medians. 
3 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.    
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Table 5.12a Mean and Median Comparison between Grant Thornton, BDO, Big 4 auditors, and others 
 
Variables1 
Grant Thornton (n=82)  BDO (n=64)  KPMG (n=62)  PWC (n=59)  Deloitte (n=45)  Ernst&Young (n=24)  Other (n=141) 
Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean  Median   Mean Median  Mean Median 
LOGAUDIT 4.703 4.653  4.870 4.875  5.035 5.035  4.997 4.940  4.972 4.929  4.936 4.932  4.622 4.643 
RESOURCE 0.150 0.000  0.390 0.000  0.100 0.000  0.120 0.000  0.330 0.000  0.420 0.000  0.370 0.000 
MANUFACTURE 0.440 0.000  0.200 0.000  0.350 0.000  0.420 0.000  0.270 0.000  0.250 0.000  0.280 0.000 
SERVICE 0.300 0.000  0.250 0.000  0.190 0.000  0.340 0.000  0.180 0.000  0.210 0.000  0.230 0.000 
FINANCE 0.110 0.000  0.160 0.000  0.110 0.000  0.120 0.000  0.220 0.000  0.120 0.000  0.120 0.000 
DUALITY 0.100 0.000  0.090 0.000  0.100 0.000  0.100 0.000  0.110 0.000  0.040 0.000  0.190 0.000 
NED 51.468 50.000  54.032 57.143  57.272 50.000  53.886 57.143  56.991 57.143  58.275 57.143  51.396 50.000 
LONDON 0.300 0.000  0.660 1.000  0.310 0.000  0.250 0.000  0.400 0.000  0.420 0.000  0.600 0.000 
BUSYDATE 0.700 1.000  0.700 1.000  0.680 0.000  0.560 1.000  0.780 1.000  0.670 1.000  0.630 1.000 
LAGTIME 1.951 1.944  1.995 1.973  1.947 1.952  1.956 1.940  1.988 1.949  2.004 2.002  2.025 2.025 
CHANGE 0.060 0.000  0.080 0.000  0.150 0.000  0.090 0.000  0.090 0.000  0.170 0.000  0.090 0.000 
SUB 8.790 6.500  9.870 8.000  11.600 8.000  9.640 6.000  9.390 7.000  8.220 6.000  7.580 6.000 
USSUB 0.330 0.000  0.250 0.000  0.280 0.000  0.420 0.000  0.270 0.000  0.180 0.000  0.260 0.000 
LOGASSET 7.461 7.526  7.581 7.610  7.869 7.804  7.770 7.790  7.797 7.806  7.757 7.816  7.287 7.297 
ROA -6.655 3.284  -11.817 -2.672  1.824 4.284  -6.605 3.828  -2.017 5.499  -0.966 -2.585  -6.586 0.562 
RECEIVABLE 20.917 13.446  16.764 10.936  14.725 12.121  18.721 16.809  15.618 11.544  9.471 5.936  16.604 11.508 
GEARING 54.389 38.244  36.958 33.902  45.542 43.685  47.845 43.190  39.798 37.736  32.291 29.271  42.117 27.567 
NONAUDIT 3.732 4.248  3.561 4.164  3.733 4.590  4.708 4.863  3.894 4.328  3.456 4.309  3.597 4.107 
LISTYEAR 5.740 5.000  5.420 5.000  5.770 5.000  5.580 5.000  5.440 5.000  5.830 5.000  5.520 5.000 
BLOCKHOLD 44.102 44.785  43.641 45.610  45.741 45.360  50.032 47.695  47.230 44.500  48.595 51.690  41.629 41.490 
NOMAD 0.830 1.000  0.810 1.000  0.770 1.000  0.750 1.000  0.730 1.000  0.710 0.000  0.790 0.000 
DUMREV 0.050 0.000  0.170 0.000  0.060 0.000  0.020 0.000  0.160 0.000  0.130 0.000  0.210 0.000 
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Notes: 
1 Definitions of variables: LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = 
dummy variable representing manufacturing company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing 
financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; 
BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable 
representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
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Table 5.13 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Explaining the Determinants of 
Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM Companies based on Whether the Audits Undertaken by 
Grant Thornton (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1 
Grant Thornton (n=68) Others (n=352) 
Coefficient T-statistic p-value Coefficient T-Statistic p-value 
RESOURCE -.169 -1.585 .120 -.047 -1.150 .251 
SERVICE -.083 -1.115 .270 -.075  -2.087 ** .038 
FINANCE .063 .638 .527 .014 .327 .744 
DUALITY .203 1.764 * .084 -.044 -1.130 .259 
NED .001 .300 .766 .000 -.360 .719 
LONDON .230 3.147 *** .003 .048 1.744 * .082 
BUSYDATE -.015 -.228 .820 .065 2.353 ** .019 
LAGTIME .278 .987 .329 .215 2.310 ** .022 
CHANGE -.007 -.047 .963 -.045 -1.072 .285 
SUB -.002 -.433 .667 .009 5.231 *** .000 
USSUB .134 1.761 * .085 .065 2.187 ** .029 
LOGASSET .482 5.477 *** .000 .409 13.717 *** .000 
ROA -.003 -3.007 *** .004 -.002 -2.695 *** .007 
RECEIVABLE -.001 -.443 .660 .003 2.795 *** .005 
GEARING 2.392E-05 .101 .920 .001 .920 .358 
NONAUDIT .036 1.566 .124 .017 2.079 ** .038 
LISTYEAR -.003 -.325 .747 -.002 -.564 .573 
BLOCKHOLD -.003 -2.112 ** .040 .001 .888 .375 
NOMAD .003 .035 .972 .007 .214 .831 
DUMREV -.221 -1.065 .292 -.063 -1.403 .162 
Constant .518 .522 .604 1.060 3.520 *** .000 
Adjusted R2 .481 .595 
F-test 4.104 ***  .000 26.761 ***  .000 
Notes: 
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: 
RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-
financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable 
representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing 
company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number 
of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing 
companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing 
companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = 
percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; 
NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = 
percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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However, the results of other variables in Table 5.13 do show significant differences between 
the two regressions.  For companies audited by Grant Thornton, the regression results in 
column 1 indicate that the dummy variable representing the same individual acting as CEO and 
chairman has significant and positive association with audit fees.  This finding suggests that 
Grant Thornton takes clients’ governance practice more seriously, since as mentioned in a 
previous chapter, AIM companies have more flexibility in board composition and leadership 
choices, and none of the previous results show any influence of board characteristics on audit 
fees.  It is reasonable to believe that companies with separate board leadership would have 
better board independence and supervision, which would then lead to a high requirement on 
internal control and risk management, hence lower audit fees.  The statistics in regression 1 
also show that the proportion of blockholder ownership has significant and negative 
association with audit fees companies pay to Grant Thornton, which suggests that large 
blockholders in companies with concentrated ownership structure may have more 
involvement in monitoring managerial behaviour, as well as in advising and supervising the 
internal control, and hence influence the audit fees.  Moreover, unlike other auditors, in the 
case of Grant Thornton clients’ complexity (represented by the number of subsidiaries and 
the level of receivables), audit undertaken during the busy season, the time lag between 
companies’ financial year end and auditors’ signing date, and the level of non-audit fees show 
no significant influence on audit fees.   
In summary, compared with its counterparts, Grant Thornton’s audit pricing strategy 
highlights clients’ size, audit risk, whether the office is located in London, and clients’ 
governance practice and ownership structure, but is less influenced by the traditional factors 
such as clients’ complexity or other engagement characteristics.  The possible reason could 
be that Grant Thornton has sufficient skilled staff, knowledge and experience in auditing AIM 
companies, so that it does not need extra effort or incur extra cost for complex clients, busy 
season auditing, or additional/more specialized audit work; while it does pay more attention 
to the potential audit risk and the corporate governance practice of AIM companies. 
The F-statistics of each regression in Table 5.13 are significant at one per cent level, suggesting 
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that the models are statistically valid.  The adjusted R2 for the regressions in Table 5.13 are 48.1 
per cent and 59.5 per cent, indicating the high explanatory power of the models.  The total 
number of observations in each model are 68 and 352 respectively.    
5.3.3 Additional Tests 
In this section, the study re-runs the AIM models reported in Table 5.5, with several more AIM-
specific variables to expand the audit pricing model.  These additional tests consider several 
audit risk variables, and further test for the impact of blockholder ownership, Nomad, audit 
opinion and auditor specialist.  In addition, a number of robustness measures of the joint 
provision of non-audit services are considered.  
Additional tests: 
In this section, the results of several additional tests are reported to extend our understanding 
of the influential factors of audit pricing in AIM companies. 
As shown in Table 5.1, 45 per cent of AIM companies in the sample suffered operating loss in 
2010, which could potentially increase the audit risk.  This test replicated the AIM audit pricing 
model but substituted the audit risk measurement of companies’ performance (ROA and 
dummy variable of companies’ revenue) with a dummy variable to represent AIM companies 
that suffered loss in 2010.  Results shown in Table 5.14 provide evidences about whether 
‘company suffered loss’ could influence the AIM companies’ audit pricing model.  However, 
the results of all four regressions indicate that the dummy variable of suffered operating loss 
has no influence on the audit fees, which suggests that although AIM companies with better 
financial performance are rewarded with a lower audit fee17, the auditors will not punish those 
companies that suffer loss with fee premium.   
As the second additional test, I further assessed whether the value of the equity owned by 
blockholders influences the fees paid by AIM companies for external auditing.  Although the 
                                                          
17 The results of Table 5.6 show that AIM companies’ financial performance has a significant and negative impact 
on audit fees.   
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impact of the proportion of equity owned by blockholders has been tested in the AIM model 
and the results show no statistical significance, given that there is considerable variation in 
the size of AIM companies 18, it is reasonable to consider that the value of the equity owned 
by blockholders may show different impacts on audit fees.  Table 5.15 shows the results of all 
four AIM models with the proportion of blockholder shareholding substituted by the natural 
log of value of equity owned by blockholders.  However, none of the regression results 
indicate that the value of the blockholder shareholding has significant association with audit 
fees in AIM companies.  
                                                          
18 Table 5.1 indicates that, in 2010, the total assets of the sample AIM companies ranged between £6131.9m and 
£0.128m, and the market values of those companies ranged from £1140.4m to £10.0m.  
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Table 5.14 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – The Tests of Companies that Suffered Loss in 2010 (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.047 -1.289 -.061 -1.632 -.067 -1.867 * -.074 -1.992 ** 
SERVICE -.069 -2.194 ** -.073 -2.227 ** -.079 -2.478 ** -.077 -2.380 ** 
FINANCE .020 .536 .025 .665 .026 .695 .021 .541 
DUALITY -.019 -.519 -.028 -.748 -.003 -.072 -.031 -.837 
NED .000 -.148 -5.021E-05 -.066 .000 .226 -5.383E-05 -.071 
BIG4 .142 5.526 *** --- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.037 -1.481 -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.176 -5.138 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.097 -2.943 *** 
LONDON .092 3.667 *** .064 2.540 ** .092 3.639 *** .057 2.254 ** 
BUSYDATE .058 2.381 ** .058 2.276 ** .052 2.115 ** .061 2.417 ** 
LAGTIME .280 3.298 *** .266 3.021 *** .330 3.841 *** .251 2.865 *** 
CHANGE -.060 -1.553 -.044 -1.097 -.034 -.871 -.045 -1.125 
SUB .010 6.144 *** .009 5.731 *** .009 5.808 *** .009 5.711 *** 
USSUB .086 3.242 *** .090 3.289 *** .089 3.324 *** .090 3.285 *** 
LOGASSET .348 13.255 *** .385 14.615 *** .366 14.230 *** .383 14.788 *** 
RECEIVABLE .002 3.064 *** .002 2.753 *** .002 2.393 ** .002 2.721 *** 
GEARING 8.639E-05 .469 .000 .616 6.744E-05 .364 .000 .809 
NONAUDIT .016 2.125 ** .019 2.391 ** .021 2.836 *** .018 2.333 ** 
LISTYEAR -.004 -.929 -.004 -.856 -.003 -.836 -.003 -.802 
BLOCKHOLD .000 .502 .001 .961 .000 .239 .001 .941 
NOMAD .012 .415 .006 .199 .000 -.004 .002 .054 
LOSS .007 .242 .018 .616 .013 .452 .019 .648 
Constant 1.312  4.803 *** 1.132 3.988 *** 1.163 4.287 *** 1.185 4.233 *** 
Adjusted R2 .599  .570  .595  .577  
F-test 32.236 ***  28.792 ***  31.734 ***  29.578 ***  
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= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; 
SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets 
represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of 
blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; LOSS = dummy variable representing company suffered loss in 
2010. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.15 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – The Tests of Value of Blockholder Shareholding (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-Statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.033 -.913 -.045 -1.192 -.055 -1.502 -.056 -1.501 
SERVICE -.067 -2.132 ** -.070 -2.168 ** -.075 -2.385 ** -.074 -2.321 ** 
FINANCE .018 .492 .023 .602 .025 .682 .018 .475 
DUALITY -.017 -.487 -.024 -.647 -.002 -.059 -.028 -.758 
NED .000 -.326 .000 -.164 -1.042E-05 -.015 .000 -.182 
BIG4 .136 5.370 *** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.036 -1.467 -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.166 -4.937 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.100 -3.072 *** 
LONDON .094 3.822 *** .069 2.745 *** .093 3.748 *** .061 2.464 ** 
BUSYDATE .051 2.104 ** .049 1.971 ** .045 1.862 * .052 2.107 ** 
LAGTIME .259 3.101 *** .243 2.805 *** .307 3.633 *** .227 2.647 *** 
CHANGE -.047 -1.235 -.029 -.744 -.023 -.602 -.030 -.774 
SUB .009 5.918 *** .009 5.484 *** .009 5.587 *** .009 5.466 *** 
USSUB .073 2.762 *** .076 2.762 *** .077 2.869 *** .075 2.738 *** 
LOGASSET .383 13.864 *** .420 15.244 *** .400 14.745 *** .419 15.423 *** 
ROA -.001 -3.226 *** -.002 -3.670 *** -.001 -3.269 *** -.002 -3.738 *** 
RECEIVABLE .002 3.148 *** .002 2.794 *** .002 2.502 ** .002 2.759 *** 
GEARING -5.757E-05 -.309 -4.207E-05 -.218 -7.494E-05 -.400 -8.364E-06 -.044 
NONAUDIT .018 2.334 ** .020 2.550 ** .023 3.002 *** .019 2.498 ** 
LISTYEAR -.003 -.813 -.003 -.736 -.003 -.737 -.003 -.686 
NOMAD .011 .400 .006 .203 .000 -.017 .001 .046 
DUMREV -.069 -1.663 * -.076 -1.762 * -.059 -1.406 -.080 -1.880 * 
VBLOCKHOLD -.010 -.928 -.007 -.603 -.009 -.852 -.008 -.707 
Constant 1.190 4.299 *** .997 3.479 *** 1.040 3.785 *** 1.061 3.756 *** 
Adjusted R2 .609  .583  .605  .591  
F-test 32.114 ***  28.922 ***  31.580 ***  29.793 ***  
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Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; 
SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; 
NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; VBLOCKHOLD 
= natural log of value of the equity owned by large blockholders. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
186 
 
Third, I would like to gain further understanding of the influence of Nomads on AIM 
companies.  Although every AIM company is required to employ a Nomad as its financial 
adviser, the market share differs among Nomads.  Similar to auditor specialists, Nomads with 
more AIM clients might have more experience due to their specialism, and have higher 
requirements on companies’ audit quality and governance practice in order to maintain their 
reputation.  Hence, in this study, an additional test is undertaken to examine the influence of 
Nomad specialism on AIM companies’ audit fees; the results are presented in Table 5.16.  In all 
four models, the Nomad specialism variable representing the proportion of AIM companies 
employing each Nomad shows significant and negative influence on audit fees for AIM 
companies.  These results suggest that Nomads with more clients have more involvement in 
AIM companies’ governance practice and internal control, which would reduce the time and 
effort of external auditing, or that they have influence on their clients’ auditor selection in 
order to reduce the audit fees – which could be supported by the correlation results that show 
a negative correlation between higher proportion of Nomad clients and the use of Big 4 
auditors.   
Fourth, previous audit pricing studies indicate that qualified or modified audit report implies 
increased audit risk and audit effort (Simunic, 1980), hence the existence of qualified and 
modified audit opinion has a positive association with audit fees (Hay, 2013).  In this study, a 
further test is undertaken to investigate the influence of qualified audit reports or audit 
comments on audit pricing in AIM companies.  Table 5.17 shows the analysis that replicates 
the AIM audit pricing model, but with a dummy variable included to represent AIM companies 
with qualified or modified audit opinion (either going concern or minor comments).  The 
results in models 2 and 4 indicate a positive relationship between audit issues and audit fees 
in AIM companies significant at ten per cent level, while in models 1 and 3 the results are 
positive but not statistically significant, which suggests that for AIM companies with qualified 
or modified reports, Big 4 and local auditors do not charge extra fees, only mid-tier auditors 
including Grant Thornton spend some extra time and effort on auditing or charge a fee 
premium as insurance for potential risk.  Table 5.17a further tests whether companies received 
qualified audit report pay have relationship on their audit fees.  The results show a consistent 
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positive relationship between qualified audit opinion and audit fees, which indicate that 
auditors do charge fee premium for companies with financial reporting problem.  When 
companies have audit problems, auditors might need to conduct extra work and increase 
audit effort for maintain the assurance, and qualified audit opinion also indicates potential risk 
which will cause increased audit fee.  When examining companies with audit comments, 
results in Table 5.17b show no significant relationship, which as suggested in Hay et al. (2006), 
might result from the changes in reporting policies on going-concern issues.    
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Table 5.16 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – The tests of Nomad Specialism (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
 
 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T- statistic 2 Coefficient T- statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.039 -1.083 -.050 -1.341 -.060 -1.640 -.061 -1.639 
SERVICE -.068 -2.173 ** -.070 -2.185 ** -.076 -2.418 ** -.074 -2.332 ** 
FINANCE .009 .236 .012 .312 .013 .357 .006 .173 
DUALITY -.011 -.318 -.018 -.495 .004 .106 -.021 -.597 
NED .000 -.395 .000 -.335 -3.767E-05 -.051 .000 -.359 
BIG4 .128 4.971 *** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.031 -1.258 -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.160 -4.705 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.096 -2.983 *** 
LONDON .089 3.573 *** .063 2.534 ** .088 3.531 *** .056 2.264 ** 
BUSYDATE .048 1.997 ** .046 1.830 * .042 1.739 * .049 1.968 ** 
LAGTIME .277 3.292 *** .272 3.132 *** .327 3.853 *** .256 2.970 *** 
CHANGE -.045 -1.177 -.029 -.726 -.022 -.562 -.030 -.771 
SUB .009 5.773 *** .009 5.345 *** .009 5.456 *** .008 5.336 *** 
USSUB .074 2.797 *** .077 2.812 *** .077 2.903 *** .075 2.787 *** 
LOGASSET .379 13.779 *** .413 15.091 *** .394 14.631 *** .411 15.228 *** 
ROA -.001 -3.212 *** -.002 -3.612 *** -.001 -3.278 *** -.002 -3.673 *** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.229 *** .002 2.935 *** .002 2.629 *** .002 2.922 *** 
GEARING -7.352E-05 -.394 -7.189E-05 -.375 -9.537E-05 -.510 -3.825E-05 -.201 
NONAUDIT .016 2.227 ** .019 2.496 ** .021 2.896 *** .018 2.409 ** 
LISTYEAR -.003 -.756 -.003 -.693 -.003 -.679 -.003 -.642 
BLOCKHOLD .000 .209 .000 .614 -9.953E-06 -.017 .000 .592 
NOMAD .020 .704 .017 .581 .011 .388 .013 .453 
DUMREV -.071 -1.707 * -.076 -1.780 * -.062 -1.477 -.081 -1.904 * 
NOMADSPE -.013 -1.801 * -.017 -2.382 ** -.016 -2.214 ** -.018 -2.430 ** 
Constant 1.160  4.243 *** .990 3.510 *** 1.030 3.803 *** 1.057 3.803 *** 
Adjusted R2 .611  .588  .608  .596  
F-test 30.873 ***  28.190 ***  30.574 ***  29.039 ***  
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Note:  
1 D finitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; 
SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; 
BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable 
representing company has no revenue in 2010; NOMADSPE = market share of Nomad as the number of AIM clients. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 5.17 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – The Tests of Audit Opinion (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.043 -1.168 -.054 -1.432 -.062 -1.706 * -.065 -1.748 * 
SERVICE -.067 -2.146 ** -.069 -2.146 ** -.075 -2.396 ** -.073 -2.304 ** 
FINANCE .017 .475 .023 .623 .024 .648 .018 .493 
DUALITY -.017 -.495 -.027 -.733 -.002 -.068 -.030 -.818 
NED .000 -.442 .000 -.400 -6.210E-05 -.084 .000 -.408 
BIG4 .132 5.191 *** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.037 -1.510 -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.160 -4.686 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.098 -3.022 *** 
LONDON .092 3.737 *** .067 2.697 *** .091 3.667 *** .060 2.412 ** 
BUSYDATE .054 2.224 ** .053 2.119 ** .048 1.968 ** .056 2.247 ** 
LAGTIME .233 2.740 *** .214 2.429 ** .283 3.269 *** .200 2.292 ** 
CHANGE -.043 -1.116 -.026 -.660 -.019 -.505 -.027 -.685 
SUB .009 5.869 *** .009 5.460 *** .009 5.549 *** .009 5.436 *** 
USSUB .073 2.756 *** .076 2.757 *** .076 2.858 *** .074 2.735 *** 
LOGASSET .384 13.883 *** .420 15.293 *** .400 14.764 *** .419 15.457 *** 
ROA -.001 -3.105 *** -.002 -3.487 *** -.001 -3.184 *** -.002 -3.556 *** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.253 *** .002 2.962 *** .002 2.597 *** .002 2.917 *** 
GEARING -5.211E-05 -.280 -4.184E-05 -.218 -6.816E-05 -.364 -7.795E-06 -.041 
NONAUDIT .015 2.076 ** .018 2.301 ** .021 2.769 *** .017 2.244 ** 
LISTYEAR -.003 -.734 -.003 -.669 -.003 -.667 -.002 -.616 
BLOCKHOLD 6.787E-05 .120 .000 .525 -4.823E-05 -.084 .000 .501 
NOMAD .013 .449 .007 .243 .001 .047 .003 .087 
DUMREV -.075 -1.794 * -.082 -1.893 * -.065 -1.537 -.086 -2.003 ** 
AUDITISSUE .062 1.461 .077 1.772 * .053 1.228 .074 1.704 * 
Constant 1.170 4.270 *** 1.003 3.539 *** 1.023 3.759 *** 1.057 3.785 *** 
Adjusted R2 .610  .585  .605  .592  
F-test 30.738 ***  27.899 ***  30.164 ***  28.688 ***  
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Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; 
SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; 
BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable 
representing company has no revenue in 2010; AUDITISSUE = dummy variable representing company received qualified or modified audit opinion or audit comments in 2010. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.17a. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – Tests of Qualified Audit Opinion (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Note:  
Variables1 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 
RESOURCE -.035 -.967 -.045 -1.199 -.057 -1.553 -.057 -1.546 
SERVICE -.064 -2.058** -.066 -2.059** -.073 -2.333** -.071 -2.228** 
FINANCE .020 .558 .026 .701 .026 .712 .021 .569 
DUALITY -.007 -.205 -.016 -.434 .005 .153 -.019 -.524 
NED .000 -.230 .000 -.186 5.793E-05 .079 .000 -.191 
BIG4 .136 5.367*** --- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.041 -1.676* -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.159 -4.676*** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.102 -3.143*** 
LONDON .091 3.678*** .065 2.603*** .089 3.585*** .057 2.303** 
BUSYDATE .051 2.114** .049 1.988** .045 1.872* .052 2.122** 
LAGTIME .217 2.556** .202 2.291** .273 3.157*** .188 2.147** 
CHANGE -.043 -1.126 -.027 -.694 -.020 -.509 -.027 -.703 
SUB .009 6.004*** .009 5.589*** .009 5.637*** .009 5.557*** 
USSUB .074 2.785*** .076 2.785*** .077 2.880*** .075 2.763*** 
LOGASSET .379 13.821*** .415 15.184*** .398 14.753*** .414 15.379*** 
ROA -.001 -3.167*** -.002 -3.572*** -.001 -3.247*** -.002 -3.643*** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.234*** .002 2.921*** .002 2.561** .002 2.866*** 
GEARING -4.460E-05 -.240 -3.311E-05 -.173 -6.207E-05 -.332 1.742E-06 .009 
NONAUDIT .016 2.151** .018 2.396** .021 2.852*** .018 2.344** 
LISTYEAR -.003 -.808 -.003 -.752 -.003 -.724 -.003 -.694 
BLOCKHOLD 2.060E-05 .036 .000 .475 -7.206E-05 -.126 .000 .444 
NOMAD .009 .326 .003 .117 -.002 -.054 -.001 -.051 
DUMREV -.073 -1.763* -.079 -1.839* -.063 -1.502 -.083 -1.956* 
QUALIFIED .247 2.309** .250 2.261** .183 1.690* .246 2.253** 
Constant 1.232 4.482*** 1.062 3.726*** 1.061 3.880*** 1.112 3.965*** 
Adjusted R2 .613  .588  .606  .595  
F-test 31.128***  28.126***  30.326***  28.942***  
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1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; 
SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; 
BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable 
representing company has no revenue in 2010; QUALIFIED= dummy variable representing company received qualified audit report in 2010. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.17b Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – Tests of Audit Opinion with Comments (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee)  
Note: 
Variables1 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 
RESOURCE -.041 -1.110 -.052 -1.381 -.061 -1.669* -.063 -1.688* 
SERVICE -.068 -2.162** -.070 -2.167** -.076 -2.412** -.074 -2.323** 
FINANCE .017 .461 .023 .610 .023 .638 .018 .480 
DUALITY -.017 -.469 -.026 -.715 -.002 -.051 -.029 -.797 
NED .000 -.447 .000 -.411 -6.728E-05 -.091 .000 -.418 
BIG4 .133 5.208*** --- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.036 -1.460 -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.163 -4.764*** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.097 -2.999*** 
LONDON .093 3.735*** .067 2.689*** .092 3.679*** .060 2.407** 
BUSYDATE .053 2.187** .052 2.081** .047 1.942* .055 2.208** 
LAGTIME .248 2.934*** .230 2.642*** .295 3.444*** .216 2.499** 
CHANGE -.045 -1.173 -.028 -.713 -.021 -.546 -.029 -.743 
SUB .009 5.858*** .009 5.440*** .009 5.539*** .009 5.421*** 
USSUB .074 2.762*** .076 2.765*** .077 2.863*** .075 2.742*** 
LOGASSET .382 13.808*** .419 15.224*** .399 14.715*** .418 15.381*** 
ROA -.001 -3.105*** -.002 -3.484*** -.001 -3.176*** -.002 -3.553*** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.205*** .002 2.906*** .002 2.559** .002 2.863*** 
GEARING -5.096E-05 -.273 -4.062E-05 -.211 -6.760E-05 -.360 -6.668E-06 -.035 
NONAUDIT .016 2.144** .018 2.382** .021 2.828*** .018 2.321** 
LISTYEAR -.003 -.742 -.003 -.671 -.003 -.669 -.003 -.622 
BLOCKHOLD 9.288E-05 .164 .000 .576 -3.260E-05 -.057 .000 .552 
NOMAD .013 .452 .007 .245 .001 .050 .003 .091 
DUMREV -.072 -1.727* -.079 -1.818* -.063 -1.483 -.083 -1.929* 
COMMENT .039 .898 .055 1.224 .038 .849 .051 1.127 
Constant 1.151 4.199*** .976 3.442*** 1.008 3.704*** 1.033 3.696*** 
Adjusted R2 .608  .584  .604  .591  
F-test 30.575***  27.711***  30.068***  28.497***  
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1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; 
SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; 
BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable 
representing company has no revenue in 2010; QUALIFIED= dummy variable representing company received qualified audit report in 2010.
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.18 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of 
Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM Companies – The Tests of Audit Specialism (Dependent 
Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1 Coefficient T-statistic 2 p-value 
RESOURCE -.049 -1.314 .190 
SERVICE -.072 -2.230 ** .026 
FINANCE .024 .646 .519 
DUALITY -.011 -.293 .769 
NED .000 -.224 .823 
LONDON .074 2.901 *** .004 
BUSYDATE .046 1.820 * .069 
LAGTIME .278 3.185 *** .002 
CHANGE -.024 -.613 .540 
SUB .009 5.392 *** .000 
USSUB .078 2.843 *** .005 
LOGASSET .415 15.123 *** .000 
ROA -.002 -3.432 *** .001 
RECEIVABLE .002 2.625 *** .009 
GEARING -6.178E-05 -.321 .748 
NONAUDIT .021 2.770 *** .006 
LISTYEAR -.003 -.757 .450 
BLOCKHOLD .000 .501 .617 
NOMAD .003 .118 .906 
DUMREV -.070 -1.620 .106 
AUDITSPE .005 1.791 * .074 
Constant .852 3.060 *** .002 
Adjusted R2 .584   
F-test 29.029 ***  .000 
Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: 
RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-
financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable 
representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing 
company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number 
of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing 
companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing 
companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = 
percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; 
NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = 
percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; AUDITSPE = the market share of each auditor by 
the number of AIM clients. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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In the AIM audit pricing model, I tested the influence of the use of the market leader, Grant 
Thornton, on audit pricing and found significant and negative impact.  In addition to Grant 
Thornton, other mid-tier auditors also occupy a large market share (as shown in Table 4.3).  As 
the fifth additional test, I undertook analysis to examine whether auditors with more clients 
in AIM charge higher prices for their audit service.  Table 5.18 presents the results of the 
regression substituting Grant Thornton with an audit specialism variable representing the 
proportion of AIM companies using each auditor.  The results indicate that use of auditors 
with more AIM clients has a positive and significant influence on the audit fee, which suggests 
that AIM companies are willing to pay higher fees for auditors with more experience and 
knowledge of the market.  This is consistent with previous literature (i.e DeFond et al., 2000; 
Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Wang et al., 2009; Zerni, 2012), but is inconsistent with results 
shown in Table 5.5 that the market specialist auditor Grant Thornton charge significantly lower 
fees for its service.  This might because that according to Table 4.3, 3 out of the top 5 auditors 
with the largest number of AIM clients are Big 4 auditors who charge significantly higher audit 
fees, while other mid-tier auditors have less significant impact on audit fees.    
Robustness tests: 
As mentioned in previous chapters, prior literature (i.e. Abbott et al., 2003; Zaman et al., 2011) 
has employed other measurements of the dual provision of non-audit services, besides non-
audit fees.  In order to determine whether the findings of the joint provision of non-audit 
services are robust, two tests were conducted with different variables measuring the auditor 
independence.  First, the AIM audit pricing models reported in Table 5.5 were rerun, 
substituting the measurement of joint provision of non-audit services with a dummy variable 
representing companies that paid higher fees for non-audit services than for auditing; the 
results are shown in Table 5.19.  Table 5.20 presents the findings of the second robustness test, 
which also replicated the AIM model in Table 5.5, this time with a variable representing the 
non-audit fee as a proportion of total auditor remuneration as the measurement of the joint 
provision of non-audit service.  All regression results in Table 5.19 indicate that the non-audit 
fee dummy variable has a negative and significant impact on audit fees for AIM companies, 
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which is supported by the results of the non-audit fee ratio shown in Table 5.20.  These 
findings are counterintuitive, but consistent with some previous evidence (i.e. Hillison and 
Kenneley, 1988; Whisenant et al., 2003), and suggest that when companies purchase more 
non-audit services than audit services, the accounting firms may offer reduced audit fees to 
increase competitive advantage and attract more business from their clients (Che Ahmad, 
2006); alternatively, the large proportion of non-audit services may increase the auditors’ 
knowledge and understanding of their clients, hence increasing the cost efficiency for audit 
services (Joe and Vandervelde, 2007).  
The third robustness test adds a different measure of companies’ complexity to examine the 
influence of foreign subsidiaries on audit pricing.  The results in Table 5.21 indicate a significant 
positive relationship between higher proportion of foreign subsidiaries and audit fees which 
provides evidences for the argument that foreign subsidiary increases the company’s 
complexity which then increases the audit effort and time due to the different financial 
reporting standards used in different countries, more foreign subsidiaries also lead to higher 
internal communication between auditors which would also increase costs.  
The F-statistics for each model are significant at one per cent level, suggesting that the models 
are statistically valid.  The adjusted R2 for all models ranges between 57.0 per cent and 62.1 
per cent, indicating the high explanatory power of the models.  The total number of 
observations in each model is 420.   
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Table 5.19   Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – The Tests of Non-Audit Fee Ratio (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 
RESOURCE -.028 -.784 -.039 -1.038 -.052 -1.417 -.053 -1.440 
SERVICE -.055 -1.754* -.058 -1.788* -.065 -2.055** -.064 -1.985** 
FINANCE .001 .015 .007 .182 .008 .206 .002 .053 
DUALITY -.021 -.586 -.030 -.831 -.006 -.181 -.033 -.911 
NED -9.819E-05 -.135 .000 -.141 .000 .168 .000 -.134 
BIG4 .150 5.920*** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.051 -2.080** -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.161 -4.716*** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.111 -3.435*** 
LONDON .088 3.566*** .061 2.421** .085 3.392*** .052 2.086** 
BUSYDATE .052 2.149** .050 2.016** .046 1.876* .053 2.152** 
LAGTIME .181 2.185** .165 1.911* .227 2.675*** .152 1.775* 
CHANGE -.068 -1.781* -.052 -1.298 -.041 -1.061 -.050 -1.276 
SUB .009 5.726*** .009 5.308*** .008 5.356*** .008 5.256*** 
USSUB .082 3.099*** .085 3.105*** .087 3.253*** .083 3.080*** 
LOGASSET .386 14.119*** .425 15.511*** .409 15.133*** .425 15.740*** 
ROA -.001 -3.056*** -.002 -3.485*** -.001 -3.156*** -.002 -3.569*** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.439*** .003 3.111*** .002 2.739*** .002 3.020*** 
GEARING 1.042E-05 .056 2.232E-05 .116 -4.747E-06 -.025 5.874E-05 .308 
LISTYEAR -.001 -.295 -.001 -.268 -.001 -.222 -.001 -.207 
BLOCKHOLD .000 .199 .000 .693 3.296E-05 .057 .000 .653 
NOMAD .014 .498 .008 .274 .001 .048 .002 .073 
DUMREV -.079 -1.905* -.085 -1.978** -.070 -1.653* -.090 -2.095** 
PROAUDIT -.002 -3.161*** -.001 -2.592*** -.001 -2.351** -.001 -2.588*** 
Constant 1.335 4.923*** 1.158 4.108*** 1.164 4.281*** 1.198 4.313*** 
Adjusted R2 .613  .584  .602  .592  
F-test 32.662***  29.001***  31.136***  29.891***  
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Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration 
or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY 
= dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; 
SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between 
December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = 
percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; 
NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; PROAUDIT 
= percentage of non-audit fee as a proportion of total auditor remuneration. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.20 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – The Tests of Non-Audit Fee Dummy (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
 
 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.025 -.690 -.037 -.967 -.049 -1.327 -.050 -1.354 
SERVICE -.058 -1.854 * -.061 -1.875 * -.067 -2.117 ** -.066 -2.064 ** 
FINANCE .003 .096 .009 .251 .009 .254 .004 .121 
DUALITY -.019 -.542 -.029 -.787 -.005 -.146 -.031 -.870 
NED -5.346E-05 -.073 -6.615E-05 -.087 .000 .240 -6.272E-05 -.083 
BIG4 .149 5.862 *** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.049 -1.978 ** -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.164 -4.801 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.109 -3.374 *** 
LONDON .085 3.445 *** .059 2.330 ** .083 3.305 *** .050 2.005 ** 
BUSYDATE .053 2.211 ** .052 2.065 ** .047 1.929 * .055 2.201 ** 
LAGTIME .216 2.641 *** .196 2.297 ** .253 3.031 *** .182 2.154 ** 
CHANGE -.063 -1.649 -.047 -1.184 -.038 -.978 -.046 -1.170 
SUB .009 5.962 *** .009 5.501 *** .009 5.548 *** .009 5.456 *** 
USSUB .082 3.095 *** .085 3.104 *** .087 3.258 *** .083 3.078 *** 
LOGASSET .383 13.996 *** .423 15.422 *** .406 15.069 *** .422 15.649 *** 
ROA -.001 -3.177 *** -.002 -3.581 *** -.001 -3.244 *** -.002 -3.661 *** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.436 *** .003 3.102 *** .002 2.747 *** .002 3.020 *** 
GEARING -3.870E-05 -.209 -1.962E-05 -.102 -4.309E-05 -.230 1.684E-05 .088 
LISTYEAR -.001 -.309 -.001 -.280 -.001 -.211 -.001 -.220 
BLOCKHOLD 7.841E-05 .139 .000 .638 -3.557E-06 -.006 .000 .600 
NOMAD .014 .488 .008 .261 .001 .045 .002 .069 
DUMREV -.081 -1.952 * -.087 -2.011 ** -.072 -1.698 * -.091 -2.129 ** 
DUMAUDIT -.093 -3.037 *** -.079 -2.484 ** -.077 -2.485 ** -.078 -2.481 ** 
Constant 1.253 4.646 *** 1.086 3.873 *** 1.107 4.092 *** 1.129 4.084 *** 
Adjusted R2 .613  .583  .602  .591  
F-test 32.564 ***  28.936 ***  31.217 ***  29.826 ***  
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Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable 
representing exploration or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable 
representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director 
as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy 
variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was 
undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited 
by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); 
LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable 
representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; 
GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of 
blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable representing 
company has no revenue in 2010; DUMAUDIT = dummy variable representing company paid higher non-audit fee than audit fee.
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5. 21 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – Tests of Foreign subsidiaries (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
 
Variables1 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 
RESOURCE -.066 -1.771* -.074 -1.899* -.091 -2.428** -.084 -2.189** 
SERVICE -.068 -2.205** -.070 -2.194** -.075 -2.426** -.074 -2.343** 
FINANCE .028 .764 .033 .873 .035 .964 .027 .734 
DUALITY -.012 -.346 -.021 -.580 .003 .072 -.024 -.661 
NED .000 -.453 .000 -.395 -7.698E-05 -.106 .000 -.391 
BIG4 .138 5.483*** --- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.041 -1.658* -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.166 -4.885*** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.094 -2.940*** 
LONDON .082 3.310*** .057 2.270** .080 3.212*** .050 2.022** 
BUSYDATE .048 1.986** .047 1.897* .041 1.681* .050 2.032** 
LAGTIME .216 2.604*** .201 2.337** .268 3.173*** .190 2.221** 
CHANGE -.038 -.993 -.022 -.568 -.012 -.327 -.022 -.578 
SUB .009 5.924*** .009 5.485*** .009 5.545*** .009 5.441*** 
USSUB .043 1.527 .047 1.621 .044 1.555 .047 1.645 
LOGASSET .370 13.504*** .407 14.907*** .388 14.425*** .407 15.130*** 
ROA -.001 -3.460*** -.002 -3.865*** -.001 -3.497*** -.002 -3.922*** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.374*** .002 3.015*** .002 2.707*** .002 2.939*** 
GEARING .000 -.595 -9.520E-05 -.499 .000 -.692 -5.990E-05 -.316 
NONAUDIT .021 2.776*** .023 2.949*** .027 3.526*** .022 2.881*** 
LISTYEAR -.002 -.505 -.002 -.468 -.002 -.404 -.002 -.419 
BLOCKHOLD .000 -.188 .000 .293 .000 -.413 .000 .281 
NOMAD .013 .461 .007 .246 .002 .064 .003 .086 
DUMREV -.096 -2.300** -.102 -2.354** -.084 -1.992** -.104 -2.439** 
FSUB .001 3.025*** .001 2.717*** .001 3.204*** .001 2.573*** 
Constant 1.270 4.665*** 1.091 3.863*** 1.108 4.096*** 1.127 4.052*** 
Adjusted R2 .621  .595  .615  .601  
F-test 31.945***  28.734***  31.217***  29.427***  
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Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable 
representing exploration or mining company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable 
representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director 
as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy 
variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was 
undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited 
by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); 
LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable 
representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US 
subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; 
GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of 
blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable representing 
company has no revenue in 2010; FSUB = proportion of foreign subsidiaries in companies’ total subsidiaries.
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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In summary, the AIM companies suffered loss in 2009/2010 financial year do not pay extra 
audit fees which indicates that auditor for AIM companies do not punish their client for 
not earning profit, while according to results in Table 5.5, auditors do provide award for 
AIM clients who have better financial performance by charging lower audit fees.  As 
measurements for audit risk, the results of AIM companies who suffered loss and who 
have no revenue in 2009/2010 financial year both provide supportive evidences to Bell et 
al (2001) who argue that the audit fee adjustment for audit risk is through increasing audit 
time and effort, rather than charging a simple fee premium, hence though companies who 
suffered loss would increase potential liability exposure, while it failed to increase 
significant amount of audit effort or cause extra audit test.  The impact of the value of 
large blockholders’ shareholding on audit fees for AIM companies is consistent with the 
results in Table 5.5 which indicate that the large blockholders’ ownership have no 
significant impact on audit fees for AIM companies, which is the counter-intuitive to the 
hypothesis that the large blockholders would like to involve in the monitoring of AIM 
companies’ governance and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Maug, 1998; Jaggi 
et al., 2009) which then constrain the earnings management and improve the internal 
control of the business and reduce the audit risk and auditors’ substantive work hence 
reduces the audit fees (Chung et al., 2002; Velury and Jenkins, 2006; Adelopo et al., 2012).  
This suggests that when the large blockholders monitoring the management of AIM 
companies, they focus more on the companies’ strategy and growth opportunities but pay 
less attention on companies’ internal control through monitoring external audit services.  
The additional tests also show that the qualified or modified audit opinion have no 
significant impact on the audit fees paid by AIM companies, which follows the findings of 
the majority of studies in fully-listed companies after 1990 (Hay et al., 2006).  Though 
Nomad who also acting as broker shows no significant impact on audit fees, this study 
then tests the impact of Nomad specialism on the audit fees and finds significant and 
negative influence.  This indicates that as external monitors of AIM companies’ 
governance, Nomads who have more market share (as number of clients) pay more 
attention on companies’ internal control and financial reporting which would reduce the 
external audit risk and effort, and auditors might value the monitoring practices of more 
experienced and skilled Nomads with lower audit fees.  The results also show evidences 
that mid-tier auditors grant more price allowance for Nomad specialist comparing with 
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other auditor firms.  The tests then indicate that inconsistent with findings that market 
auditor specialist charge significantly lower audit fees, auditors who have more market 
share in AIM tend to charge higher fees for their audit services.  This might because that 
except Grant Thornton, the other top auditors with the most AIM clients include all the Big 
4 and most of other mid-tier auditors who charge fee premium.  The robustness tests then 
examine the relationship between the joint provision of non-audit services and audit fees 
with other two measurements, and find significant and negative impact.  This finding is 
counter-intuitive to the results in Table 5.5 where the non-audit fees show significant 
positive impact on audit fees.  Since the two measurements in the robustness tests focus 
on the AIM companies pay higher fees for non-audit services than audit services, the 
results might indicate that the when non-audit fee is higher than audit fee the knowledge 
spillover exist or the auditors offer the clients fee discount for audit services.   
5.4 Summary 
This chapter investigates the impact of traditional audit pricing determinants and various 
AIM-specific explanatory variables on audit pricing in AIM companies.  It begins by 
presenting the descriptive statistics of the sampled AIM companies, followed by an 
explanation of those descriptive statistics according to the number of years listed, and by 
industry.  The analysis highlights the great differences among AIM companies in terms of 
size, complexity and audit risk, the variation in auditor selection, the dominant position of 
Grant Thornton as the auditor specialist in the market, the significant proportion of 
companies that change auditors, the relaxed regulation of corporate governance 
requirements and the unique Nomad regulatory regime.  The chapter then presents the 
results of the bivariate correlations among the different variables used in the study.   A 
number of explanatory variables show significant correlation with audit fees.  For example, 
the size and complexity of audit client, audits undertaken during the busy period, and the 
level of non-audit fees are positively correlated with audit fees, while companies’ financial 
performance shows a negative correlation with audit fees.  These findings suggest, at the 
univariate level at least, that traditional audit pricing determinants also have significant 
influence on audit pricing in AIM companies.   The positive correlation between the use of 
Big 4 auditor and audit fees, and the negative correlation between audit fees and the use 
of mid-tier or small auditor suggest that unlike in the UK main market, where the fee 
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premium for Big 4 no longer exists or difficult to test, in AIM the size of the auditor still has 
a positive correlation with the audit pricing.  Finally, the use of auditors with higher market 
share, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and the proportion of equity 
owned by large blockholders are significantly and positively correlated with audit fees, 
while the use of Grant Thornton, lack of revenue stream or suffering loss, and the use of 
Nomad with higher market share all show a negative correlation with audit pricing in AIM, 
suggesting that due to unique characteristics of the market, many explanatory factors 
unique to  AIM companies also have an impact on the audit pricing. 
Next, the multivariate regression results are presented in order to explain the 
determinants of audit pricing in AIM.  In summary, the empirical findings reported in the 
audit pricing model reveal that most of the explanatory variables used in the studies of 
fully-listed companies still show significant impact on audit pricing in AIM companies, 
including audit client characteristics such as size, complexity and risk, engagement 
characteristics such as audits undertaken during the busy season, the length between 
companies’ financial year end and the signing of the audit report, and the joint provision 
of non-audit services, and auditor characteristics such as the use of London-based auditors.  
However, neither board independence nor leadership show significant impact on audit 
fees, suggesting that even under the flexible regulatory environment, AIM companies’ 
distinctive governance practices show no impact on the external audits.  One interesting 
finding is that, consistent with Peel and Roberts (2003) and Peel (2013), auditor size shows 
significant impact on audit pricing in AIM companies, with Big 4 auditors charging a fee 
premium and local and regional auditors charging lower fees.  Since AIM is dominated by 
small and medium sized firms, many of which are in their early stages, AIM companies 
show great variation in audit product requirement and auditor selection.  Some companies 
looking for opportunities for expansion may be willing to pay higher fees for the 
reputation and service quality of big auditors, while others prefer smaller accounting firms 
who charge lower fees.  In the AIM model, which includes several AIM-specific explanatory 
variables, only companies reporting no revenue show a negative influence on audit pricing, 
which suggests that the reduction of time and effort for auditors due to lack of revenue 
outweighs the audit risk arising from potential financial failure.  The study also documents 
that, contrary to the findings of previous research, the market leader Grant Thornton 
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shows a significant and negative influence on audit pricing in AIM companies.  This 
interesting finding suggests that as a mid-tier auditor, Grant Thornton may provide an 
audit service at a lower price to attract AIM companies, and increase the audit efficiency 
with its knowledge and experience of the market.  Following the multivariate regressions, 
four sub-samples based on AIM company size and different types of auditors were further 
analysed.  The univariate statistics show that compared with smaller companies, larger 
AIM companies (based on both total assets and market capitalization) have significant 
differences in terms of the explanatory factors of audit fees.  On average larger firms 
(based on total assets and market capitalization) pay significantly higher audit fees 
compared to smaller firms.  The subsequent multivariate regressions indicate that the 
determinant factors in the audit pricing models of large and small AIM companies are 
different.  The univariate statistics of auditor size sub-samples also show significant 
differences in the explanatory factors between AIM companies audited by Big 4, mid-tier 
and small auditors.  The multivariate regressions indicate that only audit client size and 
complexity are common determinants of audit fees, with significantly positive impact for 
all sized auditors; apart from this, different sized auditors place different emphasis on each 
audit fee determinant.  Through comparing clients of Grant Thornton with clients of other 
auditors, the study also finds that as the market leader, Grant Thornton does show 
significant differences on the influential factors of audit fees.  The multivariate regression 
results indicate that only company size, audit risk, London-based offices, board leadership 
and ownership structure have significant impact on Grant Thornton’s audit pricing strategy.  
Several additional tests were conducted and the results indicate that, consistent with the 
correlation analysis, the use of Nomad with higher market share has significant and 
negative association with audit fees, which suggests that experienced Nomads may have 
better involvement in the efficiency of AIM companies’ internal control, hence reducing 
the cost of external auditing; or they may have further influence on the selection of 
auditors.  The study also documents that in general, auditors with higher market share 
charge higher fees for their services.  In addition, the robustness test of the impact of the 
joint provision of non-audit and audit services indicates that paying higher non-audit fees 
than audit fees has negative influence on the audit fees, supporting the argument that a 
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large amount of non-audit services increases the auditor’s understanding of its clients, 
which enhances the cost efficiency of auditing.   
Table 5.22 Summary of Hypotheses I 
Factors Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Findings1 
Auditee size  + + 
Audit 
complexity 
 + + 
Audit risk  + + 
Non-audit 
service 
 
Natural logarithm of non-audit fee + + 
Binary variable of non-audit fee  + - 
Percentage of non-audit fee as a 
proportion of total auditor 
remuneration 
+ - 
Governance Board independence ? N 
Governance Board leadership  ? N 
Governance Blockholder ownership - N 
Auditor size 
 
Big 4 auditors + + 
Mid-tier auditors + N 
Small auditors - - 
Auditor 
specialist 
 
Grant Thornton + - 
Auditor market share in AIM + + 
Auditor 
location 
Binary variable: (=1 if auditor located in 
London; =0 otherwise) 
 
+ + 
Audit opinion Qualified or modified audit opinion or 
audit comments in 2010  
? N 
Qualified audit report in 2010 ? + 
Audit comments in 2010 ? N 
Busy season  + + 
Audit report 
lag 
 + + 
Audit tenure Auditor changed in 2010 financial year - N 
Nominated 
Advisor 
Nomad involvement ? N 
Nomad specialism ? - 
Note:   
1 N indicates the factor shows no significant impact on audit fees.   
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Chapter 6 Empirical Analysis II – Audit Committee and Audit 
Pricing in AIM 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Due to the relaxed corporate governance regulatory regime and weak disclosure 
requirement, many AIM companies do not include corporate governance reports in their 
annual reports; meanwhile, some disclose information regarding directors, but give no 
details of audit committee members or other characteristics.  Hence, in order to maintain 
the data completeness and consistency, the second empirical analysis uses a reduced 
sample, comprising 319 AIM companies with full (albeit voluntary) disclosure of audit 
committee characteristics information.  The results and findings of the influence of audit 
committee characteristics on audit pricing in AIM companies are presented in this chapter.  
The chapter begins by outlining the descriptive statistics of the variables utilized in the 
empirical analysis.  The descriptive analysis includes an analysis of the reduced sample and 
a detailed examination of the statistics for various industrial sectors used in this study.  
Then, a correlation matrix is presented, showing a two-way Pearson correlation between 
the variables employed; this identifies the associations between audit fee and each 
explanatory variable, as well as the significant correlations among the independent 
variables.  This is followed by presentation of the results of multivariate regression analysis 
utilizing the models demonstrated in Chapter Four to investigate the hypotheses related 
to audit committee characteristics.  The multivariate analysis also includes a set of 
robustness tests of the impact of audit committee members’ expertise on audit fees based 
on the reduced sample dataset.  The chapter concludes by giving a summary of the results 
and findings of the second empirical analysis.  
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics – Reduced Sample 
Table 6.1 reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the second empirical 
analysis.  These statistical results are based on the data of 319 AIM companies in the 
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2009/2010 financial year, a reduced sample size compared to that of the first empirical 
analysis, where there were 477 firm year observations.  The companies excluded from this 
smaller sample did not disclose enough information related to the audit committee, for 
example the number of directors sitting on the committee, their independence, or their 
expertise in finance.  The variables included in the descriptive statistics can be separated 
into those used in the AIM audit pricing models and those representing AIM companies’ 
audit committee characteristics.   
212 
 
Table 6.1   Descriptive Statistics 
Variable1 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis N 
AUDITFEE 105823.677 73000.0 116048.281 5000.0 820333.200 3.275 13.456 319 
TOTALASSET(000) 82238.414 51536.0 103168.870 866.0 745500.0 2.825 10.0 319 
LOGAUDIT 4.862 4.863 0.366 3.699 5.914 0.148 0.506 319 
LOGASSET 7.638 7.712 0.536 5.938 8.872 -0.531 0.574 319 
SUB 9.410 7.0 8.701 0.0 62.0 2.432 8.249 312 
RECEIVABLE (%) 16.820 11.544 16.965 0.0 95.068 1.605 3.002 319 
USSUB 0.290 0.0 0.456 0.0 1.0 0.913 -1.174 307 
ROA (%) -6.360 1.415 35.184 -383.173 49.896 -5.579 48.196 319 
GEARING (%) 43.273 35.429 75.525 0.0 1285.219 14.133 231.455 319 
LISTYEAR 5.420 5.0 2.807 1.0 15.0 1.186 1.653 319 
DUMREV 0.130 0.0 0.332 0.0 1.0 2.273 3.187 319 
NED 54.433 55.556 15.228 20.0 100.0 0.351 0.322 319 
DUALITY 0.110 0.0 0.309 0.0 1.0 2.562 4.592 319 
BLOCKHOLD (%) 46.186 46.470 20.063 0.0 97.100 -0.100 -0.323 309 
NOMAD 0.770 1.0 0.421 0.0 1.0 -1.297 -0.320 319 
BIG 4 0.470 0.0 0.500 0.0 1.0 0.133 -1.995 319 
MIDTIER 0.420 0.0 0.494 0.0 1.0 0.339 -1.897 319 
SMALL 0.120 0.0 0.321 0.0 1.0 2.410 3.831 319 
GT 0.160 0.0 0.370 0.0 1.0 1.833 1.369 319 
LONDON 0.440 0.0 0.497 0.0 1.0 0.248 -1.951 319 
BUSYDATE 0.650 1.0 0.477 0.0 1.0 -0.641 -1.599 319 
LAGTIME 1.970 1.954 0.142 1.447 2.364 -0.029 0.002 311 
CHANGE 0.090 0.0 0.289 0.0 1.0 2.842 6.113 316 
NONAUDIT 3.926 4.415 1.591 0.0 5.740 -1.803 1.960 319 
NOACDIR 2.690 3.0 0.723 1.0 6.0 0.798 1.335 319 
ACEXDIR 0.110 0.0 0.313 0.0 1.0 2.509 4.324 319 
NOACEXP 1.260 1.0 0.742 0.0 4.0 0.385 0.299 319 
DACCEXP 0.550 1.0 0.499 0.0 1.0 -0.183 -1.979 319 
NOACCEXP 0.620 1.0 0.632 0.0 3.0 0.664 0.204 319 
PROACCEXP (%) 24.044 33.333 25.183 0.0 100.0 0.721 0.054 319 
DCACCEXP 0.420 0.0 0.494 0.0 1.0 0.339 -1.897 319 
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NOCACCEXP 0.470 0.0 0.597 0.0 3.0 0.975 0.419 319 
PROCACCEXP (%) 18.166 0.0 24.205 0.0 100.0 1.170 0.933 319 
RESOURCE 0.300 0.0 0.458 0.0 1.0 0.888 -1.218 319 
MANUFACTURE 0.330 0.0 0.469 0.0 1.0 0.746 -1.453 319 
SERVICE 0.220 0.0 0.417 0.0 1.0 1.340 -0.205 319 
FINANCE 0.150 0.0 0.361 0.0 1.0            1.930 1.738 319 
Note: 
1 LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets 
represented by receivables; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; ROA = return on assets; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total 
liabilities; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; NED = non-executive director as a proportion 
of all directors; DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable 
represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable 
representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = 
dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing 
company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed 
date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; NOACDIR = number of audit 
committee members; ACEXDIR = dummy variable representing company has an executive director(s) sitting on the audit committee; NOACEXP = number of audit committee members 
with financial expertise; DACCEXP = dummy variable indicating instance where the audit committees had one or more members with accounting experience; NOACCEXP = number of 
audit committee members with accounting experience; PROACCEXP = percentage of audit committee members with accounting expertise; DCACCEXP = dummy variable representing 
company whose audit committee has one or more chartered accountants; NOCACCEXP = number of audit committee members who are chartered accountants; PROCACCEXP = 
percentage of audit committee members who were chartered accountants; RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = dummy variable 
representing manufacturing company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company.  
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As discussed in the previous chapter, this study focuses on the detail of the audit 
committee characteristics in the sampled AIM companies.  The audit committee size in this 
sample ranges from a minimum of 1 director to a maximum of 6; on average, the audit 
committees contain 2.69 directors, with a median of 3 members.  It is unusual to have only 
one director in audit committee in fully-listed companies, but since many AIM companies 
are too small with only few directors sitting on board 19, some may only have one regular 
audit committee member and invite other directors to the audit committee meetings.  In 
terms of the proxy for independence, unlike fully-listed companies, which are required to 
either comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) 20  or explain why they 
choose not to follow, there is no compulsory requirement for AIM companies to follow 
that Code (2010) or the QCA Guideline (2008); hence most AIM companies do not disclose 
whether the non-executive directors sitting on the audit committees are independent or 
how they define the independence of the directors.  Therefore, in this study, it is difficult 
to measure the independence of the audit committee using the variables related to 
independent non-executive directors.  Certainly, many companies listed on AIM do have 
executive directors sitting on their audit committee, something that cannot happen in 
fully-listed companies, and indicates a lack of independence.  In this study, 11 per cent of 
the sample companies have executive directors sitting on the audit committee, which 
indicates that these companies choose not to follow either the QCA Guideline (2008) or 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), but instead rely on best practice based on their 
own experience and the nature of the companies.  In terms of expertise of audit 
committee members, the descriptive statistics in Table 6.1 show that, on average, audit 
committees in this sample have 1.26 members who are finance experts based on the SEC’s 
adjusted definition (2003)21, with a median of 1 member.  The range is from a minimum of 
no member with finance expertise, to a maximum of 4 members.   
Since previous studies have found different results on the association between audit 
committee expertise and audit pricing according to different definitions of finance 
expertise, in line with the prior literature in this area (e.g. Defond et al., 2005; Krishnan and 
                                                          
19 In the sample, the minimum number of directors on board of AIM companies is 3.  
20 There have been subsequent reports in 2012 and 2014 but their recommendations in respect of audit 
committees have remained virtually unchanged. 
21 Here means the broad definition in which finance experts include audit committee members with finance 
expertise, accounting expertise, and supervisory expertise.  
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Visvanathan, 2009) this study employs two detailed definitions.  The statistics in Table 6.1 
indicate that, on average, 55 percent of audit committees in the sample of AIM companies 
have at least one member with recent work experience directly related to accounting and 
auditing.  When looking at the number of audit committee members with accounting 
expertise, the range is from a minimum of no members to a maximum of 4. On average, 
each audit committee has 0.62 members with accounting expertise, compared with 1.26 
when using the broader definition of finance expert, a reduction of 0.64.  This indicates 
that some finance experts in the sampled audit committees do not have recent accounting 
or auditing experience, which means that their expertise is financial or supervisory.  The 
statistical results also show that twenty-four per cent of directors in the sample audit 
committees have recent accounting and auditing experience.  Table 6.1 also reports that 
according to a much stricter definition of finance expertise, 42 per cent of audit 
committees have at least one member who is qualified as a chartered accountant, and the 
average number of chartered accountants in each audit committee is 0.47.  The statistics 
show that, in the sampled AIM companies, the number of directors sitting on the audit 
committees who are chartered accountants as a proportion of the overall number of 
directors in the audit committees is 18.16 per cent.   
Because this analysis uses a reduced sample, Table 6.1 also presents the descriptive 
statistics of the same variables used in the AIM model of the first empirical analysis.  The 
average audit fee paid by AIM companies in the reduced sample is £105,823, with a median 
fee of £73,000, an increase of 8.2 per cent on average compared with the full sample 22.  
The range of audit fee paid by AIM companies in this reduced sample is from a minimum 
of £5,000 to a maximum of £820,333.  The total asset of the reduced sample AIM 
companies ranges from £0.866m to £745.5m, with an average of £82.238m and a median 
of 51.536m.  The average total asset in the reduced sample is lower by 7.8 per cent 
compared with the full sample 23, while the range indicates that the companies which 
disclose audit committee information are more concentrated in terms of assets; the AIM 
companies with outlier total assets are excluded from the sample because they did not 
disclose audit committee details.  The sample companies possess, on average, 9.41 
                                                          
22 The average audit fee paid by AIM companies in the full sample is £97,783 (see Table 5.1).  
23 The average total assets of AIM companies in the full sample is £88.725 million (see Table 5.1).  
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subsidiaries, with a median of 7.  Twenty-nine per cent of the sample companies have at 
least one subsidiary located in the US.  The average level of receivables as a proportion of 
total asset is 16.82 per cent.  The average listing time for the companies in this sample is 
5.42 years, with a median of 5 years.  The average ROA of this sample is -6.36 per cent, and 
the average gearing level is 43.273 per cent.  As in the first sample, 13 per cent of the AIM 
companies in the reduced sample did not generate revenue in the 2009/2010 financial year.  
The statistics also reveal that, on average, the log of non-audit fee paid by the sampled 
AIM companies for non-audit services is 3.926.  In terms of industrial sector, 30 per cent of 
the sample companies operate in natural resources, 33 per cent in manufacturing, 22 per 
cent in the non-financial service sector, and 15 per cent in financial services.  
In terms of auditor selection, 47 per cent of the AIM companies in this sample use one of 
the Big 4 audit firms, 42 per cent use mid-tier audit firms, and the remaining 12 per cent use 
local and regional auditors.  Among the reduced sample companies, 16 per cent were 
audited by Grant Thornton, 44 per cent were audited by London-based firms, and 9 per 
cent changed their auditors in 2010.  Sixty-five per cent of the sample companies have the 
audit undertaken during the busy period between 31st December and 31st March.  The 
average natural log of number of days between the financial year end and the signing of 
the audit report is 1.97.  In terms of governance characteristics, on average, 54.43 per cent 
of the board members in the sample companies are non-executive directors, and 11 per 
cent of the sample companies have the same person acting as CEO and chairman.  In this 
study, on average, 46.19 per cent of equity of the sample companies is owned by large 
blockholders, with a median of 46.47 per cent.  The statistics in Table 6.1 also reveal that 
77 per cent of the sample companies use the same financial adviser as the nominated 
adviser and nominated broker.         
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics – by Industry 
Variable1 
Natural Resources 
(95 firms) 
Manufacture 
(104 firms) 
Service 
(71 firms) 
Finance 
(49 firms) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AUDITFEE 93701.047 58000.0 117980.696 78500.0 93414.645 71000.0 121504.519 87000.0 
TOTALASSET(000) 80300.055 35395.735 80232.090 46858.0 68893.857 51842.0 109590.768 72074.0 
LOGAUDIT 4.767 4.763 4.901 4.895 4.851 4.851 4.980 4.940 
LOGASSET 7.569 7.549 7.651 7.671 7.577 7.715 7.831 7.858 
SUB 6.970 6.0 10.910 7.0 9.460 7.0 10.900 6.0 
RECEIVABLE (%) 6.964 3.536 22.139 18.769 20.526 18.346 19.273 9.252 
USSUB 0.230 0.0 0.310 0.0 0.450 0.0 0.150 0.0 
ROA (%) -16.250 -7.428 -0.466 5.709 -8.429 3.265 3.302 1.329 
GEARING (%) 22.484 15.948 46.119 47.426 68.299 46.870 41.277 35.352 
LISTYEAR 5.130 5.0 5.480 5.0 5.660 5.0 5.530 5.0 
DUMREV 0.400 0.0 0.020 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NED 56.552 57.143 50.933 50.0 53.811 50.0 58.652 57.143 
DUALITY 0.150 0.0 0.090 0.0 0.080 0.0 0.100 0.0 
BLOCKHOLD (%) 47.850 48.170 44.689 42.800 45.879 48.190 46.511 45.610 
NOMAD 0.630 1.0 0.850 1.0 0.850 1.0 0.780 1.0 
BIG 4 0.360 0.0 0.490 0.0 0.510 1.0 0.570 1.0 
MIDTIER 0.440 0.0 0.400 0.0 0.440 0.0 0.370 0.0 
SMALL 0.200 0.0 0.110 0.0 0.060 0.0 0.060 0.0 
GT 0.080 0.0 0.240 0.0 0.210 0.0 0.080 0.0 
LONDON 0.630 1.0 0.250 0.0 0.420 0.0 0.490 0.0 
BUSYDATE 0.670 1.0 0.650 1.0 0.660 1.0 0.590 1.0 
LAGTIME 2.036 2.067 1.933 1.944 1.956 1.947 1.945 1.940 
CHANGE 0.090 0.0 0.100 0.0 0.110 0.0 0.060 0.0 
NONAUDIT 3.730 4.204 3.922 4.398 4.423 4.593 3.596 4.613 
NOACDIR 2.610 3.0 2.640 3.0 2.630 3.0 3.020 3.0 
ACEXDIR 0.170 0.0 0.100 0.0 0.060 0.0 0.100 0.0 
NOACEXP 1.370 1.0 1.150 1.0 1.240 1.0 1.290 1.0 
DACCEXP 0.550 1.0 0.550 1.0 0.560 1.0 0.510 1.0 
NOACCEXP 0.600 1.0 0.620 1.0 0.650 1.0 0.630 1.0 
PROACCEXP (%) 24.737 33.333 23.670 33.333 25.704 33.333 21.088 25.0 
DCACCEXP 0.400 0.0 0.460 0.0 0.390 0.0 0.390 0.0 
NOCACCEXP 0.440 0.0 0.500 0.0 0.450 0.0 0.470 0.0 
PROCACCEXP (%) 18.246 0.0 19.103 0.0 18.192 0.0 15.986 0.0 
Note: 
1 LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; SUB = the total number 
of subsidiaries; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; USSUB = dummy variable 
representing companies have US subsidiary; ROA = return on assets; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented 
by total liabilities; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; DUMREV = dummy variable representing 
company has no revenue in 2010; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; DUALITY = dummy 
variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; 
NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; BIG 4 = dummy variable 
representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies 
whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; 
LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable 
representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural 
logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = 
dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; 
NOACDIR = number of audit committee members; ACEXDIR = dummy variable representing company has an executive 
director(s) sitting on the audit committee; NOACEXP = number of audit committee members with financial expertise; 
DACCEXP = dummy variable indicating instance where the audit committees had one or more members with accounting 
experience; NOACCEXP = number of audit committee members with accounting experience; PROACCEXP = percentage 
of audit committee members with accounting expertise; DCACCEXP = dummy variable representing company whose 
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audit committee has one or more chartered accountants; NOCACCEXP = number of audit committee members who are 
chartered accountants; PROCACCEXP = percentage of audit committee members who were chartered accountants; 
RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = dummy variable 
representing manufacturing company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; SERVICE = 
dummy variable representing non-financial services company. 
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6.1.2 Descriptive Statistics – By Industry 
Table 6.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the different industrial sectors in which the 
sample AIM companies operate.  As mentioned in previous chapters, the four industrial 
sectors used in this study are natural resources, manufacturing, non-financial services, and 
finance24.  The descriptive statistics of audit committee characteristics of AIM companies 
in the different industrial sectors are presented and explained in this section.  
The results in Table 6.2 indicate that AIM companies in the financial sector have the largest 
audit committees, with an average of 3.02 directors.  AIM companies operating in natural 
resources, manufacturing and the service sector have an average of 2.61, 2.64, and 2.63 
directors sitting on the audit committee.  In terms of audit committee independence, 6 per 
cent of AIM companies in the non-financial service sector, and 10 per cent of those in 
manufacturing and the finance sector have executive directors sitting on the audit 
committee.  Meanwhile AIM companies operating in the natural resources sector show 
weak independence, in that only 83 per cent of companies’ audit committees are 
composed entirely of non-executive directors, and the remaining 17 per cent of companies 
have one or more executive directors on their audit committee.  The statistics in Table 6.2 
also indicate that, on average, AIM companies in natural resources have the highest 
number of directors with finance expertise (1.37 members), while manufacturing 
companies have only 1.15 directors with financial expertise on the audit committee, which 
is the lowest among the four industrial sectors.  Companies in finance and non-financial 
services have on average 1.24 and 1.29 directors who could be considered as finance 
experts.  When narrowing down the definition of expertise to accounting experts who 
have recent accounting or auditing experience, 55 per cent of companies in natural 
resources and manufacturing, 56 per cent of service companies, and only 51 per cent of 
finance companies have at least one director with recent accounting or auditing 
experience on the audit committee.  In terms of the number of accounting experts on the 
audit committee, on average, AIM companies in the service sector have 0.65 directors with 
                                                          
24 Based on the 11 Business Sectors, the four industrial sectors used in this study are classified as: natural 
resources, including companies from the oil & gas and basic material business sectors; manufacturing, with 
companies in the industrials, consumer goods, and health care business sectors; service sector, including 
companies from the consumer service, telecommunications, utilities and technology business sectors; and 
finance, with companies from the financial business sector. 
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recent accounting experience, followed by the finance sector with 0.63, manufacturing 
with 0.62, and natural resources companies, with 0.60 accounting experts.  The statistics 
also reveal that accounting experts represent 24.74 per cent of audit committee members 
in the natural resources sector, 23.67 per cent in manufacturing, 25.70 per cent in the 
service sector, and 21.09 per cent in the finance sector.  Hence, results in Table 6.2 indicate 
that when using the number or proportion of directors in the audit committee who have 
recent accounting and auditing experience as the dummy variable, non-financial service 
companies have the highest level of accounting expertise, which indicates that companies 
in the service sector tend to be more aware of the importance of accounting expertise in 
the audit committee.  When considering the presence of qualified chartered accountants 
as audit committee finance expertise, 46 per cent of manufacturing companies have at 
least one chartered accountant on the audit committee, which is the highest among all 
four industrial sectors, followed by natural resources (40 per cent) and the service sector 
and finance sector (39 per cent).  The average number of chartered accountants in the 
audit committee is 0.44 in natural resources companies, 0.50 in manufacturing companies, 
0.45 in service companies, and 0.47 in finance companies.  The proportion of directors 
qualified as chartered accountants among the overall audit committee members is 18.25 
per cent in natural resources, 19.10 per cent in manufacturing, 18.19 per cent in the service 
sector, and 15.99 per cent in the finance sector.  Thus, when audit committee expertise is 
defined as directors with a chartered accountant qualification, companies operating in 
manufacturing have the highest level of expertise among the four industrial sectors.  
6.2 Correlation Matrix  
Table 6.3 presents the results of two-way Pearson correlations between the dependent 
variables and the explanatory variables to be used in the second multivariate analysis.  
Column one of Table 6.3 indicates that audit committee size, represented by the number 
of directors sitting on the committee, and audit committee expertise, represented by the 
number of finance experts 25 on the committee, are significantly positively correlated with 
audit fees.  When the definition of audit committee expertise is narrowed to accounting 
                                                          
25 Finance expertise is defined based on the SEC’s broad definition, which includes accounting expertise, 
financial expertise and supervisory expertise who have accounting, auditing, finance, investment, 
managerial and supervisory related experience in recent years. 
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experts who have recent accounting or auditing related experience, the results in column 
one indicate that the existence, and number, of accounting experts in the audit committee 
of AIM companies also have significant and positive correlation with audit fees, while the 
number of accounting experts as a proportion of the overall audit committee membership 
shows a significant correlation with audit pricing.  This study also uses a third measurement 
of audit committee expertise, namely directors with a chartered accountant qualification.  
The results in column one of Table 6.3 indicate that the existence of chartered accountants 
in the audit committee, the number of audit committee members qualified as chartered 
accountants, and the proportion of members qualified as chartered accountants in the 
audit committee are all significantly positively correlated with audit fees.   
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Table 6.3 Correlations 
No Variable1,2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 LOGAUDIT 1               
2 LOGASSET 0.692** 1              
3 SUB 0.530** 0.411** 1             
4 RECEIVABLE 0.131* -0.15 0.103 1            
5 USSUB 0.159** -0.18 0.129* 0.101 1           
6 ROA 0.198** 0.501** 0.099 0.050 -0.069 1          
7 GEARING 0.053 -0.069 0.076 0.353** 0.024 -0.177** 1         
8 LISTYEAR -0.046 -0.057 -0.078 0.147** 0.033 0.033 -0.018 1        
9 DUMREV -0.280** -0.189** -0.182** -0.287** -0.172** -0.230** -0.155** -0.020 1       
10 NED 0.043 0.054 -0.001 -0.098 -0.047 -0.014 -0.138* -0.012 -0.005 1      
11 DUALITY -0.043 -0.058 -0.103 -0.029 -0.090 -0.003 -0.027 -0.045 0.084 -0.090 1     
12 BLOCKHOLD 0.033 -0.018 -0.061 -0.101 0.047 -0.117* -0.022 -0.027 -0.008 0.258** -0.011 1    
13 NOMAD -0.100 -0.170** 0.073 0.160** 0.099 0.001 0.079 0.018 -0.154** -0.045 -0.054 -0.006 1   
14 BIG 4 0.379** 0.261** 0.077 -0.061 0.085 0.099 -0.002 0.031 -0.146** 0.014 -0.018 0.077 -0.088 1  
15 MIDTIER -0.184** -0.158** 0.011 0.107 -0.003 -0.105 0.054 -0.039 0.045 -0.027 -0.065 0.016 0.128* -0.792** 1 
16 SMALL -0.308** -0.164** -0.143* -0.070 -0.131* 0.008 -0.080 0.012 0.158** 0.020 0.129* -0.142* -0.059 -0.339** -0.306** 
17 GT -0.145** -0.114* -0.032 0.172** 0.026 -0.051 0.129* -0.048 -0.090 -0.074 -0.042 -0.043 0.079 -0.413** 0.522** 
18 LONDON 0.079 0.043 -0.013 -0.125* -0.052 -0.027 -0.075 0.011 0.142* 0.011 0.022 0.040 -0.075 -0.182** 0.072 
19 BUSYDATE 0.115* 0.031 -0.051 -0.019 0.027 -0.035 0.059 -0.071 -0.101 -0.008 0.103 -0.008 -0.085 -0.028 0.057 
20 LAGTIME 0.002 -0.090 -0.044 -0.169** -0.060 -0.224** 0.035 -0.061 0.225** -0.018 0.066 -0.029 -0.160** -0.099 -0.022 
21 CHANGE -0.066 -0.059 -0.005 0.008 0.035 0.003 -0.002 0.047 -0.019 0.047 0.031 0.020 0.038 0.055 -0.069 
22 NONAUDIT 0.140* 0.101 0.041 0.109 0.149** 0.075 0.072 0.124* -0.118* -0.024 -0.028 0.066 -0.023 0.137* -0.104 
23 RESOURCE -0.170** -0.084 -0.183** -0.379** -0.093 -0.183** -0.180** -0.069 0.540** 0.091 0.086 0.055 -0.216** -0.143* 0.033 
24 MANUFACTURE 0.074 0.017 0.119* 0.218** 0.030 0.117* 0.026 0.014 -0.223** -0.160** -0.045 -0.052 0.124* 0.032 -0.018 
25 SERVICE -0.016 -0.060 0.003 0.117* 0.185** -0.032 0.178** 0.046 -0.203** -0.022 -0.038 -0.008 0.094 0.043 0.021 
26 FINANCE 0.138* 0.154** 0.074 0.062 -0.135* 0.117* -0.011 0.016 -0.161** 0.118* -0.006 0.007 0.004 0.089 -0.043 
27 NOACDIR 0.172** 0.197** 0.064 -0.024 0.098 0.060 -0.001 -0.025 -0.060 0.365** -0.077 0.032 0.055 0.089 -0.024 
28 ACEXDIR -0.084 -0.105 -0.024 -0.044 0.017 -0.203** 0.126* -0.021 0.109 -0.298** 0.139* -0.042 -0.024 -0.047 -0.012 
29 NOACEXP 0.183** 0.147** 0.047 -0.083 0.030 -0.038 -0.025 -0.137* 0.022 0.234** -0.010 0.100 -0.083 0.048 0.033 
30 DACCEXP 0.118* 0.080 0.050 -0.016 0.034 -0.005 0.027 -0.114* 0.003 0.010 -0.052 0.022 -0.048 0.047 0.044 
31 NOACCEXP 0.161** 0.077 0.085 0.001 0.048 0.014 0.029 -0.117* 0.003 0.028 -0.050 0.059 -0.032 0.065 0.025 
32 PROACCEXP 0.083 0.005 0.027 -0.006 0.015 0.010 0.042 -0.102 0.008 -0.073 -0.004 0.023 -0.034 0.076 -0.004 
33 DCACCEXP 0.155** 0.078 0.041 -0.005 0.001 0.004 0.066 -0.080 0.006 0.061 -0.065 -0.030 -0.054 0.062 0.033 
34 NOCACCEXP 0.170** 0.068 0.044 -0.003 0.004 0.011 0.048 -0.073 0.021 0.063 -0.049 0.004 -0.061 0.067 0.020 
35 PROCACCEXP 0.111* 0.013 0.006 -0.002 -0.023 0.013 0.068 -0.061 0.009 -0.023 -0.018 -0.041 -0.055 0.075 0.000 
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Note: 
1 LOGAUDIT = the natural logarithm of audit fee; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets 
represented by receivables; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; ROA = return on assets; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total 
liabilities; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; NED = non-executive director as a proportion 
of all directors; DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable 
No 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
16 1                 
17 -0.160** 1                
18 0.173** -0.065 1               
19 -0.044 0.055 0.036 1              
20 0.189** -0.082 0.130* 0.120* 1             
21 0.021 -0.082 0.027 -0.042 0.067 1            
22 -0.054 -0.044 -0.028 -0.049 -0.120* -0.097 1           
23 0.171** -0.139* 0.253** 0.030 0.300** -0.015 -0.081 1          
24 -0.022 0.146** -0.265** 0.003 -0.183** 0.011 -0.002 -0.453** 1         
25 -0.100 0.070 -0.018 0.011 -0.055 0.042 0.167** -0.348** -0.372** 1        
26 -0.073 -0.094 0.044 -0.054 -0.077 -0.043 -0.089 -0.277** -0.296** -0.228** 1       
27 -0.102 -0.034 0.021 0.014 -0.061 -0.043 0.111* -0.071 -0.044 -0.041 0.195** 1      
28 0.092 0.008 0.134* 0.046 0.107 -0.042 -0.031 0.122* -0.030 -0.091 -0.010 0.040 1     
29 -0.126* 0.007 0.094 0.031 0.021 -0.033 0.009 0.098 -0.097 -0.013 0.016 0.337** 0.027 1    
30 -0.141* 0.079 -0.043 -0.046 -0.082 -0.037 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.019 -0.030 0.044 -0.042 0.351** 1   
31 -0.139* 0.077 0.001 -0.032 -0.072 0.002 0.000 -0.021 -0.006 0.023 0.008 0.079 -0.027 0.450** 0.898** 1  
32 -0.113* 0.067 -0.023 -0.047 -0.044 0.042 -0.027 0.018 -0.010 0.035 -0.050 -0.143* -0.033 0.355** 0.873** 0.937** 1 
33 -0.147** 0.040 -0.094 -0.036 -0.035 -0.088 -0.019 -0.022 0.063 -0.024 -0.025 0.055 -0.053 0.325** 0.772** 0.730** 0.705** 
34 -0.136* 0.039 -0.047 -0.035 -0.022 -0.044 -0.026 -0.027 0.038 -0.015 0.002 0.060 -0.023 0.395** 0.715** 0.812** 0.773** 
35 -0.117* 0.043 -0.066 -0.043 0.010 -0.014 -0.039 0.002 0.027 0.001 -0.038 -0.123* -0.032 0.311** 0.686** 0.757** 0.823** 
                  
No 33 34 35               
33 1                 
34 0.926** 1                
35 0.889** 0.947** 1               
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represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable 
representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = 
dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing 
company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed 
date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; RESOURCE = dummy variable 
representing exploration or mining company; MANUFACTURE = dummy variable representing manufacturing company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services 
company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; NOACDIR = number of audit committee members; ACEXDIR = dummy variable representing company 
has an executive director(s) sitting on the audit committee; NOACEXP = number of audit committee members with financial expertise; DACCEXP = dummy variable indicating instance 
where the audit committees had one or more members with accounting experience; NOACCEXP = number of audit committee members with accounting experience; PROACCEXP = 
percentage of audit committee members with accounting expertise; DCACCEXP = dummy variable representing company whose audit committee has one or more chartered accountants; 
NOCACCEXP = number of audit committee members who are chartered accountants; PROCACCEXP = percentage of audit committee members who were chartered accountants. 
2 * and ** denote statistically significant differences at 5% and 1% respectively. 
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As in the previous empirical analysis, other explanatory variables show correlation with 
audit fees.  For example, company size, the number of subsidiaries an AIM company 
possesses, the level of receivables as the proportion of total assets, ROA, the use of Big 4 
auditor, audit undertaken during busy season, and the fee level of joint provision of non-
audit services all show significant positive correlation with audit fee; while no revenue 
stream, and audit undertaken by mid-tier auditor, small auditor or Grant Thornton are 
significantly negatively correlated with audit fee.  Table 6.3 also show that, similar to other 
empirical studies of this kind, some explanatory variables are significantly correlated with 
other independent variables. For example, one company size variable (the log of total 
assets) is significantly correlated with number of subsidiaries, ROA, no revenue generated, 
the use of nomad as broker, auditor size, the use of Grant Thornton, and a number of audit 
committee characteristics variables.  The correlation matrix also shows that the audit 
committee characteristics are correlated with other explanatory variables.  Results in Table 
6.3 indicate that audit committee size is positively correlated with company size, the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board, and the non-audit fees; while audit 
committee independence is negatively correlated with ROA and board independence, and 
positively correlated with gearing, the use of London-based auditors, and having the same 
individual as CEO and board chairman.  The audit committee expertise is positively 
correlated with firm size and board independence, and negatively correlated with the 
number of years listed on the market and audit undertaken by small audit firms.  
Since this study employs different definitions and measurement of the audit committee 
characteristics, especially the audit committee expertise, the correlation matrix shows 
significant correlations between these linked variables.  For example, the measurements 
of accounting expertise and chartered accountant as finance expert are highly correlated 
with each other, and some of the correlation values are above 0.70.  However, all the 
variables in the correlation matrix that are highly correlated with each other have been 
included separately in each of the regression models, and none of the variables in any of 
the regression models has a correlation value above 0.70.  Similar as in last chapter, the 
VIF is also tested in the regression analysis to ensure the avoidance of multi-collinearity 
issue. 
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6.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
The results of the multivariate analysis are presented in Tables 6.4 to 6.10.  Table 6.4 
expands the AIM audit pricing model tested in the previous chapter with audit committee 
characteristics including audit committee size, independence, and expertise.  Since 
previous audit committee studies have employed different definitions of finance expertise, 
this study runs identical multivariate regressions with various measurements of audit 
committee expertise to test the impact.  In all regressions, dummy variables representing 
the four industrial sectors are included to control for sector level variations.  With regard 
to the multicollinearity issue, all the correlation values of the variables included in each of 
the regression models are at an acceptable level; furthermore, this study also calculates 
the variance inflation factors (VIF) for all regressions and they are all significantly less than 
ten.  According to Gujarati (2003, p.339), a VIF value of less than 10 is acceptable.   
6.3.1 Audit Committee Characteristics 
Table 6.4 reports the results of four main multivariate regression models, each taking the 
log of audit fee as the dependent variable.  Following the AIM audit pricing model tested 
in the previous chapter, the four regression models test separately the different types of 
auditor: the first model includes a dummy variable to represent Big 4 auditors; the second 
substitutes the Big 4 auditor variable with a dummy variable to represent mid-tier auditors; 
the third uses a dummy variable to represent small auditors, and the fourth model 
substitutes the auditor size variables with a dummy variable to represent Grant Thornton, 
the market leader in AIM.  All the regression models for this analysis include the 
independent variables used in the AIM model in the previous chapter, representing 1) AIM 
company characteristics such as company size, complexity and risk; 2) auditor 
characteristics such as the use of London-based auditors and change of auditors in 2010; 3) 
engagement characteristics such as the period between companies’ financial year end and 
the auditor report signing date, whether the audit is undertaken during the busy period, 
and the joint provision of non-audit service, and 4) governance characteristics such as 
board independence and leadership, the proportion of equity held by blockholders, and 
whether the company’s Nomad also acts as broker.  In order to examine the impact of 
audit committee characteristics on audit fee, each regression model includes as 
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measurements of audit committee size, independence, and expertise, the number of 
directors sitting on the audit committee, a dummy variable for the presence of executive 
director on the audit committee, and the number of audit committee members with 
finance expertise, respectively.                    
Table 6.4 focuses on the impact of the three cornerstones of good audit committee 
governance in the UK – size, independence, and finance expertise.  The results in all four 
models indicate that audit committee size measured by actual number of audit committee 
members, although negatively correlated with audit fee, is statistically insignificant.  This 
indicates that for AIM companies, the size of audit committee has no significant influence 
on audit fees.  Though this is inconsistent with Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) and Adelopo 
et al. (2012) who found that bigger audit committees would lead to higher audit fees, the 
results of this study provide supportive evidence to Chan et al. (2013)’s argument that the 
influence of audit committee size could be subject to firm size.  In terms of audit 
committee independence, the dummy variable representing the presence of executive 
director on the audit committee shows a significant and negative impact on audit fees in 
AIM companies.  According to Table 6.3, the existence of executive director in audit 
committee has significant negative correlation with ROA but positive correlation with 
gearing which indicate that AIM companies with low audit committee independence tend 
to have low financial performance and higher audit risk.  The correlation results in Table 
6.3 also show that the existence of executive director in audit committee is negatively 
correlated with the proportion of non-executive directors on board and positively 
correlate with the same person acting as CEO and chairman of the company.  This indicate 
that AIM companies with low audit committee independence also have relatively less 
regulated governance practices with low board independence and concentrate board 
leadership.  This link between reduced audit committee independence and lower audit 
fees is consistent with the notion that a lack of independence serves to reduce the extent 
of audit intensity, which might because that the less independent audit committee 
normally indicate less board independence and less regulated governance practice, and 
this would lead to less incentive for directors to protect the companies’ reputational 
capital and reduce litigation risk (Abbott et al., 2003a; Gul and Goodwin, 2010; Zaman et al., 
2011; Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2012).  With regard to expertise, the number of audit 
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committee members with finance expertise shows a significant and positive association 
with audit fees in AIM companies.  Consistent with prior research, this positive impact 
supports the argument that greater expertise would have better communication and 
understanding with external auditors and could offer extra support to external auditors 
on auditing issues and audit scope, hence helping to ensure that audits are more 
comprehensive (Abbott et al., 2003a; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Zaman et al., 2011).  
These findings are interesting, since they identify that in AIM, where there are no 
requirements or regulations pertaining to the audit committee, following the good 
governance practices recommended in the QCA Guideline (2009) and UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) regarding high level of audit committee independence and 
greater finance expertise has a positive impact on audit fees, consistent with previous 
studies on fully-listed companies.  Since higher fees reflect more intensive and 
comprehensive audits (Simunic, 1980), these findings could be considered as support for 
the recommendations and regulations that encourage greater audit committee 
independence and expertise for AIM companies.  Results in Table 6.4 also indicate that the 
size of auditors also influence the impact of audit committee effectiveness especially audit 
committee independence on audit fees with mid-tier auditors pay more attention on the 
audit committee independence hence more significant impact on the audit fees, while 
small auditors show less focus on audit committee effectiveness.   
With regard to the variables used in the AIM audit pricing model, the regression results in 
these four models are broadly consistent with the findings from the first empirical analysis 
shown in the previous chapter; however, when audit committee characteristics are 
included in this analysis, some variables indicate different results.  Firms in the service 
sector show a negative association with audit fees in all four models, while companies in 
the natural resources sector indicate a negative relationship with audit fees in models 3 
and 4 only.  Results in all four models indicate that the size of AIM companies represented 
by the log of company total assets has the most positive and significant impact on audit 
fees, while both the number of subsidiaries and the proportion of assets in the form of 
receivables also exert a significant and positive impact on audit fees, consistent with the 
argument that companies with higher levels of complexity require more time and effort 
for external auditing.  Consistent with previous findings, the regression results of this 
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study also indicate that the presence of US-based subsidiary has a positive impact on audit 
fees, and the company’s financial performance shows a significant negative influence, 
while the other risk measurements - gearing, the number of years listed on AIM, and no 
revenue stream - show no significant impact on audit fees.  For all four models, results 
reported in Table 6.4 show that in terms of engagement characteristics, audit undertaken 
during busy period and the time period between company’s financial year end and the 
signing of the auditor report are significantly positively associated with audit fees; 
meanwhile, contrary to previous findings, the amount of non-audit services purchased 
from the auditors shows no significant influence on audit fees.  The first three models in 
Table 6.4 indicate that being audited by a Big 4 auditor has a significant positive impact on 
audit fees, and audits undertaken by mid-tier or small auditors have a significantly negative 
impact with audit pricing.  Results from model 4 show that being audited by Grant 
Thornton is significantly negatively associated with audit fees paid by AIM companies.  This 
study also finds that London-based auditors charge significantly higher audit fees.  Results 
from model 1 indicate that change of auditors in 2010 has negative impact on audit fees, 
while in the other three models the impact of the change of auditor shows no statistical 
significance.  Consistent with the findings reported in the previous chapter, none of the 
governance characteristics - board independence, leadership, blockholder ownership, and 
Nomad characteristics - show significant impact on audit fees.  
In summary therefore, the empirical findings reported in Table 6.4 indicate that audit 
committee independence and expertise are associated with more expensive audits.  These 
findings are largely consistent with previous research and also suggest that AIM 
companies that follow the corporate governance recommendations for quoted small and 
medium sized companies, by having only non-executive directors on the audit committee 
and including audit committee members with finance expertise, have more 
comprehensive audits, hence higher audit fees.  The F-statistics of each model in Table 6.4 
are significant at one per cent level, suggesting that the models are statistically valid.  The 
adjusted R2 for all models ranges between 64.4 per cent and 67.4 per cent, indicating that 
each model in this table has a high explanatory power.  The total number of observations 
is 289.  
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Table 6.4 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Influence of Audit Committee Characteristics on Audit Fees for a 
Sample of AIM Companies (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1 
Model 1(n=289) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficients T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.056 -1.419 -.064 -1.567 -.073 -1.799 * -.083 -2.021 ** 
SERVICE -.072 -2.043 ** -.066 -1.821 * -.076 -2.096 ** -.072 -1.959 * 
FINANCE -.012 -.303 -.001 -.020 -.006 -.146 -.010 -.247 
DUALITY .035 .872 .026 .624 .058 1.385 .031 .741 
NED -.001 -.558 -.001 -1.089 .000 -.284 -.001 -1.020 
BIG4 .152 5.686 *** --- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.087 -3.186 *** -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.161 -3.582 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.097 -2.657 *** 
LONDON .082 3.049 *** .057 2.088 ** .073 2.639 *** .051 1.873 * 
BUSYDATE .057 2.166 ** .060 2.173 ** .045 1.665 * .059 2.136 ** 
LAGTIME .299 3.165 *** .271 2.762 *** .335 3.400 *** .270 2.729 *** 
CHANGE -.072 -1.709 * -.063 -1.444 -.048 -1.111 -.061 -1.379 
SUB .011 6.469 *** .011 6.298 *** .011 5.931 *** .011 6.086 *** 
USSUB .068 2.351 ** .076 2.507 ** .074 2.476 ** .076 2.493 ** 
LOGASSET .387 11.937 *** .408 12.219 *** .414 12.550 *** .413 12.335 *** 
ROA -.001 -2.971 *** -.001 -3.158 *** -.001 -2.981 *** -.001 -3.248 *** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.307 *** .002 2.834 *** .002 2.469 ** .002 2.638 *** 
GEARING 3.080E-06 .017 1.544E-05 .084 -1.064E-05 -.058 3.341E-05 .181 
NONAUDIT .007 .848 .008 .876 .012 1.439 .008 .962 
LISTYEAR .001 .300 .002 .484 .002 .518 .002 .504 
BLOCKHOLD .001 .898 .001 1.462 .000 .615 .001 1.213 
NOMAD -.003 -.106 -.008 -.240 -.017 -.531 -.016 -.486 
DUMREV -.050 -1.083 -.054 -1.130 -.062 -1.309 -.066 -1.369 
NOACDIR -.002 -.106 .004 .165 -.009 -.434 .001 .046 
ACEXDIR -.094 -2.160 ** -.109 -2.414 ** -.082 -1.817 * -.102 -2.238 ** 
NOACEXP .039 2.165 ** .047 2.473 ** .038 2.024 ** .047 2.498 ** 
Constant .979 3.119 *** .977 2.966 *** .818 2.533 ** .952 2.873 *** 
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Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining 
company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable 
representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was 
undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited 
by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm 
of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total 
number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = 
percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR 
= number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; NOACDIR = number of audit committee members; ACEXDIR = dummy variable representing company has an 
executive director(s) sitting on the audit committee; NOACEXP = number of audit committee members with financial expertise. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Adjusted R2 .674  .648  .651  .644  
F-test 25.831 ***  23.075 ***  23.408 ***  22.690 ***  
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6.3.2 Additional Tests on Audit Committee Expertise 
Definitions of finance expertise in the audit committee vary.  According to the QCA Audit 
Committee Guide (2009), companies listed on the main market of the London Stock 
Exchange and PLUS-listed companies are required to have at least one member 
‘competent in accounting or auditing’, and the last part of provision C3.1 of the Combined 
Code (2008) requires that at least one member of the audit committee should have ‘recent 
and relevant financial experience’; however, the meaning of ‘competent in accounting or 
auditing’ and ‘recent and relevant financial experience’ is not further defined, hence it is 
the board’s responsibility to make a judgment on the finance expertise based on the size 
and nature of the organization.  Previous studies indicate that different definitions of audit 
committee financial expertise generate different research findings.  Since there is no clear 
definition of financial expertise provided in the UK regulations, in the empirical analysis 
shown in Table 6.4, the SEC (2003) definition is employed, as the most widely-used in this 
area of research.  According to this definition, finance experts include audit committee 
members with recent accounting or auditing experience, financial experience in 
investment banks or merger & acquisition, or managerial/supervisory experience as 
chairman or CEO.    In order to examine whether the results of the positive impact of audit 
committee finance expertise on audit fees in AIM companies persist under different 
definitions, several additional tests were conducted using different definitions and 
methods of measurement of that expertise.   
First, the SEC’s narrow definition of audit committee expertise and the work of DeFond et 
al. (2005) restrict financial expertise to accounting expertise, referring to those members 
with work experience directly related to accounting and auditing, such as certified 
accountants, chief financial officers, controllers and auditors.  In order to test the influence 
of finance expertise thus defined on audit fees, three measurements were employed, with 
one dummy variable representing audit committees containing accounting experts, one 
representing the number of members with accounting expertise, and one representing 
the accounting experts as a proportion of all members of the audit committee.  For each 
measurement, the audit pricing model reported in Table 6.4 was re-run, substituting the 
variable representing the number of finance experts with one of the variables measuring 
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the auditing committee members with accounting expertise.  The regression results are 
shown in Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7.  
Results in the three tables indicate that, with all three measurements, accounting 
expertise in the audit committees of AIM companies has significant positive association 
with audit fees.  These findings support the results in Table 6.4, which show that the 
presence of financial experts on the audit committee, especially if they have recent 
accounting or auditing experience, helps to ensure the audit scope and assists the board 
and audit committee in communicating with external auditors, hence securing the audit 
effort and quality.  It should be noted, however, that Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) 
found opposite results, namely that accounting expertise in the audit committee exerts a 
negative influence on audit costs.  This may suggest that due to differences in regulatory 
regime between the UK and US, the influence of accounting experts on audit committee 
effectiveness and external auditors’ effort are different, and the external auditors place a 
different value on accounting expertise.   
Comparing the three measurements of accounting expertise, the results in Tables 6.5, 6.6, 
and 6.7 indicate that the impact on audit fees of the number of accounting experts and of 
the proportion of accounting experts among the total audit committee membership are 
statistically more significant than that of the presence of accounting experts: in Table 6.5, 
the significance of the dummy variable representing the existence of accounting experts 
is around five to ten per cent level, while in Tables 6.6 and 6.7, the variables representing 
the number and proportion of accounting experts in the audit committee are significant 
at one per cent level.  These findings suggest that for AIM companies, although having at 
least one accounting expert would encourage greater audit effort, the most important 
factors are how many accounting experts actually sit on the audit committee and how 
great their influence is; indeed, it is reasonable to consider that when an audit committee 
has more members or a greater percentage of members with accounting or audit 
experience, these accounting experts would have greater influence on the decision 
making of the audit committee, thus ensuring awareness of audit quality and 
communication and interaction with external auditors.   
The second definition of finance expert employed in the additional tests is restricted to 
qualified chartered accountants.  The reason for using this definition is because chartered 
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accountants definitely have recent accounting and audit related knowledge and 
experience, and will fit the financial competence attributes required by the regulations and 
recommendations.  Similar to the first additional test, three measurements of chartered 
accountant as finance expert on the audit committee of AIM companies were employed: 
one dummy variable to represent audit committees with at least one member qualified as 
a chartered accountant, one variable to represent the number of chartered accountants 
on the audit committee, and one representing the chartered accountants as a proportion 
of all audit committee members.  The additional tests for chartered accountants as finance 
experts also re-run the audit pricing model used in Table 6.4, substituting the variable 
representing the number of finance experts with one variable measuring the presence, 
number or proportion of chartered accountants on the audit committee of AIM companies.  
Tables 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 report the regression results of the influence of chartered 
accountant as a member of the audit committee on audit fees in AIM companies.  All the 
regressions in Tables 6.8-6.10 present very similar findings to those in Tables 6.5-6.7, in that 
with all three measurements in all four models, chartered accountants as finance experts 
in the audit committees of AIM companies are significantly and positively associated with 
audit fees, with statistical significance at one per cent level.  These findings further support 
the impact of good governance practice on audit fees and the importance of including 
members with professional accounting qualifications on the audit committees who have 
better understanding on the importance and process of external audit to improve 
communication between the board and the external auditors and ensure the financial 
reporting quality and audit quality. 
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Table 6.5 Results Of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Influence of Audit Committee Characteristics on Audit Fees for a 
Sample of AIM Companies – Tests on the Presence of Accounting Expertise (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficients T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.050 -1.286 -.057 -1.411 -.067 -1.674 * -.077 -1.875 * 
SERVICE -.069 -1.959 * -.063 -1.716 * -.073 -2.015 ** -.068 -1.857 * 
FINANCE -.014 -.350 -.003 -.067 -.008 -.188 -.013 -.302 
DUALITY .039 .960 .030 .714 .062 1.470 .035 .832 
NED .000 -.202 -.001 -.699 5.236E-05 .050 -.001 -.625 
BIG4 .155 5.796 *** --- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.088 -3.237 *** -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.165 -3.668 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.099 -2.720 *** 
LONDON .087 3.254 *** .063 2.295 ** .078 2.823 *** .057 2.079 ** 
BUSYDATE .059 2.238 ** .062 2.247 ** .047 1.715 * .061 2.213 ** 
LAGTIME .313 3.296 *** .286 2.892 *** .348 3.511 *** .285 2.860 *** 
CHANGE -.071 -1.692 * -.063 -1.423 -.047 -1.091 -.060 -1.359 
SUB .011 6.350 *** .011 6.162 *** .010 5.816 *** .011 5.945 *** 
USSUB .068 2.339 ** .076 2.497 ** .074 2.467 ** .076 2.482 ** 
LOGASSET .391 12.112 *** .414 12.437 *** .419 12.741 *** .419 12.557 *** 
ROA -.001 -3.017 *** -.001 -3.218 *** -.001 -3.027 *** -.002 -3.311 *** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.322 *** .002 2.839 *** .002 2.468 ** .002 2.642 *** 
GEARING -7.276E-06 -.041 4.586E-06 .025 -1.969E-05 -.108 2.285E-05 .124 
NONAUDIT .007 .895 .008 .925 .013 1.487 .009 1.011 
LISTYEAR .001 .269 .002 .440 .002 .478 .002 .460 
BLOCKHOLD .001 .955 .001 1.539 .000 .660 .001 1.285 
NOMAD -.002 -.054 -.006 -.192 -.016 -.497 -.015 -.441 
DUMREV -.052 -1.126 -.057 -1.176 -.064 -1.347 -.069 -1.420 
NOACDIR .005 .268 .013 .607 -.002 -.094 .010 .490 
ACEXDIR -.084 -1.922 * -.098 -2.155 ** -.072 -1.599 -.090 -1.972 ** 
DACCEXP .051 2.037 ** .057 2.179 ** .045 1.739 * .058 2.211 ** 
Constant .889 2.830 *** .874 2.647 *** .732 2.262 ** .848 2.554 ** 
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Adjusted R2 .674  .646  .650  .642  
F-test 25.758 ***  22.903 ***  23.270 ***  22.522 ***  
Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining 
company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable 
representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was 
undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited 
by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm 
of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total 
number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = 
percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR 
= number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; NOACDIR = number of audit committee members; ACEXDIR = dummy variable representing company has an 
executive director(s) sitting on the audit committee; DACCEXP = dummy variable indicating instance where the audit committees had one or more members with accounting experience. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6.6 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Influence of Audit Committee Characteristics on Audit Fees for a 
Sample of AIM Companies – Tests on Number of Accounting Experts (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficients T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.050 -1.292 -.057 -1.415 -.067 -1.685 * -.076 -1.881 * 
SERVICE -.072 -2.055 ** -.066 -1.819 * -.076 -2.112 ** -.072 -1.966 ** 
FINANCE -.018 -.444 -.007 -.171 -.012 -.281 -.017 -.413 
DUALITY .044 1.103 .036 .867 .067 1.611 .041 .987 
NED .000 -.194 -.001 -.685 6.457E-05 .062 -.001 -.612 
BIG4 .152 5.733 *** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.086 -3.190 *** -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.162 -3.640 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.100 -2.754 *** 
LONDON .086 3.231 *** .062 2.276 ** .078 2.814 *** .056 2.066 ** 
BUSYDATE .058 2.234 ** .061 2.240 ** .047 1.727 * .061 2.214 ** 
LAGTIME .314 3.341 *** .288 2.939 *** .350 3.574 *** .287 2.909 *** 
CHANGE -.075 -1.797 * -.067 -1.535 -.051 -1.191 -.065 -1.482 
SUB .011 6.293 *** .011 6.101 *** .010 5.763 *** .010 5.887 *** 
USSUB .068 2.357 ** .075 2.514 ** .074 2.482 ** .075 2.497 ** 
LOGASSET .393 12.265 *** .415 12.599 *** .420 12.880 *** .420 12.718 *** 
ROA -.001 -3.131 *** -.002 -3.337 *** -.001 -3.131 *** -.002 -3.434 *** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.297 *** .002 2.815 *** .002 2.455 ** .002 2.628 *** 
GEARING -9.272E-06 -.053 2.337E-06 .013 -2.314E-05 -.128 2.042E-05 .111 
NONAUDIT .008 .939 .008 .971 .013 1.532 .009 1.053 
LISTYEAR .002 .352 .002 .524 .003 .574 .003 .547 
BLOCKHOLD .001 .831 .001 1.400 .000 .545 .001 1.142 
NOMAD .000 -.009 -.005 -.145 -.014 -.439 -.013 -.386 
DUMREV -.057 -1.234 -.062 -1.288 -.069 -1.456 -.074 -1.537 
NOACDIR .003 .171 .011 .500 -.004 -.190 .008 .382 
ACEXDIR -.085 -1.978 ** -.099 -2.211 ** -.074 -1.643 -.091 -2.031 ** 
NOACCEXP .056 2.847 *** .061 3.013 *** .055 2.726 *** .064 3.117 *** 
Constant .878 2.817 *** .861 2.632 *** .719 2.242 ** .839 2.551 ** 
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Adjusted R2 .678  .652  .656  .648  
F-test 26.300 ***  23.449 ***  23.836 ***  23.123 ***  
Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining 
company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable 
representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was 
undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited 
by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm 
of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total 
number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = 
percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR 
= number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; NOACDIR = number of audit committee members; ACEXDIR = dummy variable representing company has an 
executive director(s) sitting on the audit committee; NOACCEXP = number of audit committee members with accounting experience. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6.7 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Influence of Audit Committee Characteristics on Audit Fees for a 
Sample of AIM Companies – Tests on Proportion of Accounting Experts (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficients T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.053 -1.355 -.060 -1.493 -.070 -1.750 * -.079 -1.953 ** 
SERVICE -.071 -2.035 ** -.066 -1.814 * -.076 -2.105 ** -.072 -1.961 ** 
FINANCE -.016 -.398 -.005 -.131 -.010 -.247 -.015 -.370 
DUALITY .040 .993 .032 .768 .063 1.510 .037 .883 
NED .000 -.182 -.001 -.654 8.332E-05 .080 -.001 -.580 
BIG4 .150 5.597 *** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.084 -3.087 *** -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.160 -3.592 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.098 -2.693 *** 
LONDON .086 3.230 *** .063 2.304 ** .078 2.837 *** .057 2.105 ** 
BUSYDATE .059 2.256 ** .062 2.271 ** .048 1.766 * .062 2.253 ** 
LAGTIME .309 3.281 *** .285 2.900 *** .347 3.532 *** .284 2.874 *** 
CHANGE -.078 -1.852 * -.070 -1.604 -.055 -1.264 -.068 -1.560 
SUB .011 6.346 *** .011 6.156 *** .010 5.822 *** .011 5.952 *** 
USSUB .069 2.377 ** .076 2.535 ** .075 2.500 ** .076 2.519 ** 
LOGASSET .396 12.317 *** .419 12.669 *** .422 12.937 *** .423 12.793 *** 
ROA -.001 -3.167 *** -.002 -3.379 *** -.001 -3.171 *** -.002 -3.478 *** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.314 *** .002 2.842 *** .002 2.492 ** .002 2.666 *** 
GEARING -1.486E-05 -.084 -5.908E-06 -.032 -3.037E-05 -.167 1.089E-05 .059 
NONAUDIT .008 .915 .008 .955 .013 1.507 .009 1.034 
LISTYEAR .001 .297 .002 .479 .002 .531 .002 .504 
BLOCKHOLD .001 .919 .001 1.476 .000 .623 .001 1.227 
NOMAD -.002 -.058 -.006 -.188 -.015 -.470 -.014 -.420 
DUMREV -.052 -1.124 -.056 -1.177 -.064 -1.352 -.068 -1.418 
NOACDIR .013 .630 .021 .996 .006 .272 .019 .909 
ACEXDIR -.086 -1.980 ** -.099 -2.202 ** -.074 -1.644 -.091 -2.026 ** 
PROACCEXP .001 2.468 ** .001 2.799 *** .001 2.548 ** .002 2.962 *** 
Constant .844 2.682 *** .815 2.474 ** .682 2.111 ** .791 2.391 ** 
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Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining 
company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable 
representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was 
undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited 
by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm 
of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total 
number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = 
percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR 
= number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; NOACDIR = number of audit committee members; ACEXDIR = dummy variable representing company has an 
executive director(s) sitting on the audit committee; PROACCEXP = percentage of audit committee members with accounting expertise. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
  
Adjusted R2 .676  .650  .654  .647  
F-test 26.024 ***  23.393 ***  23.715 ***  23.007 ***  
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Table 6.8 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Influence of Audit Committee Characteristics on Audit Fees for a 
Sample of AIM Companies – Tests on Presence of Chartered Accountant (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficients T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.043 -1.114 -.049 -1.218 -.061 -1.522 -.068 -1.692 * 
SERVICE -.063 -1.806 * -.056 -1.550 -.067 -1.867 * -.062 -1.694 * 
FINANCE -.008 -.205 .003 .084 -.002 -.052 -.006 -.152 
DUALITY .043 1.066 .034 .815 .064 1.540 .039 .937 
NED .000 -.462 -.001 -.982 .000 -.201 -.001 -.897 
BIG4 .154 5.801 *** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.091 -3.363 *** -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.156 -3.483 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.098 -2.721 *** 
LONDON .090 3.414 *** .067 2.476 ** .081 2.925 *** .061 2.241 ** 
BUSYDATE .060 2.316 ** .064 2.339 ** .049 1.794 * .063 2.286 ** 
LAGTIME .298 3.192 *** .270 2.770 *** .332 3.399 *** .268 2.736 *** 
CHANGE -.064 -1.540 -.055 -1.274 -.041 -.957 -.053 -1.204 
SUB .011 6.457 *** .011 6.283 *** .010 5.908 *** .011 6.053 *** 
USSUB .069 2.410 ** .077 2.570 ** .076 2.533 ** .077 2.556 ** 
LOGASSET .389 12.155 *** .410 12.464 *** .417 12.776 *** .416 12.597 *** 
ROA -.001 -3.053 *** -.001 -3.255 *** -.001 -3.066 *** -.002 -3.348 *** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.388 *** .002 2.926 *** .002 2.521 ** .002 2.707 *** 
GEARING -4.509E-05 -.257 -3.725E-05 -.204 -5.311E-05 -.292 -1.762E-05 -.096 
NONAUDIT .008 .967 .008 .988 .013 1.539 .009 1.081 
LISTYEAR .001 .226 .002 .390 .002 .447 .002 .407 
BLOCKHOLD .001 1.115 .001 1.716 * .001 .829 .001 1.451 
NOMAD 3.023E-05 .001 -.004 -.124 -.015 -.445 -.013 -.389 
DUMREV -.056 -1.219 -.060 -1.270 -.068 -1.426 -.072 -1.512 
NOACDIR .006 .282 .013 .630 -.001 -.060 .011 .508 
ACEXDIR -.082 -1.917 * -.096 -2.155 ** -.072 -1.610 -.089 -1.971 ** 
DCACCEXP .079 3.145 *** .088 3.359 *** .072 2.717 *** .086 3.255 *** 
Constant .933 3.009 *** .929 2.856 *** .771 2.408 ** .898 2.738 *** 
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Adjusted R2 .680  .654  .655  .649  
F-test 26.545 ***  23.727 ***  23.830 ***  23.234 ***  
Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining 
company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable 
representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was 
undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited 
by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm 
of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total 
number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = 
percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR 
= number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; NOACDIR = number of audit committee members; ACEXDIR = dummy variable representing company has an 
executive director(s) sitting on the audit committee; DCACCEXP = dummy variable representing company whose audit committee has one or more chartered accountants. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6.9 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Influence of Audit Committee Characteristics on Audit Fees for a 
Sample of AIM Companies – Tests on Number of Chartered Accountants (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficients T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.042 -1.104 -.048 -1.208 -.060 -1.504 -.067 -1.675 * 
SERVICE -.067 -1.942 * -.061 -1.696 * -.071 -1.989 ** -.066 -1.835 * 
FINANCE -.012 -.315 -.001 -.036 -.006 -.148 -.011 -.265 
DUALITY .048 1.215 .040 .975 .070 1.685 * .046 1.094 
NED .000 -.495 -.001 -1.009 .000 -.243 -.001 -.928 
BIG4 .151 5.746 *** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.088 -3.313 *** -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.154 -3.468 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.097 -2.696 *** 
LONDON .089 3.399 *** .066 2.463 ** .080 2.929 *** .060 2.236 ** 
BUSYDATE .061 2.341 ** .064 2.361 ** .049 1.831 * .063 2.313 ** 
LAGTIME .294 3.173 *** .266 2.753 *** .328 3.385 *** .265 2.720 *** 
CHANGE -.070 -1.681 * -.061 -1.424 -.046 -1.081 -.059 -1.351 
SUB .011 6.522 *** .011 6.349 *** .010 5.975 *** .011 6.123 *** 
USSUB .071 2.468 ** .078 2.629 *** .077 2.589 *** .078 2.614 *** 
LOGASSET .389 12.255 *** .410 12.568 *** .416 12.863 *** .416 12.696 *** 
ROA -.001 -3.153 *** -.002 -3.358 *** -.001 -3.156 *** -.002 -3.449 *** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.360 *** .002 2.897 *** .002 2.507 ** .002 2.684 *** 
GEARING -3.709E-05 -.214 -2.811E-05 -.156 -4.836E-05 -.268 -9.733E-06 -.053 
NONAUDIT .008 1.022 .009 1.046 .013 1.594 .010 1.137 
LISTYEAR .001 .224 .002 .385 .002 .450 .002 .404 
BLOCKHOLD .001 1.002 .001 1.588 .000 .735 .001 1.331 
NOMAD .003 .083 -.001 -.039 -.012 -.357 -.010 -.299 
DUMREV -.061 -1.339 -.066 -1.395 -.073 -1.545 -.078 -1.634 
NOACDIR .005 .273 .013 .617 -.001 -.069 .010 .496 
ACEXDIR -.089 -2.082 ** -.103 -2.327 ** -.078 -1.756 * -.095 -2.141 ** 
NOCACCEXP .077 3.698 *** .085 3.917 *** .074 3.409 *** .084 3.853 *** 
Constant .942 3.057 *** .938 2.902 *** .782 2.460 ** .908 2.789 *** 
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Adjusted R2 .685  .659  .661  .655  
F-test 27.063 ***  24.239 ***  24.374 ***  23.764 ***  
Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining 
company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable 
representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was 
undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited 
by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm 
of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total 
number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = 
percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR 
= number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; NOACDIR = number of audit committee members; ACEXDIR = dummy variable representing company has an 
executive director(s) sitting on the audit committee; NOCACCEXP = number of audit committee members who are chartered accountants. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6.10 Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Influence of Audit Committee Characteristics on Audit Fees for a 
Sample of AIM Companies – Tests on Proportion of Chartered Accountants (Dependent Variable is log of audit fee) 
Variables1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficients T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 Coefficient T-statistic 2 
RESOURCE -.047 -1.228 -.053 -1.339 -.064 -1.613 -.072 -1.798 * 
SERVICE -.068 -1.960 * -.062 -1.726 * -.072 -2.010 ** -.067 -1.865 * 
FINANCE -.013 -.319 -.002 -.045 -.006 -.156 -.011 -.277 
DUALITY .044 1.107 .037 .880 .066 1.588 .042 .998 
NED .000 -.444 -.001 -.951 .000 -.203 -.001 -.879 
BIG4 .149 5.599 *** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.086 -3.209 *** -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.152 -3.411 *** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.097 -2.699 *** 
LONDON .089 3.375 *** .067 2.472 ** .080 2.932 *** .061 2.259 ** 
BUSYDATE .061 2.337 ** .064 2.366 ** .050 1.844 * .063 2.331 ** 
LAGTIME .288 3.092 *** .260 2.679 *** .322 3.309 *** .258 2.643 *** 
CHANGE -.072 -1.740 * -.064 -1.491 -.049 -1.149 -.062 -1.428 
SUB .011 6.521 *** .011 6.358 *** .011 5.991 *** .011 6.145 *** 
USSUB .071 2.486 ** .079 2.652 *** .077 2.607 *** .079 2.638 *** 
LOGASSET .393 12.339 *** .414 12.670 *** .420 12.942 *** .419 12.792 *** 
ROA -.001 -3.209 *** -.002 -3.422 *** -.001 -3.213 *** -.002 -3.515 *** 
RECEIVABLE .003 3.376 *** .002 2.926 *** .002 2.545 ** .002 2.732 *** 
GEARING -4.408E-05 -.252 -3.862E-05 -.213 -5.693E-05 -.315 -2.126E-05 -.116 
NONAUDIT .008 .952 .008 .980 .013 1.524 .009 1.066 
LISTYEAR .001 .196 .002 .358 .002 .423 .002 .375 
BLOCKHOLD .001 1.121 .001 1.706 * .001 .849 .001 1.456 
NOMAD .000 .011 -.003 -.106 -.013 -.409 -.012 -.352 
DUMREV -.053 -1.161 -.057 -1.211 -.065 -1.380 -.069 -1.453 
NOACDIR .016 .767 .024 1.146 .009 .405 .022 1.037 
ACEXDIR -.088 -2.059 ** -.102 -2.296 ** -.078 -1.739 * -.095 -2.117 ** 
PROCACCEXP .002 3.318 *** .002 3.680 *** .002 3.182 *** .002 3.708 *** 
Constant .900 2.906 *** .889 2.742 *** .744 2.333 ** .864 2.650 *** 
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Adjusted R2 .682  .657  .659  .653  
F-test 26.698 ***  24.012 ***  24.182 ***  23.627 ***  
Note: 
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent and control variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining 
company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; FINANCE = dummy variable representing financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable 
representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was 
undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing 
companies whose audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited 
by a London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm 
of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; SUB = the total 
number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return on assets; RECEIVABLE = 
percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR 
= number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable represent companies have their Nomads as their brokers; 
DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010; NOACDIR = number of audit committee members; ACEXDIR = dummy variable representing company has an 
executive director(s) sitting on the audit committee; PROCACCEXP = percentage of audit committee members who were chartered accountants. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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The findings of the additional tests on audit committee expertise further demonstrate the 
positive impact of audit committee members with recent accounting or auditing 
experience, or professional qualifications in accounting, on enhancing the communication 
with external auditors on audit issues and ensuring a more comprehensive and intensive 
audit, which is reflected by more expensive audit pricing.  These findings also show great 
support for the regulations and recommendations provided to AIM companies (such as 
the QCA Audit Committee Code Guide, 2009) that encourage greater financial expertise, 
especially expertise with accounting related knowledge and experience.  In addition, the 
findings of these tests suggest that higher audit pricing in AIM companies is in fact a 
response to the accounting experts on the audit committee, rather than to the non-
accounting experts 26; hence, in order to enhance the audit committee effectiveness and 
financial reporting quality and ensure the audit quality, it might be useful for AIM 
companies to have more accounting experts with recent accounting or auditing related 
experience on the audit committee especially directors who are qualified as chartered 
accountants, rather than finance experts or supervisory experts.   
Another interestingly finding of the additional audit committee expertise tests is, the 
results of model 3 in each table show that the presence of executive directors on the audit 
committee has no significant impact on the audit fees, which is contrary to the finding in 
Table 6.4.  This might indicate that stronger positive impact of accounting expertise on 
audit fees reduces the negative influence of low audit committee independence, and 
suggests that audit committee with more members with recent accounting or auditing 
experience would help to compensate the reduced effectiveness caused by existence of 
executive directors on the audit committee by showing more influence on supporting 
more intensive audit tests and enhancing requirements on financial reporting quality and 
audit quality.    The results in Table 6.5 – 6.10 also show supportive evidences on the 
influence of different sized auditors on the relationship between audit committee 
expertise and audit fees.  Consistent with results in Table 6.4, in all six tables, model 3 
shows the lowest level of significant and model 2 has the highest level.  This suggests for 
AIM companies audited by mid-tier auditors, audit committees with more accounting 
                                                          
26 I re-ran the tests with variables representing accounting expertise substituted by variables representing 
non-accounting expertise, and none of the regressions showed significant results.   
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expertise or even qualified accountants have more intensive impact on the audit effort 
and quality, while local and national audit firms pay less attention on their clients’ audit 
committee expertise comparing with bigger auditors.  
The F-statistics of each model in Tables 6.5-6.10 are significant at one per cent level, 
suggesting that the models are statistically valid.  The adjusted R2 for all models ranges 
between 64.9 per cent and 68.5 per cent, indicating that each model in this table has a 
high explanatory power.  The total number of observations is 289. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter investigates the impact of various audit committee characteristics on audit 
pricing in AIM companies, focusing mainly on audit committee size, independence and 
expertise. The chapter begins by presenting the descriptive statistics for the reduced 
sample of AIM companies, followed by an explanation of those descriptive statistics based 
on the number of years a company has been listed on AIM, and based on industry.  For the 
whole sample, the mean and median values of the number of audit committee members 
are 2.69 and 3.00, with the largest audit committee containing 6 members and the smallest 
only 1 director.  The descriptive statistics of the audit committee independence variable 
indicate that 11 per cent of the sampled AIM companies have executive directors sitting on 
the audit committee, and in terms of expertise, on average each audit committee has 1.26 
finance experts.  The chapter then presents the results of the bivariate correlations among 
the variables used in the AIM audit pricing model and the audit committee characteristics.  
These results show that audit committee size and the level of audit committee expertise 
are significantly positively correlated with audit fees in AIM companies.  Finally, the results 
of multivariate regressions are presented to explain the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on audit pricing in AIM companies.  In summary, the empirical findings 
reported highlight broadly consistent evidence that the presence of an executive director 
on the audit committee has a significant and negative impact on audit fees, while the 
presence of greater financial expertise has a positive impact.  The link between reduced 
audit committee independence and lower audit fees is consistent with the notion that a 
lack of independence serves to reduce the extent of audit intensity, resulting in a lower 
quality audit (Abbott et al., 2003a; Zaman et al., 2011).  The positive impact of expertise on 
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audit fees is consistent with greater expertise ensuring that audits are more 
comprehensive, resulting in a higher quality and more expensive audit (Abbott et al., 2003a; 
Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009).  These findings are consistent with the impact of good 
governance practice on audit fees and provide support to regulations and 
recommendations that encourage greater audit committee independence and expertise 
in AIM companies.  For further examination of the influence of finance expertise according 
to different definitions on audit pricing, several additional tests were conducted, with 
variables measuring accounting expertise and qualified chartered accountant status on 
the audit committee.  The findings indicate that finance expertise under all definitions 
shows a positive and significant impact on audit fees, which further supports the 
importance of audit committee expertise for audit intensity and audit quality, based on 
the argument that more expensive audits equal more audit time and effort.  Hence, for 
AIM companies, following the recommendations (such as the QCA Audit Committee Code 
2009) and establishing audit committees consisting of non-executive directors with 
finance expertise, especially recent accounting or auditing experience or qualified 
chartered accountant status, would help to improve the connection and communication 
with external auditor, and enhance the financial reporting quality and audit quality. 
Table 6.11 Summary of Hypotheses II 
Factors  Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Findings1,2 
Audit committee 
size Number of Audit Committee directors 
+ N 
Audit committee 
independence 
Existence of executive director(s) on the 
audit committee 
- - 
Audit committee 
expertise  
 
Financial expertise on the audit committee + + 
Accounting expertise on the audit 
committee 
+ ++ 
Chartered accountant on the audit 
committee members who are chartered 
accountants 
+ ++ 
Note:   
 1 N indicates the factor shows no significant impact on audit fees. 
2 ++ indicates the accounting expertise and chartered accountant on the audit committee has more 
significant impact on the audit fees for AIM companies. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
In the thirty-five years since Simunic (1980) developed the original model to investigate the 
determinants of audit fees in the US audit market, a significant literature has grown up 
seeking to explain the determinants of audit pricing with expanded models applied to a range 
of countries worldwide.  These audit pricing studies explore the audit markets in different 
countries, examine the relationship between companies and audit firms, and provide both 
audit clients and auditors with an objective benchmark for fees negotiation.  The existing 
literature focuses predominantly on audit pricing in the context of large listed companies, 
while very few studies have studied the fee determinants of the smaller company market.    
The research on the audit pricing of large listed companies is facing substantial issues 
including high auditor concentration and high homogeneity in terms of internal governance, 
which gives less opportunity to study the actual influential factors on audit pricing issue.  In 
order to have better understanding of the audit pricing setting, it is important to study 
companies in a less concentrated audit market, with more audit choice, and having different 
board structure and audit committee characteristics to find out how would these factors 
influence the audit pricing.  Given the growth in size and economic influence, it is important 
to investigate the audit market for small and medium sized listed companies, to examine the 
supply and demand relationship between these companies and external auditors as well as 
the relationship between the companies’ governance practices and the external monitoring 
provided by auditors, in order to discover implications for policy to improve the audit quality 
for SMEs, and to provide evidence and suggestions on governance practices of less regulated 
companies and how to improve the relationship with external monitoring by auditors.   
Because financing capital is one of the key obstacles faced by SMEs, in 1995 the London Stock 
Exchange launched a secondary market, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), to provide 
a platform for small and medium sized British companies seeking equity capital for expansion.  
The aim of the new market was to allow small and fast-growing companies to raise new capital, 
to allow their shares to be traded widely, and to allow their owner/managers to liquidate some 
of their shareholdings.  The relaxed admission rules and reduced regulation have proven 
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attractive, with in excess of 1,000 companies currently listed on AIM, making it a very 
significant part of the UK quoted companies sector.  However, despite AIM’s growing 
importance, there has been relatively little academic attention focused on AIM companies, 
especially in the field of audit market and audit pricing.  In order to address this gap, this study 
investigates the determinants of audit fees for companies listed on AIM and provides 
previously unreported evidence on how auditors price the audits of AIM companies.   
Examining the determinants of audit fees for AIM companies provides an opportunity to 
understand more about AIM and its participants, which is important in its own right.  
Moreover, the lighter regulation of AIM companies, in particular the absence of specific 
reporting requirements, and the potentially more entrepreneurial environment, make the 
study of audit pricing for AIM companies especially interesting and important.  As a junior 
market with sufficient variation of auditor choice, AIM offers a great opportunity to study the 
operation of the audit market and its regulation, and the development of second-tier and 
local/regional audit firms.  Therefore, even though this study is primarily focused on AIM 
companies, the richness of audit client and auditor characteristics is capable of informing our 
understanding of audit pricing more broadly. 
In recent years, researchers starts to study the companies’ corporate governance practices 
and discusses how this influence the audit pricing strategy, but till now most studies only 
focus on large fully-listed companies who either have to follow detailed regulations on 
corporate governance (i.e. SOX in the U.S.) or need to comply with the regulations or explain 
why not follow (i.e. the Code in the UK).  Since AIM is a junior market and the companies listed 
are small and medium sized, they do not need to comply with the UK Corporate Governance 
Code or explain why they choose not to.  Hence, AIM companies present great variety of 
governance practices.  In 2009, the Quoted Companies Alliance, a non-profit organization 
works for small and mid-sized companies, issued Corporate Governance Guidelines For Smaller 
Quoted Companies (2009) and Audit Committee Guide for Smaller Quoted Companies (2009) to 
provide recommendations on the governance practices for AIM companies.  This provides an 
opportunity to study how different governance practices influence the companies’ financial 
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reporting quality with the proxy of audit fees, and provide evidences for the development of 
future governance practices recommendations for small and medium-sized companies.  
This study investigates the influence of a range of factors on audit fees in the context of a 
sample of companies listed on AIM in the 2009/2010 financial year. In undertaking the 
empirical analysis, this study follows prior research on the determinants of audit pricing in 
large listed companies, whilst also taking into account AIM-specific features and recent 
literature on the impact of corporate governance characteristics on audit fees.  Specifically, 
this study focuses the analysis on the impact of different sized auditors and audit specialism, 
as well as governance issues including board independence and leadership, Nomad 
involvement and specialism, and audit committee effectiveness on audit fees.   
The results of the empirical analysis reveal that most of the explanatory variables used in the 
studies of fully-listed companies still show significant impact on audit pricing for AIM 
companies.  In terms of audit client characteristics, the findings of this study show that audit 
fees for AIM companies are positively influenced by audit client size, the number of 
subsidiaries, the proportion of assets in the form of receivables and the presence of a US 
subsidiary; and the financial performance of AIM companies shows a negative impact on audit 
fees.  All these findings indicate that similar to companies listed in the main market, AIM 
companies with larger size, greater complexity, and higher audit risk pay higher fees for the 
external auditing service, since these companies require more time and effort to audit, or 
auditors charge a fee premium as insurance for higher liability exposure (Simunic, 1980; 
Simunic and Stein, 1996).  When considering AIM-specific explanatory variables related to 
audit risk, only companies reporting no revenue show a significant negative influence on audit 
pricing, which is counter-intuitive to the hypothesis since companies with no revenue usually 
indicate higher audit risk, which should result in higher audit fees.  One possible explanation 
for this finding is that the audit fee adjustment for audit risk is due to increased audit time and 
effort, rather than a simple fee premium (Bell et al., 2001), so the reduction of time and effort 
for auditors due to lack of revenue outweighs the increase of audit input due to higher audit 
risk arising from potential financial failure.  The analyses of large and small AIM companies 
based on total assets and market capitalization indicate that, on average, larger firms pay 
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significantly higher audit fees compared to smaller firms, and the determinant factors in the 
audit pricing models of large and small AIM companies are different.   
With regard to engagement attributes, the results of this study show that the audit fees for 
AIM companies are positively influenced by the length of time between the company’s 
financial year-end and the signing date of the audit report, audits undertaken during the audit 
busy period, and the joint provision of non-audit services; while qualified or modified audit 
opinion does not show a consistent and significant impact on audit fees paid by AIM 
companies.  Hence, in common with larger companies listed in the main market (e.g. 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Knechel and Payne, 2001), AIM companies with longer audit report lag might 
require incremental auditing with extra time and effort or might be audited by less 
experienced auditors, with consequently higher audit fees; while AIM companies that have 
their financial year end on 31st December would have their annual reports audited during the 
UK audit busy season (from 31st December to 31st March) and pay higher audit fees due to the 
higher workload of the auditors.  Moreover, the results of this study also provide supportive 
evidence for the positive impact of the provision of non-audit services on audit fees, which 
indicates that, rather than being explained by ‘knowledge spillover’ hypothesis (Whisenant et 
al., 2003) or ‘loss leader’ argument (Ahmad et al., 2006), whereby higher non-audit fees could 
result in lower audit fees, larger non-audit fees could be a sign that extra audit effort is 
required or that there is a higher litigation risk due to the extra consultancy requirements or 
they could be an indicator of higher overall audit remuneration or better reputation of audit 
firms, which would lead to higher audit fees.  However, the insignificant results on the 
influence of modified audit opinion on audit fees of AIM companies follows the findings of 
the majority of studies in fully-listed companies after 1990 (Hay et al., 2006) while I find 
qualified audit report leads to higher audit fees.   
With regard to the competitiveness of the audit market, the results of this study show that 
London-based auditors have a significantly positive influence on audit fees for AIM companies, 
which in common with previous studies provides evidence for the higher operating costs of 
London-based offices and the more costly and greater expertise of individuals and audit 
teams.  However, this study failed to find supportive evidence for the existence of a ‘low 
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balling’ strategy, since there is no consistent significant relationship between change of 
auditors and audit fees for AIM companies.  As one key finding of this research, this study 
indicate that Big 4 auditors charge a fee premium for their services and the use of small audit 
firms has a significant and negative impact on audit fees.  This is also consistent with Peel and 
Roberts’ (2003) finding that in a market with relatively low auditor concentration and higher 
audit competition, both Big 4 and mid-tier auditors charge a fee premium compared with local 
and national audit firms, which indicates that companies are willing to pay higher fees for 
differential auditing; while compared with Big 4 auditors, mid-tier auditors charge relatively 
lower fees for their audit services, which provides AIM companies with the opportunity to 
choose an audit firm offering relatively high quality auditing at a moderate price.  This could 
explain the lower degree of Big 4 auditor domination in AIM, since for small and medium sized 
companies, the economic benefits of acquiring an audit from reputable accounting firms such 
as the Big 4 are insufficient to outweigh the costs and the attractions of mid-tier auditors.  The 
results of auditor size sub-samples also show significant differences in the explanatory factors 
between AIM companies audited by Big 4, mid-tier and small auditors: apart from audit client 
size and complexity, different sized auditors emphasize different factors.  Meanwhile, the 
investigation of audit specialist in the market reveals that the use of auditor with more AIM 
clients has a positive impact on the audit fee. This finding is consistent with previous studies 
examining the fully-listed companies (Francis et al., 2005; Carson, 2009) and indicates that 
AIM companies are willing to pay higher fees for the auditing services provided by auditors 
with more experience in the market.  This might be because the AIM companies believe that 
these auditors are more capable of solving specific issues related to small and medium sized 
companies and better able to ensure high audit quality and financial reporting quality, since 
the top 9 auditors in the AIM specialist list (based on number of AIM clients) are Big 4 and 
mid-tier auditors.  However, when examining the influence of audit undertaken by Grant 
Thornton, the market leader in AIM with the greatest number of clients, on the audit fees for 
AIM companies, the results show a significant and negative impact.  This finding is inconsistent 
with previous studies on market or industry leadership (DeFond et al., 2000; Ferguson et al., 
2003), while the unique feature in this study is that the market audit specialist is a non-Big 4 
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auditor.  Since Grant Thornton holds the dominant position in AIM (with over 15% of AIM 
companies as clients, 3% higher than its closest competitor), its experience and knowledge of 
the market might contribute to reducing the overall audit time and effort required by its 
skilled individuals and audit teams.  Moreover, the comparison between clients of Grant 
Thornton and clients of other auditors confirms the finding that Grant Thornton places 
significantly different emphasis on the influential factors of audit fees.  This study documents 
that Grant Thornton’s audit pricing strategy is strongly influenced by audit client size, audit 
risk, London-based offices, board leadership and blockholder shareholding, a set of factors 
significantly different from those influencing other auditors.  This suggest that as the market 
leader, Grant Thornton has more knowledge and experience staff on auditing companies 
listed on AIM which allows it avoiding charging clients higher fees for the clients’ being 
complex to audit or clients’ taking the auditing services during the busy period or having 
longer audit time lag; however, Grant Thornton cares more about its reputation and potential 
litigation exposure hence pay more attention on the clients who have higher audit risk and 
charge them higher fees for extra tests or assurance.  Meanwhile, Grant Thornton also reward 
AIM clients with better governance practices and stronger internal and external monitoring 
and believes that these companies would have better financial reporting quality which would 
save the time and effort for external audit hence reducing the audit fees.  The special pricing 
strategy of Grant Thornton and its experiences and expertise in auditing small and mid-sized 
companies then become its competitive advantages in the market for providing differential 
product.  
With reference to board characteristics, this study finds no evidence that audit fees are 
significantly influenced by board independence or leadership, which is consistent with 
O’Sullivan (1999) and Peel and Clatworthy (2001).  This finding indicates that for AIM 
companies, the auditors’ pricing decision is not significantly influenced by companies’ board 
characteristics in the form of board independence or leadership, which might be because 
auditors are fully aware of the AIM companies’ freedom as regards board structure, hence 
pay less attention to its influence in the internal control.  Similarly, consistent with O’Sullivan 
(2000), this research finds no supportive evidence for the notion that blockholder ownership 
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influences audit fees.  This finding suggests that unlike in the large companies listed in the 
main market where large shareholdings play a significant role in monitoring the financial 
report quality and internal control, in AIM companies the large shareholders may have less 
influence on management or pay less attention in enhancing internal control  through 
monitoring external audit services.  This might be because, given that the majority of AIM 
companies are small and medium sized, the investment is not large enough for shareholders 
to pay attention to the firm; or it may be that when large shareholders invest in AIM 
companies, they focus more on the growth opportunities and the companies’ strategic 
direction and are willing to take a high level of risk, so it is less important for the AIM 
companies to improve the quality of financial reporting and auditing for attracting the 
attention of such investors.   
Turning to the unique internal governance mechanism of AIM companies, the nominated 
advisor characteristics show different impacts on audit fees - Nomad also acting as broker has 
no influence, but the use of Nomad with higher market share shows a significant and negative 
association with audit fees.  This may indicate that as a common phenomenon (78 per cent of 
the AIM companies in the sample have their Nomad company as their broker), whether or not 
the nominated advisor also acts as broker has no significant influence on their monitoring role.  
However, nominated advisors with larger market share in AIM might have greater 
involvement in their clients’ selection of external auditors to reduce the auditing cost, or they 
might pay more attention to improving the effectiveness of monitoring the clients’ financial 
reporting quality and internal control hence reduce the audit risk; or they might use other 
methods to monitor the clients’ managerial actions rather than increasing the audit effort.   
The empirical analysis of this study also examines the impact of various audit committee 
characteristics on audit pricing in AIM companies.  Due to incomplete information disclosure, 
a reduced sample of 319 companies with adequate information on audit committee size, 
independence and expertise is used.  This study finds no significant relationship between the 
size of audit committee and audit fees of AIM companies.  This is consistent with the 
argument of Chan et al. (2013) that the influence of audit committee size is subject to firm size 
– it would be more significant in large companies that have bigger audit committees (Vafeas 
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and Waegelein, 2007; Adelopo et al., 2012), but not in smaller and medium sized companies 
listed on AIM.  The results of this study consistently indicate that in AIM companies, the 
presence of an executive director on the audit committee has a significant and negative 
impact on audit fees.  Since executive director sitting on the audit committee is a sign of less 
independence, this result could be interpreted as indicating that AIM companies with more 
independent audit committees pay higher audit fees.  This finding is consistent with the 
argument that a more independent audit committee has greater incentive to ensure high 
audit quality in order to protect reputational capital and reduce litigation risk, which would 
lead to greater audit effort hence higher audit fees (Abbott et al., 2003a; Gul and Goodwin, 
2010; Zaman et al., 2011), while when there is an executive director sitting on the board, the 
audit committee could be less supportive of an auditor’s requirement for extra testing, or 
more concerned about the cost of external auditing, which would lead to lower fees.  This 
study also shows that a higher level of financial expertise, regardless of definition, has a 
positive impact on audit fees, which indicates that in AIM companies, audit committee 
members with financial expertise are more likely to understand the importance of external 
auditing, be more supportive of the auditor’s judgement, and enhance the communication 
and discussion of financial reporting issues with external auditors in order to improve the 
audit quality and financial reporting quality (Abbott et al., 2003a; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009).    
It is noteworthy that in terms of internal governance factors, this study finds evidence that 
only nominated advisor and audit committee characteristics have significant impact on audit 
fees.  This suggests that in AIM companies, the control and monitoring of financial reporting 
quality and audit quality are undertaken predominantly by the audit committee rather than 
the board, and an effective audit committee with more independence and financial expertise 
would be likely to ensure a high level of financial reporting quality and audit assurance, hence 
increase the audit effort.  Meanwhile, with large shareholders failing to impact on audit fees, 
nominated advisors with higher market share in AIM tend to carry out the monitoring function 
to improve internal control and reporting practices within their AIM clients in order to reduce 
litigation risk, and this would lead to reduced level of audit work.  
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This study contributes to the literature by investigating the audit fee model for companies 
listed in the Alternative Investment Market in the UK.  Studying AIM companies’ audit pricing 
setting not only allow us to have better understanding of the market and the small and 
medium sized listed companies in the UK, it also fills the gap of audit pricing research with 
companies in a less concentrated audit market, with more auditor selective power, under 
more relaxed external regulatory regime, and with greater diversity in internal governance 
practices.  Due to the change in the audit market and the governance regulations, it is difficult 
to examine related factors in the audit pricing settings.  As expected, most of the influential 
factors examined in the fully-listed companies also determine the audit pricing of AIM 
companies.  The results provide evidence that AIM companies do have the selective power 
for diverse audit products with distinct pricing provided by different sized auditors.  For 
example, some AIM companies are willing to pay fee premium for Big 4 auditors for their 
reputation and signaling benefit (Peel and Roberts, 2003), and for other companies who are 
not willing to pay significant fee premium for Big 4 auditors could choose mid-tier auditors for 
good quality audit with less cost.  Moreover, the market specialist of AIM is a mid-tier auditor 
– Grant Thornton, who actually charge significantly lower fees with different audit pricing 
strategy.  The success of Grant Thornton and other mid-tier auditors in AIM may provide 
suggestions for policy makers on how to increase the competition in the audit market.  In 
addition to government’s tax or other incentives to encourage the development of mid-tier 
auditors (McMeeking, 2007), the mid-tier auditors would create their specialism in some 
particular sub-market or industry and develop competitive advantage to attract independent 
companies that either are not willing to pay additional fee premium after analyzing the costs 
and benefits from different auditors, or require auditors with knowledge and skills on the sub-
market or industry.  With the cost benefits and differential audit products, mid-tier auditors 
might be able to gain market share from clients switching from Big 4 as well as reputation in 
a market or industry (Peel, 2013).  Meanwhile, the regulatory bodies could conduct further 
research on the development of Grant Thornton in AIM – how it managed to obtain the 
market share and secure so many clients in AIM, which might be able to provide further 
evidences on how to introduce proper intervention to the UK audit market and increase the 
259 
 
competitive advantage of other mid-tier and small auditors.  Furthermore, the impact of 
Nominated advisor on audit fees extends the importance roles played by the reputation of 
Nomad from regulating the IPO process and extending the survival times for AIM companies 
(Espenlaub et al., 2012) to monitoring the internal control of its clients and reducing the 
external audit costs.  Hence, this study provides further evidence on the function of Nomad 
system and the reputation of Nomads as well as the economic benefits Nomads could provide 
to the AIM companies.  Our results have important implications for the regulators to improve 
the regulatory system of AIM, also suggest that it is important for AIM companies and the 
investors pay attention to the reputation of the Nomad during the entire period the 
companies’ listed on the market.  The results of this study also provide evidences on how the 
governance practices of AIM companies influence on the audit fees and help the AIM 
companies have better understanding of the importance of internal and external control and 
governance practices.  This study provides supportive evidence to the QCA Guideline (2009, 
2013) and the QCA Audit Committee Guide (2009) that independent audit committees and 
audit committee members with financial expertise would enhance the external monitor from 
auditors and improve the financial reporting quality and audit quality.  Further considerations 
would need to be borne in mind by regulators on demonstrating the definition of financial 
expertise in the audit committees and emphasizing the importance of financial expertise with 
recent accounting and auditing experience and knowledge as developing the corporate 
governance guidelines in the future.  For academic, the finding of this study provides 
comprehensive evidences for the moderation of audit pricing model and supportive empirical 
results for the audit pricing literature.  For managers, this study provides evidences that unlike 
large listed companies, managers in AIM companies could choose different sized auditors 
base on their own requirements and some mid-tier auditors could provide audit services that 
suitable for them with lower price.  The findings of this study also provide the mid-tier and 
small auditor firms evidences on how to improve their market share.  For policy makers, the 
findings provide evidences with audit pricing setting in a less concentrated audit market with 
a mid-tier audit firm having the largest number of client, which would hopefully help them 
figure out how to increase audit market competitiveness and reduce concentration.  The 
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results related to the internal and external governance also suggest a different regulatory 
system for corporate governance practices and its relationship with external auditors.  The 
findings suggest the scholars and policy makers to revisit the function of the board and audit 
committee in terms of financial reporting quality, and provides evidences on how to improve 
the effectiveness of audit committee and improve its function as the bridge between the 
board and the external auditor.  
7.1 Research Limitations and Future Study 
This study has undertaken a comprehensive study of audit pricing in AIM companies, however, 
there are a number of limitations that need to be considered, and significant opportunities 
exist for further research.  First, unlike studies of larger companies where information is 
properly disclosed and secondary data is relatively easy to collect (e.g. from databases), the 
study of AIM firms is considerably more problematic.  An obvious limitation of this study is the 
short time frame used in the observation, with only one year’s data (2009/2010 financial year) 
collected.  Hence, it cannot be stated with confidence that the results will generalize to the 
panel data analysis.  However, the detail and richness of the data collected ensure the veracity 
of the findings in this study and provide some interesting evidence on the competitiveness of 
the small and medium sized audit sub-market and the determinants of audit pricing in AIM, 
such as that fewer than half of the AIM companies choose Big 4 accounting firms as their 
external auditors, which based on the study findings might relate to the lower audit fees and 
relatively good audit quality provided by mid-tier auditors, while Grant Thornton, a second-
tier auditor, owns the largest number of clients in AIM and charges lower audit fees compared 
with its competitors.  Therefore, further research should be undertaken in a longitudinal study 
to investigate the issues related to auditor selection for AIM companies, to understand the 
reasons for and impact of the relatively low representation of Big 4 auditors and the 
popularity of mid-tier and smaller auditors, and to investigate the change of this audit market 
with the change of auditors, especially the direction of the change and the reasons behind 
audit change.    
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Secondly, since this study relies heavily on publicly available data, including information in the 
companies’ annual reports and various databases, due to the relaxed disclosure requirements 
in AIM, especially for corporate governance related information, some data are incomplete, 
and it is therefore necessary to exclude certain variables from the study, such as audit 
committee diligence and directors’ ownership.  Moreover, the lack of internal information 
about the audit process might mean that some important factors that influence the audit 
pricing decision are omitted from the empirical models. For example, some literature finds 
that there is a significant association between audit hours and audit fees (Caramanis and 
Lennox, 2008), and some research has studied the impact of internal audit on audit fees (e.g. 
Goodwin-Stewait and Kent, 2006).  The variables omitted from this study may link with 
influential factors of audit fees, and it is difficult to compensate for this weakness.  
Thirdly, some scholars suggest a non-liner audit pricing relationship.  For example, Chan et al. 
(1993) suggest that the relationship between audit client size and audit fees is likely to be non-
linear due to the economies of scale in the auditor’s production function and the possibility 
that big companies having more sophisticated internal control procedures and efficient 
internal governance.  Using Australian data, Carsons et al. (2004) find evidence of non-linear 
relationship between audit client size and audit fees.  Hay et al. (2006) also indicate that the 
relationship between profitability and audit fees may not be linear because the loss dummy 
may not be the appropriate threshold to reflect the point when the auditors begin to perceive 
increased risk, and the change in ROA in different situation may have different impact for the 
company.  In this study, I used residuals analysis and Q-Q plot analysis to test the 
homoscedasticity and linearity of the variables.  Other research indicates that a single-
equation model may not be appropriate when there is endogeneity issue among variables.  
Following Whisenant et al. (2003), I applied the two stage least square model to correct the 
endogeneity issue between audit fees and non-audit services.  While other studies suggest 
that endogeneity issue may also exist between audit fees and other governance or control 
variables (Hay et al., 2006).  Therefore, these econometrical issues should be addressed in 
future research.  
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Fourthly, although in this study I separately tested the financial and non-financial companies 
with the AIM audit pricing model and found the results hold with non-financial companies but 
the financial sector27 , this study did not further design distinctive audit pricing model for 
financial industry.  Since financial sector normally has different regulatory requirements on 
financial reporting, it is reasonable to expect a different audit pricing model for finance sector 
from other industries.  Moreover, the results in this study show consistent evidences that 
service companies pay significantly lower audit fees, while I did not investigate the differences 
between different industries in terms of audit pricing setting.  Hence, future studies could 
separately test the audit pricing models for financial and non-financial companies, as well as 
detailed sectors within in the non-financial industries with the consideration of their 
distinctive industrial factors, financial reporting regulations as well as governance 
requirements.     
Finally, use of the regression-based approach and publicly available data to investigate the 
determinants of audit fees has been criticized because, as noted by Humphrey (2008), it is 
difficult to understand how auditors actually price an audit and how those determinant 
factors influence the audit pricing strategy if no insights are obtained from the real 
practitioners.  While these limitations are acknowledged, they do not detract from the 
strength of this research and the importance of its findings.  For future research, more 
qualitative research methods may help shed light on these concerns, and obtaining insights 
from practitioners would crystalize our understanding of auditors’ pricing decisions and 
reveal the omitted factors that they consider to have important impact on audit fees in AIM 
companies.   
From a public policy perspective, the findings of this study regarding the influence of 
governance practices, especially audit committee characteristics, should provide evidence to 
governance regulators as to the positive impact of a range of audit committee characteristics 
on the audit fees in AIM companies.  Since in many studies audit fee is considered as a proxy 
of external audit quality, under the assumption that higher audit fee indicates extensive audit 
                                                          
27 The results for financial and non-financial companies are shown in Appendix 1a and 1b.  
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hence results in better audit quality (O’Sullivan, 2000; Abbott et al., 2003a; Zaman et al., 2011), 
further research could fully explore whether the effectiveness of audit committees in AIM 
companies really influences financial reporting quality, using other measurements to 
represent the evidence of better financial reporting quality, such as earnings quality.    
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1a: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – Non-financial companies 
Variables1 
Model 1 (N=352) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 
RESOURCE -.035 .363 -.042 -1.073 -.053 -1.384 -.054 -1.391 
SERVICE -.061 -1.912* -.063 -1.903* -.069 -2.167** -.067 -2.054** 
DUALITY -.013 -.319 -.016 -.380 .003 .080 -.020 -.494 
NED -.001 -.693 -.001 -.586 .000 -.436 -.001 -.587 
BIG4 .133 4.625*** --- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.030 -1.104 -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.167 -4.424*** -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.109 -3.123*** 
LONDON .088 3.100*** .058 2.018** .087 3.031*** .053 1.877* 
BUSYDATE .049 1.821* .044 1.593 .039 1.451 .049 1.785* 
LAGTIME .250 2.740*** .247 2.614*** .292 3.178*** .223 2.383** 
CHANGE -.063 -1.478 -.047 -1.077 -.041 -.958 -.050 -1.165 
SUB .010 5.206*** .010 4.928*** .009 4.804*** .010 4.966*** 
USSUB .071 2.500** .071 2.421** .073 2.562** .069 2.371** 
LOGASSET .395 12.212*** .433 13.414*** .413 13.052*** .432 13.648*** 
ROA -.001 -3.208*** -.002 -3.643*** -.001 -3.143*** -.002 -3.735*** 
RECEIVABLE .003 2.832*** .003 2.649*** .002 2.334** .003 2.719*** 
GEARING -5.203E-05 -.268 -5.508E-05 -.275 -6.603E-05 -.339 -1.434E-05 -.072 
NONAUDIT .007 .815 .010 1.109 .013 1.483 .009 .971 
LISTYEAR -.003 -.573 -.001 -.319 -.002 -.466 -.001 -.322 
BLOCKHOLD 6.099-05 .097 .000 .471 -8.824E-05 -.139 .000 .451 
NOMAD .006 .171 .001 .034 -.006 -.183 -.004 -.107 
DUMREV -.063 -1.432 -.067 -1.481 -.054 -1.221 -.072 -1.613 
Constant 1.095 3.442*** .875 2.677*** .962 3.056*** .954 2.975*** 
Adjusted R2 .589  .564  .586  .574  
F-test 26.103***  23.662***  25.883***  24.695  
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Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent variables: RESOURCE = dummy variable representing exploration or mining 
company; SERVICE = dummy variable representing non-financial services company; DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also serves as CEO; NED 
= non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit firm; MIDTIER = 
dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was 
undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a London 
based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural logarithm 
of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor in 2010; 
SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = return 
on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = the natural 
logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy variable 
representing companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 1b: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for a Sample of AIM 
Companies – Financial companies 
Variables1 
Model 1 (N=68) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 Coefficient T-statistic2 
DUALITY .017 .188 -.025 -.278 .006 .065 -.033 -.366 
NED .002 1.086 .002 1.179 .002 1.190 .002 1.171 
BIG4 .149 2.293** --- -- -- -- -- -- 
MID-TIER -- -- -.080 -1.173 -- -- -- -- 
SMALL -- -- -- -- -.150 -1.540 -- -- 
GT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.075 -.729 
LONDON .062 1.028 .068 1.080 .080 1.293 .057 .824 
BUSYDATE .089 1.240 .087 1.163 .106 1.437 .096 1.284 
LAGTIME .099 .337 .110 .362 .166 .553 .125 .406 
CHANGE -.119 -1.032 -.118 -.976 -.069 -.578 -.106 -.873 
SUB .007 2.194** .005 1.722* .006 2.017** .005 1.567 
USSUB .128 1.476 .156 1.752* .146 1.652 .169 1.885 
LOGASSET .294 4.555*** .318 4.834*** .324 5.052*** .325 4.884*** 
ROA -.002 -1.068 -.002 -.850 -.003 -1.464 -.002 -1.041 
RECEIVABLE .001 .474 .000 .191 .000 .255 -3.247E-05 -.018 
GEARING .000 -.360 .000 -.179 .000 -.442 .000 -.213 
NONAUDIT .044 2.798*** .041 2.536** .044 2.718*** .042 2.564** 
LISTYEAR .001 .128 -.002 -.223 -6.209E-05 -.006 -.002 -.154 
BLOCKHOLD .001 .403 .001 .451 .001 .328 .001 .433 
NOMAD .035 .477 .006 .082 .013 .175 -.001 -.015 
DUMREV -.342 -1.372 -.349 -1.339 -.428 -1.673 -.383 -1.475 
Constant 1.908 2.436** 1.848 2.241** 1.647 2.072** 1.766 2.124** 
Adjusted R2 .622  .593  .601  .586  
F-test 7.133***  6.428***  6.609***  6.274***  
Note:  
1 Definitions of variables: Dependent variable: the natural logarithm of audit fee; Independent variables: DUALITY = dummy variable representing company has chairman also 
serves as CEO; NED = non-executive director as a proportion of all directors; BIG 4 = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Big 4 audit 
firm; MIDTIER = dummy variable representing companies whose audit was undertaken by a Mid-tier audit firm; SMALL = dummy variable representing companies whose 
audit was undertaken by a small audit firm; GT = dummy variable if the company is audited by Grant Thornton; LONDON = dummy variable representing firms audited by a 
London based auditor; BUSYDATE = dummy variable representing company whose financial year end is between December and March (inclusive); LAGTIME = the natural 
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logarithm of number of days between company’s financial year end and the signed date of audit report; CHANGE = dummy variable representing companies changed auditor 
in 2010; SUB = the total number of subsidiaries; USSUB = dummy variable representing companies have US subsidiary; LOGASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA 
= return on assets; RECEIVABLE = percentage of total assets represented by receivables; GEARING = percentage of total assets represented by total liabilities; NONAUDIT = 
the natural logarithm of non-audit fee; LISTYEAR = number of years company admitted to AIM; BLOCKHOLD = percentage of blockholder ownership; NOMAD = dummy 
variable representing companies have their Nomads as their brokers; DUMREV = dummy variable representing company has no revenue in 2010. 
2 *, ** and *** denote statistically significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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